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---“[Juries] will introduce into their verdicts a certain amount--a very large amount, so far as I
have observed--of popular prejudice, and thus keep the administration of the law in accord with
the wishes and the feelings of the community.” Oliver Wendell Holmes (238, 1920)
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Abstract

During the ratification debates the Federalists and Anti-federalists contested the merits of
the civil jury. The Anti-federalists, preferring strong local government, argued that civil juries
empowered communities to settle disputes themselves based on local standards. On the other
hand, Federalists maintained that civil juries were outmoded and produced inconsistent
applications of the law from one locale to another, jeopardizing the rule of law. Although the
ratification debates ultimately ended with the inclusion of the Seventh Amendment guaranteeing
the right to a jury trial in all disputes involving claims greater than $20, the disagreement
between the Federalists and the Anti-federalists closely mirrors the current debate between
advocates and opponents of tort reform. These persistent, normative questions regarding the role
of civil juries in American society give rise to the empirical questions that my dissertation
explores. First, are there differences in the way that civil juries resolve disputes and allocate
resources from one community to another, and if there are, what factors explain and predict
those differences? Secondly, are there similar differences across states in litigation outcomes? I
endeavor to explain differences in civil trial outcomes based on social, political, and economic
conditions, within and across states, using an original data set comprised of all 2009 cases
decided in the Alabama, Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky, and Tennessee civil trial courts, including
an in-depth analysis of Alabama trial courts using interviews conducted in the state and data
collected from 2002-2009. My dissertation also explores the underexplored relationship between
judicial selection method and trial court decision-making by comparing outcomes across
partisan, nonpartisan, retention, and gubernatorial appointment selection systems. I also analyze
the effect of tort reforms seeking to limit non-physical and punitive damage awards on amounts
awarded across states.
v

Introduction
During the ratification debates the Federalists and Anti-Federalists contested the
desirability of the constitutional protection of civil juries. The Anti-Federalists, preferring strong
local government, argued that civil juries empowered communities to settle disputes themselves
based on local standards. ―Juries are constantly and frequently drawn from the body of the
people, and freemen of the country; and by holding the jury‘s right to return a general verdict in
all cases sacred, we secure to the people at large, their rightful control in the judicial department‖
(Federal Farmer XV, Storing1981, 320). On the other hand, the Federalists maintained that civil
juries were outmoded and produced inconsistent applications of the law from one jurisdiction to
another, jeopardizing the rule of law. Hamilton argued that ―The capricious operation of so
dissimilar a method of trial in the same cases, under the same government, is of itself sufficient
to indispose every well regulated judgment towards it…The best judges of the matter [civil
juries] will be the least anxious for a constitutional establishment of the trial by jury in civil
cases, and will be the most ready to admit that the changes which are continually happening in
the affairs of society may render a different mode of determining questions of property
preferable in many cases in which that mode of trial [civil juries] currently prevails‖ (Federalist
83, Goldman 2008, 416).
Although the Framers ultimately included the Seventh Amendment‘s guarantee of the
right to a jury trial in all disputes involving claims greater than $20, the disagreement between
the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists closely mirrors the current debate between advocates and
opponents of tort reform. The President of the America Tort Reform Association (ATRA)
asserts that "Some astonishing decisions come out of the courts these days. Hundreds of millions
in punitive damages piled on top of relatively minor actual damages. Meritless cases settled
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because defendants fear the outcome of an emotion-filled jury trial or a lawless court. That's why
the ATRA leads the fight for a better civil justice system - one that's fair, efficient and
predictable‖ (Joyce 2007). On the other hand, the American Association for Justice, a
professional trial lawyers‘ association argues that ―Special interests like big tobacco, the
insurance industry, HMOs, and drug companies have mounted multi-million dollar campaigns
against the civil justice system and Constitutional right to trial by jury. As part of those
campaigns, companies and corporate lobbyists hype bogus numbers and questionable studies,
make exaggerated and untrue claims about so-called ‗frivolous‘ lawsuits, and fall back on ageold stereotypes about trial lawyers‖ (American Association for Justice 2005).
These persistent normative and political tensions regarding the role of civil juries in
American society give rise to two empirical questions that this research seeks to explore. First,
are there observable differences in the way that civil juries resolve disputes and allocate
resources from one community to another? Secondly, if we observe differences across
communities, what factors explain and predict those differences? Theoretically, the local
community, from which civil litigation typically emerges, might directly affect trial court
outcomes by shaping the participants‘ evaluation of the conflict. This research maintains that
trial courts are political institutions that are affected by the local political, social, and economic
context.
Despite numerous normative and political debates surrounding civil jury decisionmaking, a severe lack of reliable empirical data prevents a meaningful assessment of the claims
of either side (Elliot 2004; Galanter 1993; Galanter, Garth, Hensler, and Zemans 1994; Hensler
1994; Saks 1992; Sanders and Joyce 1990; Vidmar 1995). The lack of civil trial court research is
especially pervasive in political science. Political scientists devote considerable attention to
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federal appellate courts, and the body of state supreme court research is growing rapidly; yet, the
majority of all litigation never receives appellate review. Unfortunately, trial courts remain
under-studied and underdeveloped theoretically, especially in political science. This research
develops a model of trial court behavior and collects the data necessary to facilitate more indepth study of the courts that form the foundation of the U.S. judicial system. Additionally, I
seek to inform the debate through a comprehensive examination of jury verdicts in five states.
This study improves our understanding of trial court decision-making and contributes to our
theoretical understanding of the effects of extra-legal factors on the performance of judicial
institutions. Furthermore, this study contributes much needed knowledge regarding the decisionmaking and functioning of trial courts and contributes to our understanding of the effects of local
context on public institutions.
Although this research makes no specific policy recommendations, state and local
governments possess strong policy interests in the civil litigation system. The questions of
managing court workloads, eliminating ―frivolous lawsuits,‖ and assessing the need for reform
remain central questions both at the state and national level. In particular, today‘s politicians
frequently argue the need for medical malpractice reform in light of the current health care
debate. In fact, in the 2011 State of The Union Address1, President Obama suggested medical
malpractice reform as a potential way to bring down health care costs. In reference to bringing
down health care expenses, President Obama said, ―Still, I‘m willing to look at other ideas to
bring down costs, including one that Republicans suggested last year -- medical malpractice
reform-- to rein in frivolous lawsuits.‖ Unfortunately, both proponents and opponents of medical
malpractice reform rely on minimal empirical evidence. The data collected for this project will

1

Office of the Press Secretary. 2011. ―Remarks Made by the President in the State of the Union Address.‖ United
States Capital, Washington, D.C.
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provide a data source allowing researchers and policy analysts to comprehensively compare
medical malpractice and other civil jury verdicts both across and within states.
Modern academics and political theorists also contest the virtues of the civil jury and seek
to empirically tests juries‘ competence. Latin (1993) summarizes the three dominant arguments
in favor of civil juries made by modern scholars. First, proponents of civil juries argue that
juries are more sensitive to community values and are therefore more capable of deciding
liability and determining damages regarding complex or conflicting social issues than judges.
Additionally, juries serve to localize courts in the federal structure and allow citizens to govern
themselves (Chapman 2007). Similarly, Haldon argues that juries provide the opportunity for
diverse groups to contribute to legal decision-making and ―provide the local knowledge and
experience and community connection‖ that judges and experts lack (1994, 61). Furthermore,
juries might better represent the community, since jury verdict reflect groups‘ decisions, rather
than the decisions of a single judge (Jonakait 2009). Second, Latin states that supporters of civil
juries maintain that jurors can restrain governmental abuses of power. Finally, Latin states that
advocates of civil juries rely on De Tocqueville belief that civil juries educate citizens about
democracy. Marder (2003) maintains that juries fulfill an important political role in addition to
educating citizens in the democratic process, because juries also make difficult political
decisions regarding complex civil disputes.
However, Latin (1993) refutes all three justifications for the continued use of civil juries.
Latin argues that relatively few civil juries decide cases involving complex social issues.
Additionally, few cases involve the exercise of government power. When the government
participates in litigation, cases typically involve rudimentary issues such as poorly maintained
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sidewalks or streets. Finally, in modern urban jurisdictions, an individual is unlikely to serve on
a jury in an entire lifetime, thereby greatly decreasing the educational role of civil juries.
While normative evaluations of civil juries discuss the advantages and disadvantages of
utilizing civil juries, empirical explorations of the virtues of civil juries typically evaluate the
quality of jury decision-making relative to that of judges. However, like other areas of trial court
research, scholars lack access to comprehensive empirical data and report conflicting findings.
In an early investigation of jury competence, Kalven and Zeisel (1966) found the juries and
judges reach the same conclusions when deciding cases 79% of the time. Wissler, Hart, and
Saks (1999) compare decisions of jurors, judges, and lawyers in Illinois and New York and find
consistent and comparable evaluations of plaintiff‘s injures by all three groups. Additionally,
Eisenberg, LaFountain, Ostrom, Rottman, and Wells (2002) observe that juries and judges award
punitive damages at similar rates. On the other hand, other scholars find that juries are
significantly more likely to award punitive damages than judges (Hersch and Viscusi 2004;
Sunstein, Hastie, Payne; Schkade, and Viscuis 2002) and also dispense larger compensatory
damage awards (Hersch and Viscusi 2004). Using mock jury simulations involving punitive
damages, Hastie, Schkade, and Payne (1998) find that mock jurors understand less than 10% of
judges‘ instructions regarding the assessment of punitive damages. Furthermore, they observe
that typical juries consider less than half of the conditions for finding in favor of punitive
damages. As jurors rely less on the law, the more likely the jury to render a verdict that
disagrees with a judge‘s decision. Jurors also appear inattentive to judges‘ instructions (Hastie et
al 1998; Sunstein et al 2002). Empirical investigations of jurors‘ decisions relative to judges
generate mixed assessment of jury competence.
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Beyond the normative and empirical questions, the conflict over civil jury decisionmaking also includes a political element. Civil trial courts rely on judges and juries to settle
disputes and prescribe (typically) monetary retribution for injuries. In civil cases, participants
convert damages to dollars and require jurors to determine both the winner and the appropriate
compensation. Additionally, civil litigation performs the important functions of resolving
disputes, allocating resources, and modifying behavior (Shapiro 1981). In political science, two
common definitions of politics include ―competition over scarce resources‖ and ―who gets what,
when, why, and how.‖ Those seeking to limit the discretion available to jurors argue that trial
verdicts do not represent rational, consistent analyses of the conflicts at bar, and variability in
outcomes negatively affects businesses and individuals involved in litigation. Those who trust
the constitutional mandate of a trial by jury assert that jurors are capable of equitable resolutions.
These arguments clearly reflect a disagreement over how resources should be distributed and
who should make the allocation decisions. Although scholars of judicial behavior have long
acknowledged that political factors influence decision-making in appellate courts, the assertion
that political forces also sway outcomes in trial courts remains underexplored.
Relying on both normative and empirical assessments of civil juries, this research
develops and tests a model of civil trial courts as political institutions. Additionally, I seek to
explain differences in civil trial outcomes based on demographic differences across communities
and states using an original dataset comprised of all jury verdicts decided in the Alabama,
Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky and Tennessee civil trial courts of general jurisdiction in 2009 and an
over-time examination of verdicts in Alabama from 2001 to 2009. To increase validity and
garner the perspective of legal professionals, I conducted a series of interviews with judges and
attorneys in two contiguous Alabama counties. These data allow for the examination of a greater
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number of issues and alleged injuries than previous studies and provide the ability to control for
litigant, judge, and attorney characteristics. Additionally, empirical models also explore courts‘
dispute resolution and resource allocation functions by examining both a plaintiff‘s likelihood of
success and the amount awarded to successful plaintiffs.
Chapter 1 provides an overview of the current sources of state civil jury verdict data and
provides a detailed description of the data used in this research. The chapter then develops a
theory and a model of civil trial court decision-making based on interviews with legal
professionals and previous scholarly research drawing on literature from civil trial courts, state
appellate courts, state politics, and voting behavior. Chapter 2 provides a descriptive overview
of the win/loss rates, docket composition, case issues, alleged injuries, and the parties at bar in
Alabama, Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky, and Tennessee trials in 2009.
Chapter 3 reports the results for nine years of quantitative analyses in the state of
Alabama (2001-2009) to explore civil jury verdicts over time. Additionally, the chapter includes
discussions of judges‘ and attorneys‘ perspectives regarding judicial retention mechanisms and
tort reforms in Alabama. Chapter 4 begins with a description of the variables and measures used
in subsequent analyses. The chapter then proceeds in four parts with a subsection for Hawaii,
Indiana, Kentucky, and Tennessee. Each subsection discusses the jurisdiction and organization,
institutions, and tort reforms under investigation in each state followed by empirical models and
results. These sections are intended to assess the affect of within and cross-state variation in
circuit demographic composition and institutions on outcomes and awards. The chapter
concludes with a combined model utilizing data from Alabama, Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky, and
Tennessee in 2009 to determine the variables that commonly influence verdicts in all five states.
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Finally, a conclusion summarizes and discusses the project‘s findings and outlines a plan for
future research.
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Chapter 1
Developing an Integrated Model of Trial Court Decision-Making
Although the vast majority of litigation occurs at the trial-court level, trial courts‘ dispute
resolution and resource allocation functions remain underdeveloped theoretically, and
researchers have produced mixed findings. A lack of robust and reliable data consistently
hinders the study of civil jury verdict research. Unfortunately, scholars lack first hand
observation of jury decision-making. Much of the process leading up to a civil trial, the trial
itself, and the final jury verdict is unobservable to researchers after the fact, making outcomes in
civil trials difficult to explain. The study of civil litigation is further complicated by the fact that
there is no way of knowing the universe of cases from which trials are drawn, as many if not
most, civil cases settle before reaching trial. In addition, courts keep no written record of the
jury‘s composition or deliberations.
Due to a lack of access to jurors during trials, most studies of state trial court decision–
making rely on experimental designs to predict jury decisions. A second approach utilizes posttrial interviews to assess jurors‘ decision-making processes. Other studies of state civil jury
verdicts utilize data collected by the Civil Trial Network, a publicly available data source that
reports annual verdicts handed down by civil trial courts in the 45 most populous counties in the
United States. However, the data only provide information on the verdict and the case type. The
Jury Verdict Research project (1988-1997) provides additional information regarding the alleged
injuries in each case, but these data focus exclusively on the largest awards and have not been
updated. The available data sources prevent researchers from examining the effects of the
specific claims, the attorneys, the judges, or litigant characteristics. Additionally, because
current quantitative sources focuses on the largest counties or the largest awards, neither

9

provides a representative sample of trials. Examining verdicts from only the most populous
counties obscures the major variation in political and social features in suburban and rural areas,
while examining only the largest awards eliminates the majority of jury decisions.
Although post-trial interviews, mock jury simulations, and extant quantitative studies of
jury verdicts all contribute to our understanding of trial court behavior, each method possesses
benefits and limitations. Post-trial interviews provide the ability to speak directly with actual
jurors; however, these interviews depend on self-reported data that might not adequately reflect
jurors‘ actual decision-making processes and evaluations (Sommers and Ellsworth 2003). Mock
trials often seek to observe the influence of individual juror traits on verdicts; however, scholars
critique mock jury experiments for their validity and research methods. Breau and Brook (2007)
conduct four mock jury simulations in which juries comprised of law students evaluated a fellow
student‘s alleged violation of the law school‘s code of conduct. The two ―juries‖ with
knowledge of participation in a simulation, convicted the student of the violation. Of the other
two juries that believed the school would enforce the verdict, one found for the student and the
other could not reach a verdict. Breau and Brook conclude that mock jury simulations suffer
from a lack of validity, because knowledge of participating in a simulation biases the
participants‘ behavior. Additionally, mock jury simulations have been criticized for their
reliance on students (Bray and Kerr 1982; Devin, Clayton, and Dunford 2001; Howard and Leber
1988) and for lacking the depth, detail, and authenticity of actual trials (Bray and Kerr 1982).
The use of experimental methods also prevents the exploration of actual trials.
On the hand, scholars critique quantitative studies that rely on available data sources for
their inability to control for case facts, injuries, or quality of representation (Saks 2002).
Additionally, Saks argues that quantitative studies of jury decision-making that rely on U.S.
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Census data to make assumptions about individual juror behavior suffer from ecological fallacy,
since aggregate patterns might not reflect behavior at the individual level. Beyond the issue of
ecological fallacy, scholars note that juror demographics might not adequately represent the jury
pool, since not all demographic groups receive equal representation on juries (Saks 2002).
Additionally, attorneys might attempt to prevent minorities from serving on juries (Badcock
1993; Benokraitis and Griffin-Keene 1982; Ramirez 1993).
While not immune from all of the previous critiques, this research improves the quality of
civil jury verdict research through the creation of a comprehensive trial court database.
Additionally, this research tests the hypothesis that the political, social, and economic
composition of a community shapes the verdicts juries render. Although circuit-level
demographics admittedly provide a weak test of the hypothesis that individual juror traits affect
trial outcomes, examining the relationship between community composition and jury verdicts
allows me to test the hypothesis that jury verdicts reflect the larger political, social, and
economic conditions in the community, regardless of the composition of any particular jury.
Jury verdict reporters provide the primary data source utilized in this study. Jury verdict
reporters are independent publications primarily used by attorneys that provide a summary of
each civil case, the attorneys for the parties, the judge presiding over the case, the type of case,
the type of injury alleged, and the jury verdict. Practicing attorneys use jury verdict reporters to
assess what types of cases win, where cases win, and the types of awards juries hand down. The
data collection for the volumes runs from November to November. Scholars have critiqued the
use of jury verdict reporters, because some jury verdict reporters rely on self-reported data from
attorneys or litigants in the state, or focus exclusively on large awards (Eisenberg et al 2002;
Marder 1998; Vidmar, Gross, and Rose 1998). Additionally, some reporters focus exclusively
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on one region or metropolitan area within as state. These types of data collection produce biased
data sources and unrepresentative samples; however, the reporters utilized in this study attempt
to collect the universe of civil jury verdicts for the entire state in a given time period.2 Alabama,
Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky, and Tennessee Reporters were selected, because the editors of these
volumes attempt to consistently report all of the jury verdicts in each state based on actual trial
records rather than self-reported data. The data provide significant advantages over other data
resources. First, the data are the only comprehensive records that include all civil trials for a
significant period of time for entire states. As noted previously, earlier studies include only the
most populous counties or largest awards, eliminating significant contextual variation. Second,
previous data did not allow scholars to explore the effects of the litigants, judges, or the attorneys
on each case. Additionally, these states provide considerable variation on political, social, and
economic indicators as well as variation in judicial selection method. Although the civil trial
courts in Alabama, Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky, and Tennessee may or may not necessarily
represent the nation‘s civil courts, these data provide the most comprehensive source of civil
verdicts available. Additionally, these states provide ample variation at the sub-state level on
social, political, and economic indicators. Furthermore, the states utilize differing institutional
arrangement and rules for selecting judges and determining liability, allowing for an
investigation of trial outcomes across a number of institutional variables.
A second source of data for this project comes from interviews conducted with lawyers,
judges, and court administrators in Alabama. The interviews contribute the perspective of
2

The editor of the Alabama, Indiana, Tennessee, and Kentucky Jury Verdict Reporters describes the data collected
for each volume as complete as possible. ―[I]n the AJVR calendar year which runs for November to November, our
coverage is as close to complete as an imperfect judicial system provides (Miller 2002-2008).‖ The editor who
publishes Personal Injury Judgments Hawaii states that, ―All personal injury judgments in the Circuit Courts and the
U.S. District for the District of Hawaii [federal suits are not included in the data for this research] are reported
(Semmens 2009).‖
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experienced legal practitioners and add validity and explanation to quantitative evidence.
Interviews were conducted in two contiguous Alabama counties (see Appendix A for interview
questionnaires). One county possesses a more urban, larger minority, and economically
stratified population. Additionally, judges in the first county participate in elections with greater
partisan competition. The second county‘s population is more rural, more affluent, with a
considerably smaller minority population. Judges in the second county participate in largely
uncontested, one-party-dominated judicial races. Interviews in the two counties allow for
comparison of judges‘ and attorneys‘ views regarding the influence of community composition
and judicial institutions on winners and losers and awards across the two circuits. I interviewed
circuit clerks and court administrators to better understand civil procedure and rules in the
Alabama Circuit Courts. In order to protect the identities of interview participants, the names of
all interviewees and interview locations remain confidential. Where necessary, I removed
identifying names and locales from quotations derived during interviews.
The Civil Litigation Process
In order to situate civil trials in the broader litigation process, I begin by exploring
scholars‘ and legal experts‘ perceptions of the pre-trial process before moving on to the factors
that affect winners and losers and awards. Although this research focuses primarily on the
factors that influence civil litigation outcomes, trials represent only the final stage of the
litigation process. In fact, Engel and Steele (1979) describe the civil litigation process as
pyramid. ―The ‗life‘ of a legal case can be conceived in terms of five stages: (1) the primary
event, (2) the response decision, (3) pre-judicial processing, (4) judicial processing, and (5)
implementation and consequences‖ (Engel and Steel 1979, 300). Miller and Sarat (1981) also
envision the civil litigation process as a pyramid in which the base of the pyramid contains all
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societal grievances, and tappers offer as grievances become claims, which become disputes. The
pyramid narrows even further as parties hire lawyers and disputes become litigation. Each stage
of the pyramid contains fewer claims as disputes are resolved through various means. A civil
case begins with the plaintiff‘s alleged accident or injury and the decision on the part of the
injured to hire an attorney to represent his/her interests. Once the injured party contacts a
personal injury attorney, the attorney must decide whether or not to take the case. In other
words, the lawyer must decide if the case has merit. I assume that a plaintiff‘s attorney
determines a case‘s merit based on the case‘s prospects and the potential monetary gain. Earning
potential should possess additional weight for plaintiff attorneys, since most plaintiff attorneys in
civil cases utilize contingency fees to attract clients. Lawyers that defer payment until the case is
settled must believe that they can make a profit from the case; however, defense attorneys
typically receive pay regardless of the outcome. Baum (1998) argues that the use of courts to
solve civil disputes is attractive when the potential benefits of a trial outweigh the costs.
Furthermore, previous studies maintain that because attorneys strategically determine which
cases to settle prior to trial, the cases that reach trial tend to be those with the least predictable
outcomes or the most at stake for the parties (Priest and Klein 1984; Waldfogel 1995). Due to
attorney strategy, trial courts adjudicate only the most contentious and unpredictable cases.
If the attorney feels she can make a profit by taking the case, she becomes the plaintiff‘s
lawyer and files the case in the appropriate county and waits for the assignment of a judge to the
case. Plaintiffs‘ attorney possess the legal right in Alabama to file the case in the circuit where
the alleged accident occurred or the circuit in which the plaintiff lives if the two locals differ.
Once a case is properly filed in Alabama, changing the trial venue is difficult, and the original
judge must approve the venue change. With the judge and county finalized, both attorneys must
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reevaluate their chances of winning the case based on the county characteristics, the county‘s
previous jury verdicts, and the attorneys‘ prior knowledge of the judge. In Alabama juries are
drawn from the total population possessing a driver‘s license, which should encompass the
majority of Alabama residents; therefore, it is possible to approximate the potential jurors‘
demographic characteristics based on the distribution of income, education, partisan affiliations,
and race. Both attorneys at this point estimate the interaction of the potential jury, the judge
assigned to the case, the type of case, and the amount of money involved, and the parties to the
case to determine their chances of winning. Baum (1998) states that 62% of all cases settle
without a trial. Baum argues that trials present serious drawbacks for litigants, because litigation
is expensive, the parties to the dispute lose control of the resolution, judges and juries may
deliver unfavorable outcomes, and litigation increases the conflict between the parties.
In an examination of criminal cases, Albonetti (1987) finds that prosecutors attempt to
avoid uncertainty in trial outcomes by trying only the cases they are the most likely to win based
on the evidence, the type of criminal, and the type of victim. Her findings may be generalized to
civil cases if attorneys in civil litigation follow a similar logic of trying cases they are confident
in winning and settling more uncertain cases. Another study focusing on the decision to try
criminal cases finds that attorneys use the seriousness of the crime, the strength of the case, and
the defendants‘ background information to evaluate a cases‘ chances of success (Emmelman
1996). Emmelman argues that attorneys engage in the bargaining process leading up to the trial
as long one attorney believes that the offer will improve as the adjudication process continues.
Lawyers, regardless of whether a case is criminal or civil, should want to reduce uncertainty in
outcomes based on the type of case and the parties involved. The decision to settle before trial
should also reflect the attorney‘s beliefs about the best possible outcome of the case. According
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to Bovjerg, Sloan, and Hsieh (1991), the attorneys‘ relative bargaining power varies with talent,
experience, and resources. The decision to settle a case before trial seems to stem from the
combination of the strength of the case and the attorneys‘ relative abilities to bargain.
The second calculation attorneys must consider is the judge assigned to the case. Practicing
attorneys have professional knowledge and work histories with the judges in their state that allow
them to predict the judges‘ reactions to certain types of cases. The county the case is tried in
should also affect the likelihood that a trial occurs if attorneys calculate their chances of winning
based on the counties‘ demographics.
Unfortunately, researchers cannot observe pre-trial or settlement procedures using jury
verdict data obtained post-trial. However, I attempted to qualitatively investigate pre-trial case
management and settlement procedures during my interviews with Alabama court clerks and
administrators, judges, and attorneys. When interviewed, Alabama judges report that 90% of
cases settle prior to the trial. Of those, half of the cases settle through mediation. The judges
questioned maintain that, almost without exception, all cases in Alabama go to mediation before
trial. Judges typically forgo the mediation step in the litigation process only in cases involving
very small claims not justifying the additional cost of mediation. One circuit judge stated:

I strongly support mediation, both because it helps parties, and because it helps the civil
system. It cuts down on the amount of trials, but it also helps people settle disputes.
Most people just want to have a say. If their attorney wants them to settle, a lot of people
see that as sign of weakness; their attorney won‘t fight for them and bring their case to
trial. But, if they hear it from a third party, they are much more willing to settle.

The parties typically split mediation costs evenly. However, there are times when one
party cannot afford to pay mediation costs, and the judge can tax the other party with the cost.
But, as one judge pointed out ―No one wants a mediator that the other side is paying.‖ Another
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judge argued that the widespread use of mediation fosters the ―lost art of settlement‖ among
attorneys. The judge believes that prior to the initiation of mediation procedures in Alabama,
attorneys engaged in more and more adept settlement negotiations.
My discussions with attorneys regarding the settlement process suggest that plaintiff and
defense attorneys view the merits of settlement somewhat differently. In general, plaintiff‘s
attorneys view settlement more favorably than defense attorneys. An attorney who represents
both plaintiff and defense clients who told me that:
Every case you hope to settle. A good settlement is one where the plaintiff thinks he
settled for too little and the defendant thinks he gave too much. Even if you have a good
case, you only go to trial when there is no choice--no choice means a fair and reasonable
settlement was not offered. Trials are like rolling the dice; you never know what the jury
is going to do. There is too much risk involved for both parties. Typically, I only try
about four or five cases a year.

Other plaintiff attorneys confirmed the notion that trials involve greater risk than settlement,
making settlement preferable. However, defense attorneys appear more willing to try cases,
depending on the parties to the case, the trial locale, the judge, and the jury composition. One
defense attorney told me that he sometime represents ―obnoxious‖ clients who refuse to settle
and insist on taking every case to trial. Occasionally, his firm will conduct mock jury
experiments to convince obstinate clients that a jury might deliver a worst case verdict to
encourage settlement. Other defense attorneys admit to waiting until the conclusion of voir dire
to make the settlement decision. If the jury appears favorable to the defense, the attorney will
then proceed to trial. A defense attorney said:
Juries can determine the decision to settle up until the deliberation. The longer the jury is
in there, the more likely the defendant is to settle. You know if they are taking a long
time to deliberate, they are disagreeing about something; you have an angry jury in there.
You‘re not supposed to be able to hear the jury deliberate, but sometimes I‘ve heard
jurors yelling at each other all the way in the courtroom. That‘s when it‘s time to make a
deal.
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Beyond consistent use of mediation, judges differ in their case management behavior. A
judge described the difference in judges‘ case management techniques this way:
You have to understand--this is a very broad generalization--judges fall into two
categories. The first type are staunch docket managers. They stick to a strict time
schedule and keep the attorneys on a strict schedule. I‘m different. I‘m more laissez
faire, more lenient about postponing a trial. It gives the lawyers more time.

The particular judge asserts that allowing attorneys more time, when necessary, prevents
premature trials and under-prepared counsel. Despite the variation in adherence of a strict time
schedule, most judges view their pre-trial role as fulfilling the need to move the case along at a
reasonable pace. The judge that admitted to a laissez faire pre-trial management philosophy
described his case management role as, ―monitor[ing] the case so that it is moving along at a
reasonable pace.‖ He said:
The way I handle a case is: The case is filed. Then I set a pre-trial order; we have a status
hearing. At the status hearing, both sides tell how long they think it will take to get the
case ready. I decided on a second status or trial date 90 days later. At the second status
[the lawyers] should know how and when the case will be ready. I set a trial date for no
less than 60 days after the status. Then, that‘s a firm date. If it‘s a very complex case,
and both sides need more time, I may set another status. But, I‘m very strict once the
trial date is set. My objective is to make sure that all sides have a full opportunity to get
ready. It‘s not my job to give lazy lawyers more time. How aggressively lawyers
prepare for a case is between them and their clients. They have problems on trial day
when they‘re not ready. I hold their feet to the fire.

During the pre-trial procedures, judges must rule on a number of motions which
presumably affect attorneys‘ evaluations of their cases. A number of attorneys mentioned that
judges‘ pretrial rulings dramatically affect the settlement decision. According to judges, one side
typically makes a motion for summary judgment, a request that the case be thrown out for a lack
of merit, at some point during the pre-trial procedure. Attorneys view summary judgment as
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both a way for judges to clear dockets and dispose of frivolous lawsuits. According to judges
and attorneys Alabama civil courts dispose of a substantial number of civil disputes through
summary judgment.
In Alabama the circuits use a statewide procedural guide called ―Fast Track‖ that governs
pre-trial procedure and orders with the intent of getting cases into trial within a year of the
original filing date. When asked why cases take longer than a year to reach trial, a judge stated:
Typically cases [take longer] where there are more defendants, which makes the cases
take longer for scheduling reasons. The more parties, the more lawyers. The more
lawyers, the more scheduling conflicts and the longer the time. Product liability and
medical malpractice cases also tend to have more discovery and require expert witnesses,
which also makes cases take longer. Auto cases are the standard. They take one day.
Everything is easy, unless there is a serious injury with death; that can take longer.

Voir dire, the jury selection process, constitutes another important aspect of pre-trial
procedure that likely affects attorneys‘ evaluations of their cases. In Alabama judges possess the
right to conduct the entire voir dire process if they choose; however, typically voir dire begins
with the judges‘ set of standard jury questions. According to one judge, ―The questions I ask are
a script. I read them from a three-ring binder. Questions like: Are you related to, partners with,
made up your mind already, convicted of a crime, an Alabama citizen. All judges ask the same
questions.‖ The attorneys then ask the jurors questions from an approved list. Alabama uses the
voir dire process to select 12 jurors and two alternates. The number of strikes allotted to each
side depends on the number of jurors in the original pool. When asked to describe the voir dire
process, an attorney said:
Once a jury pool is selected, each attorney can ask questions about the facts of the case. Have
you ever been convicted of this crime? Or, have you even been involved in an automobile suit?
Voir dire is one of the only ways an attorney can talk directly to individual jurors. It allows you
to get into those jurors‘ minds.
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Although scholarly research suggests that the voir dire process often makes juries a less
representative sample of the general population (Badcock 1993; Benokraitis and Griffin-Keene
1982; Ramirez 1993), overall, the Alabama attorneys and judges report that juries typically
reflect the demographic composition of the circuit. However, one attorney told me that in his
professional opinion, juries are representative. Yet, personally, he feels that juries could be made
more representative than they currently are. The attorney attributed lack of jury
representativeness to both individuals‘ self selection out of jury service and the voir dire process.
According to the lawyer:
Certain counties and districts are more lenient than others [when it comes to enforcing
jury summons]. This is another example of where politics come into play [in the civil
litigation process]. Circuits have different requirements for opting out of the jury
process. Some aren‘t very strict. In some it‘s very strict. We could make juries a lot
more representative if the jury service process was mandatory and policed in some way.
He also noted that ―Voir dire allows crafty lawyers to choose what juries look like. The
idea is that the pool is representative of the community. Crafty lawyers are good at making it
less representative than it could be.‖ On the other hand, one circuit judge argues voir dire
actually serves to increase the representativeness of juries. The judge described his view of the
voir dire process:
At the beginning of the voir dire process, I ask a few qualifying questions. We sat a jury
just the other day. I asked questions, and five jurors admitted that they thought they
might be biased, so they were dismissed. Then, the lawyers ask more specific questions.
So, we started out with 35 jurors. I dismissed the first five. Then the lawyers take turns
striking until we get the 12. The plaintiff tries to strike the nine most conservative jurors
and the defendant tries to strike the nine most liberal jurors--you understand by liberal
and conservative, I mean relative to the case, not politically. So, what you‘re left with are
12 moderates, the people that seem like they could go either way depending on the
evidence or the people the attorneys didn‘t figure out. So, you end up with moderate
jurors, because the most extreme people are removed in voir dire process. Sure, plaintiff
attorneys would like to have all liberals and defense attorneys would like to have all
conservatives, but the voir dire process prevents that from happening.
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Those cases that survive the pretrial process without settling then go on to trial.
According to the pyramid theory, trials represent the least common civil disputes. After both
parties conclude their arguments, the judge instructs the jury on the points of law relevant for the
particular case. Alabama judges give two types of jury instructions, pattern jury instruction and
general. General instructions involve the burden of proof, inferences, demeanor of jurors,
unanimous verdicts, and admission of expert testimony. Pattern instructions are specific to the
individual case. For example, depending on the case type, judges will provide definitions of
negligence, wantonness, or other torts. The judge also informs the jurors of the charge on
damages. In other words, the judge tells the jury the type of damages the plaintiff seeks (pain
and suffering, future damages, punitive damages, or special damages).
The jury must consider the evidence and make a number of decisions in order to reach a
verdict. For civil cases, the jury must evaluate the severity of the plaintiff‘s alleged injury.
Then, the jury must decide if the defendant‘s actions or inactions caused the plaintiff‘s injury. In
a negligence case, ―Negligence refers to whether [a defendant] has taken the care of a reasonable
person, whether by act or omission, in order to avoid the harms that might foreseeably flow from
his actions (Jonakait 2003, 65).‖ If the jury deems the defendant liable, the jury must then
determine the appropriate compensation. In Determining Damages (Greene and Bornstein 2003)
outline three broad types of damages that juries consider. Compensatory damages are damages
intended to compensate the injured party and return him or her to pre-injury levels of function or
replace the loss caused by the injury or incident. If the defendant is liable, the jury typically
awards compensatory damages. Plaintiffs may also seek, and juries sometimes award punitive
damages. Punitive damages seek to punish the defendant and deter similar behavior in the
future. The jury awards punitive damages when the defendant‘s conduct goes beyond negligence
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to the extent of reckless or malicious conduct (Ghiaridi and Kircher 1995). Most states only
allow punitive damage awards when the jury first awards compensatory damages; however,
some states, such as Alabama and Kentucky, allow juries to award only punitive damages.
Plaintiffs may also seek and juries can award pecuniary (economic) damages and non-pecuniary
(non-economic) damages. Economic damages include things such as property damage or
monetary loss, while non-economic damages include awards for emotional injuries, pain and
suffering, and loss of life enjoyment.
Although all juries within a unified judicial system utilize the same civil procedure to
decide liability and damages, much of the actual jury decision-making process remains
unobservable to researchers. MacCoun (1987) refers to the jury decision-making process as the
―black box,‖ because we only observe the evidence that goes in and the verdict that comes out.
Because the jury deliberation process is largely a ―black box,‖ researchers are left to assess the
relationship between observable variables and jury verdicts. However, previous research,
conducted at the appellate court level, provides a guide for developing a model of trial court
behavior. Brace and Hall‘s early research sought to develop and test integrated models of state
supreme court decision-making. Brace and Hall (1993) build an integrated model based on four
categories of variables, justices‘ personal preferences, case characteristics, institutional
arrangements, and environmental characteristics. Brace and Hall go on to note, that although not
relevant for their study of death penalty appeals, litigant resources and litigant status might
influence outcomes in other contexts. This project adapts Brace and Hall‘s theoretical
framework to create an integrated model of decision-making in civil trial courts. Theoretically,
judicial ideology, institutional arrangements, environmental factors, litigant resources, and case
facts should interact to shape litigation outcomes in trial courts. In particular, this research
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investigates the influence of local community composition and judicial institutions on civil
litigation outcomes.
Civil trials characteristically emerge from disputes that originate in the local community.
Disputing litigants hire attorneys, usually from the immediate vicinity, to bring their
disagreement before a jury also drawn from the area. Furthermore, the judge, elected from the
district in many states, presides over the case. Although the judge, lawyers, disputants, and
jurors possess a variety of goals in each individual case, all of the participants exist in the same
community context. Theoretically, an institution‘s community context influences how all of the
participants in a case perceive a just dispute resolution and adequate compensation for damages.
Accordingly, local social, political, and economic conditions should influence a community‘s
evaluation of litigants‘ claims and determine the monetary value the community deems fair
compensation for an injury. Additionally, analyses of the relationship between social, political
and economic conditions in a community and trial court outcomes will enhance our theoretical
understanding of community interactions with local political institutions.
While this study focuses on five states, the approach is adaptable to other states with
varying institutional arrangements and social, political, and economic environments.
Additionally, this study attempts to create a truly integrated model of trial court decision-making
that incorporates characteristics of the case, the judge, attorneys, litigants, and the surrounding
community from which the jury is drawn. Furthermore the data include all reported cases for an
extended period of time. Yet, I must acknowledge some limitations. First, although the data
provide significant variation at the sub-state level, this is a five-state study, and I do not claim
that Alabama, Hawaii, Indian, Kentucky, and Tennessee necessarily represent of the other 45
states. Furthermore, while I believe strongly that the community surrounding a court affects
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litigation outcomes, these analyses cannot control for the composition of any particular jury.
Ideally, a model would include the demographic composition of each jury; however, if
community composition exerts an independent influence on litigation outcomes, patterns of jury
behavior should and do emerge across circuits regardless of the composition of any particular
jury. Additionally, previous studies maintain that the cases that reach trial differ significantly
from cases that settle beforehand (Priest and Klein 1984; Waldfogel 1995). Unfortunately, I am
unable to compare settled cases to cases concluding in trial with these data.
An Integrated Model of Litigation Outcomes in Trial Courts
Local Context and Trial Court Outcome: Political, Social and Economic Influences
Jury trials require local citizens to settle disputes between litigants, directly involving
members of the community in trial court decision-making. Although prior research has produced
mixed results and considerable debate over the substantive effect of individual juror
characteristics on jury decision-making, practicing attorneys obviously believe that individual
juror traits influence jury verdicts. The following quote from and interview conducted with a
civil defense attorney clearly illustrates the weight lawyers place on individual juror
demographics when trying a case. The attorney stated:
I tried a case- this was about 15 years ago-where I represented a department store. I had
a case where two middle-aged, black women were leaving a store and [the store] had left
the metal cuffs on their handbags. The sales clerk was a 19-year-old girl. The
department store trains its clerks not to accuse anyone of stealing. According to the
training manual, you‘re supposed to approach the customer and tell them that you‘ve
made a mistake and would they kindly come back inside so you can take the cuff off, so
they don‘t tear their clothes later. I‘ll never know what really happened, but the ladies
said she called them thieves and harassed them. They sued for outrage, slander, false
imprisonment… The first time the jury had five black and three white jurors. The jury
mis-tried along racial lines. So, we tried it again. This time I got lucky, there were no
black jurors out of the 36 jurors that showed up. I didn‘t even have to strike anyone. I
don‘t know how I got that lucky; juries in [the county] don‘t normally look like that. The
plaintiff‘s attorney took one look at the jury and settled.

24

Despite lawyers‘ persistent beliefs that individual juror traits influence trial outcomes,
civil courts keep jurors‘ names confidential and do not keep records of jurors‘ demographic
information, making scholarly assessment of the belief difficult to study. Due to the lack of
directly observable data, most examinations of juror demographics utilize mock jury scenarios to
predict juror preferences. A second approach utilizes the demographic composition of the
community surrounding the court to predict jury verdicts. However, both methods produce
considerable scholarly debate and mixed findings. On one side of the debate, some scholars
maintain that individual juror demographics substantially influence civil trial outcomes. Using
mock trials, Overland (2009) finds that race, gender, education, income, and attitudes influence
verdicts in civil cases. Devon and Imwinkelreid (1995) examine survey responses to
hypothetical tort claims and find that men, white-collar workers, and African Americans exhibit
the most pro-plaintiff tendencies. Helland and Tabarrock (2003) observe that tort awards appear
to increase as the black and Hispanic populations in the county increase and especially as
poverty rates among black and Hispanic residents increase. Other studies also support the
finding that minority (Bornstein and Rajki 1994; Diamond, Saks, and Landsman 1998; Devon
and Imweinklreid 1995) and low income (Bornstein and Rajki 1994; Diamond et al 1998; Devon
and Imweinklreid 1995; Hastie, Schkade, and Payne 1998; Vidmar and Rice 1993) jurors exhibit
pro-plaintiff tendencies. Hastie et al (1998) uncover a relationship between juror ideology and
damage awards; Republican jurors appear to give significantly lower awards than Democrats.
Criminal trials also provide evidence that juror characteristics influence trial outcomes.
Somers (2006) conducts an experiment in which he finds that the presence of African American
jurors decreases the number of guilty votes before and after deliberations. Mills and Bohannon
(1980) observe an interaction between gender and race in survey responses to hypothetical
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criminal cases in which African American women evidence the greatest tendency to deliver
guilty verdicts.
Conversely, Eisenberg and Wells (2002) find little evidence that race, poverty, income, or
urbanization effect trial outcomes. Other scholars find that juror demographics only account for a
small amount of the variance in trial outcomes (Visher 1987) and produce weak and inconsistent
relationships (Kassin and Wrightsman 1988). Furthermore, Diamond (1990) argues that the
juror traits that emerge as pro-defendant in a particular case fail to maintain a consistent pattern
across cases types. Other studies find no effect of juror‘s incomes on liability judgments
(Bronstein and Rajki 1994; Vidmar 1993). Similar findings emerge regarding juror‘s education.
Vidmar (1993) finds that jurors with higher education levels find defendants liable less often;
although, more highly educated jurors appear to assess larger damage awards (Goodman, Loftus,
and Greene 1990; Vidmar and Rice 1993).
However, none of the studies examining individual juror traits, tests the possibility that
jurors‘ decisions reflect the socioeconomic and political leanings of the community at large. In
addition, researchers tend to look at juror traits in isolation from each other. For example,
scholars modeling juror traits examine race, income, education, and age as independent variables
without assessing the combined influence that demographic variables might have on an
individual or the makeup of the community in which the individual resides. This research tests
the hypothesis that civil trial courts are political institutions that respond to the broader
socioeconomic context of the circuit, regardless of the composition of any particular jury. If
community preferences shape civil jury verdicts as Anti-Federalists suggest, civil litigation
outcomes should vary with the political, social, and economic composition of the circuit.
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Furthermore, a wealth of literature demonstrates that economic downturns impact
election outcomes; the public blames the incumbent party for poor economic performance and
punishes incumbents electorally (Abramowitz, Lanoue, and Ramesh 1988; Feldman 1982; Key
1966; Kramer 1971; Lau and Sears 1981; Nadeau and Lewis-Beck 2001; Rudolph 2003;
Rudolph and Grant 2002). Conversely, scholars have devoted considerably less attention to the
relationship between courts and economic conditions. However, prior studies supply preliminary
support that economic conditions impact court outcomes. In his analysis of federal district
courts, Heydebrand (1976) concludes that federal government economic activity both stimulates
litigation and influences how judges decide cases. Theoretically, economic conditions in general,
not just government economic activity, might influence litigation outcomes. Furthermore, this
relationship should be apparent when examining the functioning of state courts. Trial court
research also suggests that courts respond to economic conditions. Jury awards in tort cases
appear to increase as county poverty rates increase (Helland and Tabarrock 2002, 2003;
Tabarrock and Helland 1999). Although studies examining the local economic context and
verdicts in civil cases provide groundwork for the hypothesis that economic conditions impact
litigation outcomes, these studies fail to control for other attributes of the local community or for
the characteristics of the case, parties, judges, or the attorneys.
On the other hand, my qualitative research demonstrates that judges and attorneys
attribute considerable weight to local economic conditions in shaping civil litigation outcomes. I
asked judges and attorneys if economic conditions, both in terms of the overall wealth of a
community and business cycles, affect jury verdicts. In response to the overall wealth of the
community judges and attorneys unanimously agree that more affluent communities render more
conservative verdicts than less affluent communities. An attorney practicing at a large, defense
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firm referred to poor, rural communities in Alabama as ―free lunch‖ counties. The term ―free
lunch‖ county appears to refer both to those communities‘ socioeconomic status and their
perceived willingness to render plaintiff verdicts and give large awards, regardless of the merits
of the case. According to the attorney, his firm looks at the number of students on the free lunch
program in the public schools in a circuit to determine their clients‘ likelihood of success. The
lawyer and his firm believe that plaintiff verdicts and awards go up in a circuit as the number of
children receiving free lunches increases.
Yet, I received mixed opinions regarding the influence of business cycles on jury
verdicts. One attorney believes that unemployment influences jurors‘ decisions because of
people‘s inherent tendencies to sympathize with each other. ―Jurors sympathize with litigants.
If jurors are feeling economic pressures they can relate to the economic pressures litigants are
facing. People sympathize with each other.‖ However, I interviewed a judge that sees little
influence of changing economic conditions on the operation of trial courts but rather views
economic cycles as driving the types of cases on courts‘ dockets. The judge said:
Generally, business cycles don‘t affect verdicts much, but it does affect the types of
cases. Two years ago when the economy was good, we heard lots of cases about condo
development. Any time you have economic development, you‘re going to have lawsuits.
Now, there‘s not as much business litigation on the high end, but now there‘s a lot of
business litigation on the low end, people trying to get out of condo purchase agreements
and things like that.

Yet, another attorney suggested that economic downturns might produce differential
affects on litigation outcomes depending on the case and the litigants. He said:
Yes [unemployment influences jury verdicts], but it‘s not one way all the time. For
example, I had a client that was a beautiful woman who couldn‘t scuba dive anymore
because of an accident. There were five unemployed jurors on the jury who couldn‘t
relate. They think: I‘m really hurting right now; your problem is not that bad. [But the
opposite] is especially true when a business hurts the economy during bad times. I don‘t
think you could lose a case against BP right now. But, I think it varies by case.
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Sometime economic conditions can help you, sometimes they can hurt. You have to go
on a case by case basis.

Although the precise relationship between economic conditions and jury verdicts remains
somewhat unclear, previous research and interviews with Alabama judges and attorneys provide
evidence that jury verdicts might reflect local economic conditions. Previous research also
provides evidence that county-level demographics predict liberal/conservative voting patterns
(Ardoin and Garand 2003; Koetzle 1998; Levendusky, Pope, and Jackman 2008), suggesting that
the demographic makeup of a community might also influence other decision-making patterns.
According to Koetzle (1998), communities characterized by larger minority populations, lower
incomes, lower education levels, and greater percentages of urban dwellers tend to vote more
liberally. Like Koetzle, I hypothesize that certain demographic combinations within a circuit
should produce solidly liberal communities, which in turn should generate stronger support for
plaintiffs.
Litigants Resources and Litigant Status
Since Galanter‘s seminal theory predicting the success of wealthy, repeat players in trial
courts, scholars have dedicated considerable attention to investigating the effect of litigant
resources on appellate court decisions. Scholarly research maintains that litigant resources and
litigant status predict litigation outcomes. Extant academic research also maintains that legal
representation constitutes an important resource in the litigation process which affects litigation
outcomes. Litigants represented by more experienced (Haire, Lindquist, and Hartley 1999;
McGuire 1995, 1998) and more capable (Haynie and Sill 2007; Johnson, Wahlbeck, and Spriggs
2006) attorneys achieve higher success rates. During interviews in Alabama, I asked practicing
attorneys about the influence of firm size, differences between working for the plaintiff and the
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defendant, and the contingency fee system. Overall, most lawyers agreed that large firms
provide greater security, more resources, and talented co-workers; however, most also believe
that small firms or single practitioners often receive greater financial compensation.
According to Heinz and Laumann (1982), large legal firms serve mostly corporations,
attract highly skilled lawyers from elite law schools, and provide lawyers with higher incomes
and greater support services. Their research asserts that the attractiveness of jobs at large firms
and the support structure large firms provide, facilitate effective legal work by talented
practitioners, suggesting that attorneys at larger firms possess considerable advantages in terms
of resources, status, and perhaps talent. When asked about the advantages of working in large
firm, an independent practitioner said:
There are some advantages to working at a big firm, but I think the disadvantages
outweigh the advantages. Big firms operate like a big business. You are expected to
generate hours and fees. You start at the bottom, and it takes a long time to work your
way up. It takes nearly a lifetime to make partner…The advantage of working at a big
firm is that you get to try the big cases that make new law.

The attorney went on to give an example of case that he, as a single practitioner, could not
accommodate that went on to established ―bad faith‖ as a recognized legal claim in the state of
Alabama. According the lawyer:
There was this fireman‘s wife who needed psychological treatment and had to go into the
hospital. Her husband was insured through …, but the insurance company refused to
pay. I wrote a letter to the insurance company. They wrote back and said they didn‘t
believe that the woman needed to go into the hospital, and I would need to get a letter
from the doctor. I got the doctor to write the letter saying it was necessary, but the
insurance company said that still wasn‘t good enough. So, I went back to doctor and got
him to write a more detailed letter; he even sent the woman‘s medical records. The
insurance company said that still wasn‘t good enough. I told the woman, she was going
to have to sue her insurance company. This was a bad faith claim. Alabama didn‘t
recognize the bad faith tort at the time. I turned the case over to my friend at a big firm.
He was able to go up to the insurance company and get the records of their conversations
with me. He had documents where they said, ‗This … guy doesn‘t know what he‘s
doing; let‘s just play with him.‘ The original medical bill was only $900, but the award,
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with punitives was three million dollars. The jury just couldn‘t believe that an insurance
company would treat someone that way. It was appealed and went all the way up and
back down again, but [the attorney] was finally able to get the money.

In addition to some career advantages associated with working in a large firm, lawyers
also support the notion that large firms possess greater resources. Working at a large firm
appears to both limit attorneys‘ personal financial pressures and increase the research and
investigative resources available. One attorney working at a large, multi-state firm noted, ―You
definitely have more resources [at large firms]. Large firms provide security. You are not
devastated if you lose a client. We also have a large research division at our firm in
Birmingham.‖ Possessing a research division allows the particular firm to conduct large
investigative studies, hire expert witnesses, and even conduct mock jury simulations.
When asked whether defense attorneys typically enjoy greater resources, most attorneys
agreed. While defense attorneys charge by the hour, allowing for a steady income, plaintiff
attorneys typically work on a contingency fee basis. One plaintiff‘s attorney said, that working
on contingency fee basis means ―you never know if you are going to make money off a case or
not. But, there is money in personal injury cases. Most of them settle; that‘s easy money.‖
Although plaintiffs‘ attorneys lack the hourly salary supplied to defense attorneys, the
contingency fee system means that cases with the potential for large damage awards might lead
to large pay checks for successful lawyers. Additionally, the attorneys interviewed note that
many cases involving small claims settle quickly once a lawyer becomes involved. Often, a
phone call from an attorney leads to settlement in cases involving smaller damage claims. While
small claims provide only a small pay check, they supply a relatively easy and frequent source of
income. I also asked what percentage of the award a personal injury attorney typically makes, if
he or she garners an award for the client. Plaintiffs‘ attorneys, working on a contingency fee
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basis in personal injury cases, usually ask for a third of the award. Typically, the attorney‘s
share is not beyond 50%, but medical malpractice lawyers sometimes take more, because the
cases are tough and expensive.
Not only do plaintiff and defense attorneys typically represent different types of clients,
but scholarly research maintains that the litigants differ in their experience with the courts and
their ability to successfully navigate the litigation process. According to Galanter (1974), repeat
players such as business and the government routinely utilize the courts, allowing for greater
knowledge of the legal system. Galanter also hypothesized that repeat players could shape the
rules of the litigation process in their favor over time. Individuals, the prototypical one-shotters,
rarely use the courts and lack familiarity with legal proceedings. In order to assess Galanter‘s
thesis, I asked practicing lawyers their perspectives regarding the importance of litigant classes.
I interviewed an attorney who represents plaintiffs and defendants who largely confirmed
Galanter‘s thesis. The lawyer said, ―Businesses constantly pursue litigation. Individuals are
clueless.‖ The attorney went on to liken his attorney, client relationship with individual litigants
to that of a priest and a parishioner: ―When I see individuals it is the first case in their lives. I am
their friend, their spokesperson, their guide. I am everything to them; I‘m like their priest. They
totally rely on me. They do whatever I say. No one ignores my advice. I have never advised
someone to take a settlement, and had them not take it.‖
In addition to narrative evidence, political science research also maintains that parties
with greater resources incur considerable advantages when pursuing litigation in the United
States (Farole 1999; Songer and Sheehan 1992; Songer, Sheehan, Haire 1999; Wheeler,
Cartwright, Kagan, and Friedman 1987). Furthermore, possessing an advantaged status also
appears to improve a litigant‘s chances of success (Kinsey and Stalans 1999). The government,
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in particular, achieves success rates in the courts above that of any other litigant class (Farole
1999; Kritzer and Sibley 2003). Similar advantages appear for better resourced parties in the
United Kingdom (Atkins 1991) and in Canada (McCormick 1993).
However, structural and ideological considerations in developing countries seem to favor
litigants with fewer resources. Haynie, Songer, Tate, and Sheehan (2005) conduct a nine country
cross-national examination of litigant resources and discover that those with fewer resources
achieve higher success rates in developing countries. Studies conducted in the Philippines
(Haynie 1994, 1995), Israel (Dotan 1999) and South Africa (Haynie 2003) provide additional
support for the assertion that disadvantaged litigants in developing countries achieve higher
success rates than similarly situated litigants in developed countries. Taken together, previous
research concerning litigant resources indicates that better-resourced parties possess considerable
advantages; although, context appears to condition the extent of the benefit.
Previous research examining trial courts also provides insight into the effects of
individual litigant characteristics on outcomes. Most of the trial court research examining the
effect of the litigant status explores the ―deep pockets‖ effect - the idea that civil juries hold
wealthy defendants liable more often and assess larger damage awards against them when
compared to other types of litigants. Yet, explorations of the deep pockets hypothesis produce
mixed results. Some scholars maintain that civil juries judge corporate defendants more harshly
(Hans and Ermann 1989) and assess large damage awards against corporations (Chin and
Peterson 1985; Hans and Ermann1989). Using an experiment, Bornstein and Rajki (1994)
observe that mock jurors judged a chemical company more harshly than a pharmaceutical
company or a manufacturer for the same alleged injury. In another experiment varying defendant
characteristics and wealth, MacCoun (1996) discovers that jurors treat corporations differently
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than other types of defendants, but the difference is not attributable to wealth, since individuals
with identical resources received less severe treatment. On the other hand, Vidmar (1995)
detects no evidence that medical malpractice awards increase with perceived ability to pay.
Conversely, Eisenberg, Goerdt, Ostrom, Rottman, and Wells (1997) caution that if award
amounts partly serve to correct behavior, then the assessment of large awards against wealthy
defendants does not necessarily indicate bias, because differential amounts produce varying
degrees of punishment or deterrence based on defendant‘s wealth.
Yet, individuals bringing suits, especially torts, are often portrayed in the media as
opportunists trying to capitalize on others‘ economic success. Previous research indicates that
media coverage of civil trials leads to inaccurate views of the civil justice system. A number of
scholars uncover empirical verification that the media exaggerate the pro-plaintiff image of juries
(Diamond 2006) and disproportionately cover cases involving large awards while ignoring
defense verdicts (Bailis and MacCoun 1996; Garber 1998; Garber and Bower 1999; Marder
2003). In an examination of newspaper coverage of product liability cases against automobile
manufacturers, Garber (1998) finds that newspapers covered just 3% of defense wins compared
to 41% of plaintiff wins. Additionally, newspapers‘ coverage increased with the size of the
award, and papers covered 63% of cases in which the jury awarded punitive damages.
Furthermore, the skewed nature of media coverage leads the public to adopt biased perceptions
of the civil litigation process (Galanter 1993, 1998). Songer (1988) finds that exaggerate views
of civil litigation not only persist among the general public, but highly educated professionals
maintain similar views. When surveyed, South Carolina attorneys, doctors, and legislators
overestimated the frequency of trials, the pro-plaintiff tendencies of juries, and the size of
awards.
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Furthermore, media exaggeration of civil verdicts might hurt plaintiffs‘ chances of
winning their claims. The now nearly legendary tale of the woman who sued McDonald‘s
because she burned herself with a cup of hot coffee is a prime example of a lawsuit portrayed as
frivolous in much of the media in which a ―runaway‖ jury awarded a massive sum (Hamilton and
McCann 2004, for other examples see Hans 2000). Yet, few people realize that the woman
involved suffered third-degree burns and required skin grafts as a result of the incident, or that
McDonald‘s had been sued previously by other burn victims for maintaining coffee at unsafe
temperatures. While the woman in the McDonald‘s case was able to garner financial
compensation for her injury (although the final awards was greatly reduced), negative
perceptions of individuals bringing frivolous claims might hurt individuals‘ chances of winning
cases (Hans 2000; Robbennolt and Studebaker 2002). A second example of media exaggeration
comes from the data I collected in Alabama. In 2003 a Macon County, Alabama jury awarded
the plaintiff $1,000,000 in the uninsured motorist case, Smith v. Allstate (00-0054) (Miller AJVR
2003, 260). Despite, the jury‘s award, the plaintiff only received the maximum available
coverage provided by the uninsured motorist policy of $40,000. However, the editor of the
volume notes that when covering the verdict, The Tuskegee News mentioned the million dollar
award several times without ever mentioning the contractual limit of $40,000. This trial provides
another example of a case in which a media outlet covered a large damage verdict without
discussing the details of the case or plaintiff‘s actual award.
Taken together, the previous literature examining litigant resources and litigant status
suggest several implications for winners and losers and awards in civil trial courts. Overall,
individual litigants may possess a resource disadvantage when pursuing litigation, because
plaintiffs lack familiarity with courts and typically hire lawyers at smaller firms with fewer
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resources. Additionally, media bias and exaggeration of awards might prejudice juries against
individual plaintiffs. Furthermore, Galanter‘s party capability theory asserts that wealthy parties
such as business and the government might achieve higher success rates in the courts, because
they possess greater familiarity with the courts, hire better legal representation, and shape the
rules over time through repeat interactions with the legal system. Yet, the ―deep pockets‖
hypothesis maintains that wealthy parties might pay more when they lose. However, although
Galanter (1974) theorized that wealthy would attain better counsel, the contingency fee system
utilized by most plaintiff attorneys in civil litigation might attenuate some of defendants‘
representational advantages. Theoretically, individuals with strong cases could hire high quality
representation because of the potential to make money from the claim. Furthermore, like defense
attorneys, plaintiff attorneys are also repeat players with familiarity with the court system.
Judicial Ideology
Although scholars have devoted little attention to the relationship between judicial
ideology and outcomes in trial courts (where jurors‘ preferences presumably have greater
influence), research conducted at the appellate court level substantiates the notion that judicial
ideology influences judges‘ decision-making. Scholars of the U.S. Supreme Court maintain that
judges seek to create policy that mirrors their own preferences as closely as possible (Gibson
1983; Rhode and Spaeth 1976; Segal and Spaeth 1995, 2002; Schubert 1965, 1974). Previous
research also demonstrates that ideology matters at the state supreme court level. Judges‘
partisan identifications appear to predict state supreme court judges‘ liberal or conservative
policy preferences (Brace and Hall 1993, 1995). In addition, Brace, Langer, and Hall (2000)
demonstrate that state supreme court judges‘ preferences reflect their partisan affiliations and
ideology of their states at the time of their initial election/appointment. The overwhelming

36

impact of judicial ideology on appellate court judges‘ behavior suggests a relationship might
exist between judicial ideology and trial court outcomes.
Like their appellate court counterparts, trial judges directly rule on numbers of pre-trial
motions, suggesting considerable room for trial judges to express their ideological preferences
during the pre-trial phase of litigation. However, jurors‘ preferences might influence jury trial
outcomes to a greater degree than judges‘ dispositions, perhaps limiting judges‘ influence to the
pre-trial stage and settlement process. Yet, trial judges presumably serve as important authority
figures and information filters during the trial process, potentially allowing trial judges to
transmit their preferences to jurors during trial. Unfortunately, scholars have devoted little
attention to the relationship between judicial ideology and outcomes in civil trial courts and
provide little guidance.
Admittedly, only an indirect relationship between judicial ideology and jury verdicts
exists, if at all. However, in Democracy in America, Alexis De Tocqueville subscribes a
substantial role to judges and their ability to influence juries in civil trials. De Tocqueville states,
―It is the judge who sums up the various arguments which have wearied their [jurors‘] memory,
and who guides them the devious course of the proceedings; he paints their attention to the exact
question of fact that they are called upon to decide and tells them how to answer the question of
law. His influence over them [jurors] is unlimited (Bradley 1948, 286). If trial judges influence
civil juries to the extent that De Tocqueville asserts, trial court judges might transmit their
ideological preferences to jurors.‖
Despite the lack of consistent theoretical or empirical evidence that trial judges‘
dispositions influence jury verdicts, interviews with Alabama lawyers demonstrate that attorneys
believe judges possess the ability to substantially influence juries. Alabama judges, on the other
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hand, subscribe a minimal to nonexistent role to the judge in the jury decision-making process.
When asked about judges‘ influence over the jury, one attorney related a view of the judge
similar to that ascribe by De Tocqueville. According to the attorney:
Judges have tremendous amount of influence over jurors. The jury looks to the judge as
a respected, elected official. Juries look to the judge for guidance. Judges can influence
the jury through their tone; their court room demeanor influences the jury—everything
from conversing with council and witnesses to dealing with the jury. Judges instruct
juries about the law. If the judge has a predisposition to the case, the jury knows. If a
judge is predisposed to one side, the case is more likely to settle.
All of the attorneys interviewed agreed that judges possess the ability to influence juries‘
decisions. However, some attorneys believe that ―good‖ judges seek to be as neutral as possible
and hide their opinions from the jury. According to one attorney, ―[the amount of influence over
juries] varies from judge to judge. A fair judge uses, what they call a ‗judicial attitude,‘ lets both
sides make an argument. Good judges are neutral.‖ However, the lawyer went on to describe a
judge he believed failed the judicial attitude standard. ―There used to be a [county] judge…that
was very defense oriented. If there was a case that he thought was bad, he would let the jury
know. A judge can influence the jury a lot.‖ Despite the perceived conditional relationship
between judicial ideology and judges‘ influence on juries, the same attorney admits that his firm
begins each case by researching the judge‘s background, use of mediation, and past rulings on
motions, demonstrating that the firm believes that judges‘ dispositions influence litigation
outcomes strongly enough to devote investigative resources into researching each judge‘s life
experiences and prior judicial behavior. An attorney at another firm told me that one of the
partners tells all of the young lawyers to, ―always start with judge,‖ and encourages them to
begin each case by researching the assigned judge.
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On the other hand, the judges interviewed firmly trust that judges play little to no role in
influencing the jury. When asked how much influence judges‘ have on a trial‘s outcome, one
judge gave a description very different than that of lawyers or De Tocqueville. When asked how
much influence a judge has over the jury‘s verdict, the judge stated:
I would say not very much. The judge should not have an influence on the outcome. The
judge should be neutral. The judge should not be noticeable in the courtroom. The
judge‘s job is to make the case understandable to the jurors, and the jurors make the
decision based on the evidence. During the trial, I try to move things along. The legal
instructions I give the jury are very standard. I don‘t want the jurors to feel like we are
wasting their time. Then, I instruct them on the law. My job is to ensure that jurors
understand the law. I try to make the law comfortable and understandable for jurors.
In fact, another judge maintained that judges lack ideological preferences at all. ―When you
become a judge, you‘re not supposed to have a philosophy. When you take the bench you agree
to set ideology aside.‖ Yet, another Alabama judge admitted, ―We would all like to think of
ourselves as neutral. We think we are all fair and impartial. No one has biases. We have as
good of an unbiased system as possible, but we‘re all human. Everyone has biases.‖
If trial judges‘ influence jurors to the extent that De Tocqueville and lawyers assert,
judges might transmit their ideological preferences to jurors through their rulings and courtroom
demeanor. Additionally, previous research demonstrates that liberal state supreme court judges
possess more pro-underdog policy preferences than their conservative counter parts (Brace and
Hall 2001). If jury verdicts reflect judges‘ partisan leanings, plaintiffs, the prototypical
underdogs in most cases, should win more often and receive larger awards in courts presided
over by Democratic judges who presumably possess more liberal policy preferences.
Additionally, previous research notes that more conservative populations tend to elect
conservative judges (Brace and Boyea 2007, 2008), so elected judges‘ preferences may parallel
those of the local population or judges may defer to their constituents.
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Institutions
If judges play a critical role in shaping litigation outcomes in trial courts, judicial
institutions that condition judges‘ behavior on the bench might also affect jury verdicts. Brace
and Hall assert, ―institutional arrangements, which consist of internal and external rules as well
as organizational structures, determine the aggregation of individual preferences within any
given decision-making body (1993, 916).‖ The judicial election literature provides insight into
the affects of institutional arrangements on judicial decision-making in appellate courts. Much of
the literature concerning institutional effects on litigation outcomes focuses on death penalty
cases, because of the highly salient nature of the issue and the relatively large amount of media
attention devoted to capital punishment cases. These studies find that judicial selection and
retention method shapes the types of judges on the bench, which conditions their initial
likelihood to support the death penalty (Brace and Boyea 2007, 2008). However, selection and
retention method also conditions judges‘ decisions in death penalty cases once on the bench
(Brace and Hall 1990, 1993, 1997; Brace and Boyea 2007, 2008). Both liberal and conservative
judges show increased support for the death penalty when constituencies become more
conservative and when judges are elected. Constituency influences result in even stronger
support for the death penalty when judges approach reelection, are selected through districtbased selection methods, and face competitive races (Hall 1992). Elected state supreme court
justices also show greater support for the death penalty as they gain experience as elected
officials, especially after a particularly close election (Hall 1995). The greater the judge‘s
reelection concerns, the more closely judges reflect constituent preferences in their decisions to
uphold the death penalty (Hall 1987). Hall also finds that elected judges not only feel
accountable to the public, but judges actually face electoral defeat (2001,a). Incumbent judges in
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partisan state supreme court elections lose their offices more often than incumbents in the House
of Representatives.
Previous research also suggests that reelection concerns affect judges in all levels of the
legal system and at all stages in their careers. Huber and Gordon attribute sentencing
inconsistencies in aggravated criminal cases to trial judges‘ electoral pressures (2004). They find
that elected trial court judges, regardless of their ideological dispositions, hand out longer
sentences with election proximity. While judges presumably wish to retain their posts, they may
also wish to obtain a higher office. Langer, McMullen, Ray, and Stratton (2003) find that policy
preferences and institutional design shape judicial promotions. In addition to judicial
promotions, institutional design also shapes judges‘ decisions to retire (Hall 2001,b). Hall finds
that judges retained through judicial elections choose to retire when faced with an especially
competitive election.
In addition to fostering occupational insecurity among elected judges, judicial elections
also require judges to raise campaign money for reelection bids. A growing body of research
maintains that campaign spending influences voter participation and thereby affects campaign
outcomes (Hall and Bonneau 2006, 2008). Like other elections, campaign spending in judicial
races conveys information about the candidates to the public and increases voter participation in
judicial races. Although incumbents possess considerable advantages (Hall 2001, a), incumbent
vote shares decrease when a challenger, especially a quality challenger enters the race (Bonneau
2005, 2007 a, b; Bonneau and Hall 2003; Hall 2007). As judicial elections become more
competitive and spending increases, judges may feel pressure to cast votes in favor of campaign
contributors to secure funds for future elections (Cann 2007; Palmer and Levendis 2008, but see
Newman, Speyer, and Terrell 2008). While the true influence of campaign contributions on
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judicial elections and judges‘ behavior remains in question, the reality of increasingly costly
judicial elections suggests that elected judges, like other elected officials must consider
campaigning and campaign fundraising as part of their careers.
Although much of the judicial election literature focuses narrowly on the one issue of the
death penalty, these studies provide considerable information concerning the role institutional
design plays in judicial decision-making. While Supreme Court Justices possess life tenure,
allowing them to decide cases in a manner consistent with justices‘ policy preferences, judicial
elections tie state court judges more closely to public preferences. Furthermore, the type of
electoral system (i.e. district-based vs. statewide elections) also appears to constrain judges‘
actions. District-based elections appear to produce the most direct ties between judicial decisionmaking and public opinion. Institutional constraints also seem to condition the relationship
between judges‘ policy preferences and judges‘ abilities to implement their preferred policy
without sanction. Judicial elections provide a method, whether the public utilizes it or not, to
sanction unpopular judicial behavior. Accordingly, elected judges appear to modify their
behaviors to avoid electoral sanction.
While examining the influence of campaign fundraising on trial judges‘ behavior exceeds
the scope of this project, Alabama judicial races continue to be some of the most expensive in the
nation, and I asked Alabama judges and attorneys about their perceptions of elections in the
state. When asked if judicial elections shape trial court judges‘ behavior, one judge stated, ―I‘m
not sure a person who had achieved sainthood could raise millions and millions of dollars and
then vote against the group that gave you $5 million. Even if you‘d achieved sainthood, how
could you do that?‖ The judge went on to narrate his experience during the 2010 judicial race:
This last election cycle I had a lot of law firms that contributed to my campaign, but two
law firms really took the lead in supporting me. The first case I tried after the election,
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they were on opposite sides. I‘d like to think that they respect you if you treat them
fairly. But, if there‘s not a true tainting, there is at least a tainting in the public‘s
perception.

When asked if they supported judicial elections, most of the judges interviewed advocate
moving from a partisan elections to a non-partisan system but support judicial elections overall.
However, judges also report that Alabama typically relies on a gubernatorial appointment system
to initially place judges on the bench. According to one circuit judge:
I am the only circuit judge to get here by running; everyone else was appointed. On the
local scale, there has been a big movement to get away from a partisan system. But, we
pretty much have an appointed system already. Out of the 11 judges currently on the
bench, I‘m the only one to run. Typically, the governor fills mid-term vacancies. The
[county] Bar Association makes a recommendation of three names to the governor, and
the governor picks one of the three. It has also been the practice in [the county], like in
other circuits, I would expect, that typically, you don‘t draw a challenger. In ten years,
there‘s only been one judge removed since appointment.

Following appointment, a judge then runs for reelection under the partisan label of the governor
that appointed him or her. A judge in a heavily Republican circuit stated that, because of the
partisan imbalance in the circuit, elections there might be better classified as nonpartisan rather
than partisan, since all of the judges run as Republicans in the primary. If judges in the circuit
receive a challenge, it occurs in the Republican primary. ―Most of the competition, when there is
any, occurs in the primary. You can almost say elections here are nonpartisan, since all of the
candidates run as Republicans. Generally, whoever is the Republican nominee wins.‖ In that
circuit, primary challenges typically occur only in open seat elections, which happen infrequently
given the norm of gubernatorial appointment during mid-term vacancies. However, the judge
admits that judges in circuits with high partisan competition might feel greater pressure to
conform to constituent pressures. ―I have a friend in another circuit where elections are closer.
She told me, ‗I‘m ruling on things to appease my constituents. I shouldn‘t be ruling on things to
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please voters.‘ I told her no, you shouldn‘t, but in areas where there‘s a lot of competition, judges
feel like they have to.‖
On the other hand, trial court judges appear to perceive considerable advantages to
partisan and nonpartisan judicial elections. In Alabama a judicial candidate must work as a
practicing lawyer for at least five years prior to becoming a judge, thereby limiting the potential
pool of judicial candidates. One judge said, ―I like to think that, unlike other elected officials,
not just anyone can run against me. They‘ve got to find a lawyer to run against me. If you‘re
fair to the lawyers, they‘re not going to run against you.‖ Additionally, the judge pointed out
that running against a seated judge could negatively impact the challenger‘s career if
unsuccessful. ―The only other time [a judge receives a challenge] is when an attorney is mad at a
judge and runs to teach him a lesson. But, if you run against a judge, you better win. Otherwise,
it could be quite uncomfortable for an attorney the next time he‘s in the judge‘s courtroom.‖ In
fact, judges seem to perceive changing demographic or partisan patterns in the community as the
greatest threat to judges currently on the bench in Alabama. One judge told me, ―I‘ve heard
horror stories about judges who lose their seats when the county switches parties and the judges
don‘t switch in time. That happened to a friend of mine in another county. The county was
switching from Democrat to Republican, and he didn‘t switch in time and lost his seat.‖
Another judge said, ―In 10 years, there‘s only been one judge removed since appointment [in this
circuit]. But, for Democrats in an overwhelmingly Republican county, if they draw a challenge,
they might well be gone. The area is so heavily Republican that a little known Republican can
defeat you.‖
Conversely, a number of judges interviewed believe that retention elections make judges
vulnerable to removal due to one unpopular decision. Unlike partisan or nonpartisan election,
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citizens can mount campaigns against judges in retention systems without fielding a candidate.
Several of the judges interviewed pointed to the removal of judges in Iowa for their support of
gay marriage as an example of the dangers of retention elections. An Alabama circuit judge said,
―On the other side, judges in retention elections can get run out of office for one bad decision,
like those judges in Indiana that voted in favor of same-sex marriage. Those were highly
respected judges that voted that their sincere beliefs that banning gay marriage violated the state
constitution. All of those judges got run out of office3.‖
Although most attorneys view the influence of judicial elections as greater in appellate
courts than trial courts, the attorneys interviewed report a more consistent and direct influence of
constituent preferences on judges‘ behaviors than judges. One attorney said, ―Judges, even
though their goals may be pure, the fact is that they are human, and they are influenced by
constituents.‖ Other lawyers expressed views that the excessive cost of Alabama judicial races
jeopardizes judges‘ potential impartiality. An Alabama defense attorney stated, ―Judicial
elections have gotten out of hand when judicial races cost millions of dollars and judges run on
platforms. ‗Vote for me, and I‘ll be a conservative judge.‘ ‗Vote for me, and I‘ll be a liberal
judge.‘ Furthermore, a plaintiff lawyer said, ―Republican judges have to rule in favor of
businesses to keep campaign money coming in, and Democrats have to rule in favor of
individuals to keep the trial lawyers‘ associations happy.‖
While civil trials primarily entrust the final verdict to the jury, judicial retention methods
and institutional arrangements might influence jury verdicts. If judicial selection methods affects
judges‘ behaviors like Alabama lawyers or previous research demonstrates, we might observe
3

After declaring the state‘s gay marriage ban unconstitutional in 2009, the three Iowa State Supreme Court justices
up for reelection in 2010 lost their seats, including the chief justice. Since judicial elections are staggered in Iowa,
the other justices on the bench at the time of the decision have not yet stood for reelection. For more information
see http://www.desmoinesregister.com/article/20101103/NEWS09/11030390/Iowans-dismiss-three-justices.
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differences in jury verdicts across jurisdictions utilizing partisan, nonpartisan, retention elections,
or gubernatorial appointment, especially given that Alabama, Indiana, Kentucky, and Tennessee
all retain judges in district-based elections. Unfortunately, previous research provides little
insight into the possible relationship between judicial selection method and trial court outcomes.
On the other hand, Indiana provides the ideal context for exploring the influence of judicial
selection method on jury verdicts, since Indiana utilizes partisan, nonpartisan, and retention
elections to retain trial court judges. Both Alabama and Tennessee retain trial court judges
through partisan elections, while Kentucky uses nonpartisan elections. Hawaii uses
gubernatorial appointment and retention by committee. If judicial selection and retention
mechanism shape judges‘ preferences and behaviors, jury verdicts may vary across states both in
terms of who wins and how much successful parties receive. The judicial selection literature
suggests that elected judges, especially those elected in partisan, district-based elections, feel
pressure to comply with citizen demands. However, it is unclear whether elected judges, seeking
to reflect citizens‘ preferences would favor individual citizens or the businesses that likely
contribute to judges‘ campaigns.
On the other hand, a number of state institutions might directly affect jury verdicts. The
manner in which civil juries determine fault constitutes an important institutional difference
across states. Some states employ comparative fault standards, in which juries can determine the
extent to which the plaintiff contributed to the alleged injury and adjust the award accordingly.
On the other hand, states that apply the higher standard of contributory negligence prevent
plaintiffs from collecting damages if the plaintiff contributed to his or her injury in any way.
States that employ higher standards for determining the defendant‘s fault likely produce more
pro-defense verdicts than states with lower standards of fault. On the other hand, states that
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allow the jury to diminish the plaintiff‘s award if he or she contributed to the alleged injury
might hand out consistently lower awards. In other words, while a plaintiff in a comparative
fault state might have a greater likelihood of wining given the lower standard of fault, the ability
to adjust the award might lead to less compensation upon success. Through the mechanism of
tort reform, both Indiana and Kentucky place statutory caps on the amount successful plaintiffs
may receive in certain types of cases. Presumably, damage caps should diminish the size of
awards in these states. Additionally, the state of Indiana relies on a unique institution called a
medical review board to review medical malpractice cases. Presumably, the state intended the
review board to limit ―frivolous‖ medical malpractice suits. However, the actual affect of the
review board on litigation has not been studied. On the other hand, all of the institutional
structures might directly influence how juries determine liability and compensation.
Case Facts: Issues and Alleged Injuries
Saks (2002) argues that the mix of cases coming before a court plays a critical role in
determining the initial likelihood that the plaintiff wins, since the mix of cases varies
substantially from one jurisdiction to the next. However, the few studies that attempt to examine
the influence of case types on jury verdicts come to opposite findings. Bovbjerg et al. (1991)
argue that the case type and the severity of the injury predict the amount of the award in civil
cases. The authors observe that plaintiffs win medical malpractice cases least often but garner
the largest settlements upon success. Conversely, plaintiffs achieve the highest success rates in
automobile cases but receive consistently less compensation. On the other hand, Vidmar (1994)
concludes that jurors assess similar damage awards against liable defendants in medical
malpractice and automobile cases.
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Overwhelmingly, the judges and attorneys I spoke with identified medical malpractice
cases as especially difficult. As one attorney summarized, ―Medical malpractice cases are the
most difficult cases. You never win those.‖ Medical malpractice cases also require a large
investment in resources given the long preparation time and the state of Alabama‘s requirement
of expert witnesses. In fact, only two law firms take medical malpractice claims in the two
counties where I conducted my field work. Judges and attorneys maintain that, because of the
cost, lawyers turn down most medical negligence cases, even ones where individuals possess
legitimate claims. According to one plaintiff lawyer:
[Medical malpractice cases] are tough and expensive. When someone calls me and asks
me to take a medical malpractice case, I ask them if they can still walk. You‘re on the
phone, so obviously you can talk. Can you still work? If they say yes, I tell them that
they really don‘t have a case. It‘s gotten to where, if you are not totally and permanently
disabled, dead, or whatever, you don‘t have a case, which is unfortunate, because
doctor‘s make mistakes.

A judge I spoke with informed me that even when an individual obtains representation
and wins a medical malpractice case, the Alabama State Supreme Court often overturns those
decisions. The judge said:
If the plaintiff gets a big verdict in Alabama, the State Supreme Court looks over the
record for anything to overturn it. There was one case where the Supreme Court found
that the hospital was affiliated with the state and therefore had state sovereign immunity.
There was another case where the judge told the jurors that the case was going to last two
weeks and let the jurors go if they couldn‘t stay the two weeks. Even though there really
wasn‘t any protest at the time, the appellate court found that that was improper and sent
the case back down. Things have gone so far in the direction of the medical community
that it‘s really unfair. In Alabama a nurse can kill someone every year for nine years, and
that evidence isn‘t admissible. In fact, it‘s not even discoverable. What other profession
can you make the same mistake and injure people year after year and it‘s not admissible?
Beyond medical malpractice, judges and attorneys also identify products‘ liability and slip and
fall cases as especially difficult for plaintiffs. Like medical malpractice, product‘s liability cases
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require large investments in research and expert witnesses. On the other hand, a plaintiff
attorney told me that ―Juries hate slip and fall cases,‖ because jurors perceive slip and fall claims
as frivolous.
Although scholarly results regarding the influence of case type are mixed, attorneys and
judges perceive clear patterns of success rates across case types. Yet when turning to
compensation, previous research clearly demonstrates that more seriously injured plaintiffs
receive greater compensation in civil trials (Bornstein 1998; Bovbjerg et al 1991; Chin and
Peterson 1985; Greene and Bornstein 2003; Vidmar, Gross, and Rose 1998). When asked what
types of injuries make for a strong case, one plaintiff attorney I interviewed said, ―You want
broken bones. That way when you have the X-Ray that shows the break. There‘s no questioning
that. I once had an attorney tell me that, ‗I don‘t want a client that can walk into the office.‘‖
Additionally, Hans (2008) ascertains that the type of injury alleged influences the likelihood that
jurors perceive the injury as legitimate. In her experiment, Hans observed that jurors found
fractures and broken bones more convincing than soft tissue injuries (scratches, bruises, and
whiplash). A plaintiff attorney interviewed agreed with Hans‘ assessment of soft tissues cases.
The lawyer identified soft tissue cases as especially difficult to win, because, ―there is no
objective evidence.‖ Judicial practitioners‘ views and scholarly research indicate that plaintiffs
likely prevail less often in medical malpractice, products‘ liability, and premises liability cases;
however, plaintiffs alleging more concrete injuries presumably achieve higher success rates.
Additionally, more seriously injured plaintiffs should garner large awards when successful.
Summary and Discussion
Based on empirical observations generated by political science, trial court, and state
politics research, as well as the perceptions of experienced legal practitioners, this chapter
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develops an integrated model of trial court decision-making. Specifically, I contend that the
socioeconomic and political context of the circuit, judges‘ ideological dispositions, state
institutional features, litigants‘ resources and status, and case facts predict jury verdicts both in
terms of winners and loser and awards. In particular, I hypothesize that the composition of the
local community in terms of race, economics, age, education, urban characterization, and
ideology will predict both the probability of plaintiff success and awards. Additionally, I
theorize that judges might transmit their preferences to juror through their rulings, courtroom
demeanor, or jury instructions. This study is the first to explore a possible relationship between
judicial ideology, judicial selection methods, and jury verdicts. If jury verdicts reflect judges‘
ideological dispositions, I expect juries presided over by Democratic judges, who presumably
holding more liberal ideological views, to render more pro-plaintiff verdicts and larger awards.
Additionally, if judges influence jurors, judicial selection and retention mechanisms that alter
judges‘ behavior on the bench might also lead to varying patterns of jury outcome, but previous
research provides little guidance as to how this relationship might work at the trial court level. I
also hypothesize the plaintiffs with greater resources, in terms of legal representation, should
achieve higher success rates. Additionally, party capability theory posits that, in general,
businesses and government possess greater resources than individuals, are more familiar with the
legal system, and likely hire better representation, suggesting that businesses and government
should typically garner more favorable verdicts than individuals. On the other hand, the ―deep
pockets‖ hypothesis maintains that juries will assess larger damage awards against litigants such
as businesses and government who possess greater perceived wealth. While previous data
sources largely prevented researchers from exploring the influences of case issues and alleged
injuries on plaintiff success rates and awards, the greater detail provided by the database utilized

50

in this study allows for an in-depth examination of the effects. Prior research, although limited,
and interviews with judges and lawyers suggest that plaintiffs prevail less often in medical
malpractice cases; yet, successful plaintiffs likely receive greater compensation after sustaining
more serious and demonstrable injuries. Subsequent chapters will apply this theory to
investigate the factors that predict juries‘ dispute resolution and resource allocation functions
within and across states in Alabama, Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky, and Tennessee.
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Chapter 2
Comparing Civil Courts in Five States: Docket Composition, Win/Loss Rates, and Awards
Variation in civil rules, procedures, and outcomes comprised Federalist‘s primary
objection to a constitutional mandate protecting civil juries. In Federalist 83, Hamilton
highlights the numerous dissimilarities in civil jury selection and civil procedure that existed at
the time of the ratification and the potential for inconsistent outcomes. Presumably, more
disparities currently exist in states‘ application of the civil jury system as the number of states
and courts have increased in the United States. However, assessing the influences of state-level
variation on civil jury verdicts requires previously unavailable comprehensive data. The
following chapter descriptively examines the composition of courts‘ dockets, verdicts,
institutional structures, and litigant characteristics in state civil courts in Alabama, Hawaii,
Indiana, Kentucky, and Tennessee in 2009.4 Admittedly, one year of data might not adequately
represent the docket composition, the types of cases, or they types of verdicts a court handles
over a broader period of time; however, no existing reason emerges to suggest that 2009
radically differs from subsequent or future years. Overall, the types of cases decided over a
given year in a court ought to reflect the general pattern of cases and decisions-making in the
civil trial courts in that state.
Table 2.1 reports the number of verdicts in each state in 2009, verdicts per one million
residents (based on the size of the state‘s population in 2009 according to the U.S. Census), the
median and maximum awards in each state, the percentage of verdicts favoring plaintiffs, and the
percentage of verdicts in which the jury awarded punitive damages. In 2009 civil juries in the
five states adjudicated 926 civil disputes and awarded $425,532,301 in total damages. Of the

4

Although the data reported in the 2009 volume for the five states does not perfectly reflect the 2009 calendar year,
and includes part of 2008, I refer to the data as 2009 in the text for ease of discussion.
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five states Alabama and Kentucky both possess similar population sizes, near 4.5 million
residents. Tennessee and Indiana also hold comparable populations near 6.3 million persons.
Hawaii‘s population is the smallest with only 1.3 million residents. However, the 2009 verdicts
per one million residents suggest that Alabama juries adjudicate more trials than the other four
states (56.1 verdicts per million residents), despite having a population smaller than both
Tennessee and Indiana. Indiana trial courts rendered the second largest number of verdicts per
million persons (48.8). Despite Hawaii‘s smaller population, it still appears that Hawaiian juries
decided fewer cases than the other states. The Hawaii reporter reports only 12 civil jury trials for
2009. Kentucky and Tennessee trial courts both adjudicated around 200 cases in 2009. Overall,
a comparison of the number of civil jury verdicts in each state, compared to state population,
implies that factors beyond population size determine number of jury trials in each state. On the
other hand, even in Alabama where civil juries adjudicate the most civil trial, the data show less
than 60 trials for every million residents, demonstrating that trials are an infrequent event.
Table 2.1.Civil Jury Verdicts in Five States (November 2008 to November 2009)
State

Verdicts
per Million
Persons
56.1

Median
Award

Maximum
Award

% ProPlaintiff

Alabama

Number of
Jury
Verdicts
258

$30,000

$33,257,694

50%

%
Punitive
Damages
6.6%

Hawaii

12

9.2

$208,050

$6,150,000

42%

0

Indiana

244

38.1

$23,380

$157,000,000

62%

1.7%

Kentucky

210

48.8

$42,612

$55,900,000

49%

4.5%

Tennessee

199

32.1

$16,250

$23,600,000

56%

1.5%

Table 2.1 also reports the median and maximum awards to compare the typical award in
each state to the largest awards given the highly skewed nature of awards (awards in 2009 range
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from zero dollars to $157,000,000).5 In order the capture the jury‘s evaluation of litigants‘
claims, the data set records the jury‘s initial award in each case. I do not adjust awards for posttrial increases or decreases. However, jury awards are often reduced post-trial either through
settlement, court action, or appeal (Border 1986; Greene and Bornstein 2003; Ostrom, Hanson,
and Daley 1993). Additionally, successful plaintiffs often recover little if any of the actual
award (Hans 2008). In an analysis of medical malpractice verdicts in New York City, Vidmar et.
al (1998) observe that 44% of all verdicts were reduced post trial, and that on average, plaintiffs
received 62% of the jury‘s initial award. Although plaintiffs may not receive the jury‘s initial
award, the median and maximum jury awards provide insight into the typical award in a state
and the factors that lead juries to generously compensate plaintiffs. Once again, I possess
relatively few observations for Hawaii, preventing a broad comparison; however, the largest
median award occurs in Hawaii, $208,050. The smallest median award, only $16,250 occurs in
Kentucky. The median award in Alabama is $30,000, while the median awards in Kentucky and
Indiana are $42,612 and $23,380, respectively. The median awards in each state, other than
Hawaii, suggest that the typical jury award is not especially large.
Obviously cases involving extremely large awards represent atypical trials; however, the
maximum award cases provide illustrations of actual litigation where juries delivered million
dollar verdicts. For example, Alabama juries awarded $33,257,694 to the state in State of
Alabama v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. et al in which the state claimed that Novartis
fraudulently over charged the state‘s Medicaid system for drugs (05-219.52) (Miller AJVR 2009,
412). Novartis charged the state of Alabama the average wholesale prices (AWP) or average
wholesale acquisitions costs (WAC) for drugs over a 10 year period. However, the state alleged

5

A zero dollar award occurs when the plaintiff wins but is not awarded damages.
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that the true cost paid by pharmacies and providers was significantly less than that paid by the
state. In Novartis‘ defense, the company claimed that the state knew that WAC and AWP did
not reflect the actual prices charged to wholesalers. Additionally, Novartis maintained that the
state possessed the right to audit pharmacies and should have done so. The trial lasted half a
month, and the verdict currently awaits appellate review.
A Hawaiian jury awarded $6,150,000 to a plaintiff alleging a medical malpractice injury
in Ray v. Kkapiolani Medical Specialists (0600304) (Semmens HJRR 2009, 838). The plaintiff,
a teenage girl at the time, alleged that the high dosage of steroid used to treat her Lupus at a
hospital resulted in permanent physical disability, leaving the plaintiff unable to walk without
crutches. She argued that the hospital‘s use of the high dosage of steroid violated the accepted
standard of care. The defense maintained that the hospital warned the family before treatment
that a rare chance of muscle weakness might result. In addition, the defense noted other
instances of higher doses of steroids used to successfully treat other patients.
The largest award in Indiana occurred in a product liability case. The jury awarded
$157,000,000 to the family of a man who was tragically strangled to death when his treestand
collapsed while hunting in the case Estate of Simonton v. L&L Enterprises Inc. (79D01-0602CT-20) (Miller IJVR 2009, 475). After finding the man hanging from a tree, the plaintiffs, the
wife and stepson of the deceased, alleged that the company was liable for the defective treestand.
The treestand had been recalled the year before. The company, having previously gone out of
business in 2004, did not participate in this litigation. The court granted the estate a default
judgment on liability, and the jury issued a verdict on damages only. Although the jury decided
to compensate the family, this case presents an example of the type of trial where the plaintiff
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likely received little if any of the actual award since the business likely possesses few if any
resources after going out of business.
Kentucky jurors awarded $55,900,000 ($53,000,000 of the verdict representing punitive
damages) to the family of a woman involved in a fatal assault in Wittich v. Flick (08-4294)
(Miller KJVR 2009, 581). The case began when two business partners in an optometry office
had a business disagreement that apparently became violent. Flick, one of the business partners,
invaded his colleague‘s home and shot and killed his girlfriend, Wittich. Flick then waited for
his partner to return home, and shot him as well before being subdued (a Kentucky jury also
resolved a civil suit regarding the second shooting in another trial). Wittich‘s estate filed suit
against Flick, who by this time was serving a life sentence for her murder. However, like the
previous example, the deceased‘s family is unlikely to obtain the amount awarded from a
convicted murderer serving a life sentence.
In Hill v. Moise (000093-06) (Miller TJVR 2009, 288) a Tennessee jury awarded the
plaintiff $23,600,000 in a medical malpractice suit. Hill, a woman in her early twenties in 2003,
found a lump in her breast and reported it to her Ob-Gyn. After examining the lump in an office
visit by palpating the lump, Dr. Moise concluded that the lump was harmless and ran no
additional tests. In 2005, during her pregnancy, Hill noticed that the lump appeared larger and
visited a second doctor. At that time, medical tests revealed that Hill had breast cancer that had
spread to her liver. Hill‘s diagnosis predicts a small chance of survival, and she was physically
unable to attend the trial. Hill alleged that Dr. Moise‘s failure to perform cancer screening on the
lump violated the standard of care and lead to a later diagnosis of the cancer, allowing the cancer
to spread and preventing early treatment. Dr. Moise‘s defense argued that, because of the
plaintiff‘s age, cancer was unlikely, and therefore, additional screening was not necessary.
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Although the cases where juries handed down the largest awards are atypical when
compared to the majority of cases, these five cases have a number of features in common and
shed light on the factors that lead jurors to the largest damage awards. Of the five cases
involving the largest awards, there are two medical malpractice cases, one product liability, one
fraud, and one fatal assault claim. All five cases involve severe injuries. Case injuries include
two deaths, a high probability of death, a permanent disability, and a claim for a large monetary
loss. In four of the five cases, an individual or an individual‘s estate alleged an injury against the
defendant. Additionally, three of the five cases involve a business defendant. These trials
suggest that the cases with the largest awards typically involve severely injured plaintiffs,
individuals and businesses, and medical malpractice claims.
Turning to the types of cases shaping the dockets in Alabama, Indiana, Kentucky and
Tennessee, comprehensive examination demonstrates that civil trial courts handle similar case
issues; however, the distribution of case issues across states varies considerably.6 Cases types
are aggregated into the seven most common issue areas including auto negligence, premises
liability, fraud, medical malpractice, products liability, uninsured motorist, and breach of
contract (see Appendix B). A general negligence category captures all other types of negligence
claims, while an ―other issue‖ category represents cases not captured by any other category. The
general public likely recognizes trials involving automobile accidents and medical malpractice,
but other case types might be less familiar. For example, premises liability cases involve a
plaintiff‘s claim that the defendant negligently maintained an unsafe premises. Felix v. WalMart (06-0754) (Miller KJVR 2009, 659) provides an example of typical premise liability case
in which a woman slipped and fell in a sticky substance on a Wal-Mart floor and dislocated her
6

In 2009 Hawaiian juries decided only 12 cases. Unfortunately the small number of cases in Hawaii prevents a
graphic comparison to the other states. Therefore, Hawaii is not included in the discussions of states‘ docket
compositions. However, a discussion of the distribution of the cases in Hawaii is included Section 4.1 of Chapter 4.
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hip in the fall. Although Wal-Mart prevailed at trial, the plaintiff argued that Wal-Mart failed to
maintain a reasonably safe floor. Products liability cases involve an allegation that the defendant
failed to provide a reasonably safe product. In the product‘s liability case, Maroney v. Taurus
International Manufacturing (07-73) (Miller AJVR 2009, 490), a man sued a gun manufacturer
for making and selling an unsafe product when the gun allegedly fired a bullet into the man‘s
buttocks after falling from the man‘s pocket and hitting a cement floor, despite the engaged
safety (the jury awarded Maroney $500,000 in compensatory damages and $750,000 in punitive
damages). Uninsured or under-insured motorist cases involve plaintiffs injured in automobile
accidents in which the driver at fault lacked insurance or adequate coverage for all of the
damages. In these cases, the injured plaintiff sues his or her own insurance company for
damages caused by the uninsured or under-insured driver. Civil trial courts also examine
economic cases such as fraud and breach of contract. The previously discussed case of State of
Alabama v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. et al (Miller AJVR 2009, 412) provides a good
example of a fraud trial. A breach of contract trial occurred following the alleged theft of a
man‘s SUV. When the man made a claim with his insurer for the loss of the stolen vehicle, the
insurance company found the theft fraudulent and denied that claim. Although unsuccessful at
trial, the man made a breach of contract claim against the insurer in Green v. Allstate Insurance
Company (49D06-0606-PL-27082) (Miller IJVR 2009, 380).
Plaintiffs may also seek, and juries sometimes award punitive damages. Punitive
damages seek to punish the defendant and deter similar behavior in the future. Juries award
punitive damages when the defendant‘s conduct goes beyond negligence to the extent of reckless
or malicious conduct (Ghiaridi and Kircher 1995). Most states only allow punitive damage
awards when the jury first awards compensatory damages; however, some states, such as
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Kentucky and Alabama, allow juries to award only punitive damages. However, the data show
that juries award punitive damages infrequently. Alabama juries award punitive damages most
often of the five states; however, even in Alabama only about 7% of awards include punitive
damages. Of the available cases in Hawaii in 2009, none include punitive damages. Juries
award punitive damages in about 2% of trials in Indiana and Tennessee and in 4.5% of trials in
Kentucky.
Figure 2.1 provides a descriptive overview of the 2009 dockets in Alabama, Indiana,
Kentucky, and Tennessee. States‘ dockets show that trials involving auto accidents make up
close to fifty percent of the caseload in Alabama (48%), Indiana (49%), and Tennessee (54%).
Unlike the other states, only 21% of the trials in Kentucky entail auto accidents. Medical
Malpractice cases make up the second largest segment of the docket in Alabama (12%), Indiana
(14%), and Tennessee (15%), and represent the largest segment of the docket in Kentucky
(29%). The next largest category of trials varies by state. In Alabama uninsured motorist cases
comprise 10% of the docket. Premises liability cases are the third largest segment of the docket
in Indiana. In Kentucky, the third largest categories of issues are general negligence (15%) and
other issues (15%). Kentucky courts appear to hear a greater number of negligence cases and
cases involving more varied issues than the other three states. Economic cases, fraud and breach
of contract, together account for 10% of the trials in Alabama, 2% in Indiana, 1% in Kentucky,
and 3% in Tennessee. The dockets of all four states suggest that products liability cases occur
infrequently. Products liability cases account for only 1% of the docket in Alabama and Indiana
and just 2% of the cases in Kentucky and Tennessee. Overall, trials involving auto accidents,
medical malpractice, and general negligence cases make up the majority of the dockets in all four
states. However, Tennessee courts resolve considerably more auto negligence cases.
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Alabama

Indiana
8%

9%
8%

11%
0%
2%

4%

1%

48%

6%
1%

49%

12%

2%
10%

3%
14%

12%

Kentucky

Tennessee
10%

15%

21%

0%

8%

1%
2%
15%

8%

54%

2%

2%
5%

29%
2%

15%
5%
6%

Figure 2.1. Docket Composition in Alabama, Indiana, Kentucky, and Tennessee

Kentucky civil trial courts adjudicate almost twice as many medical negligence cases as any of
the other states. Indiana courts hear considerably more premises liability cases, and Alabama
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trial courts resolve more economic (fraud and breach of contract) disputes than any other state.
Examining the cases that comprise the civil dockets in Alabama, Indiana, Kentucky, and
Tennessee demonstrates that mix of cases coming before courts varies across states. Although
explaining the differences in trial court‘s dockets is beyond the scope of this research,
presumably, statutory and organizational variation accounts for some of the differences.
Institutional variation across states also provides another important distinction between
state trial courts. Table 2.2 reports the institutional arrangements explored in this study.
Although the influence of judicial selection and retention methods on trial court behavior
remains understudied, previous research demonstrates that judicial selection and retention
methods strongly influence decision-making at the state supreme court level, especially in highly
salient cases (Brace and Hall 1990, 1993, 1997; Brace and Boyea 2007, 2008). If judges shape
jury decision-making through their rulings or courtroom demeanor, jury verdicts might vary
across judicial selection and retention mechanisms. Alabama selects and retains judges in
partisan elections every six years in circuit-based elections.7 However, the Alabama governor
fills mid-term vacancies. In some counties the governor selects the replacement judge from a list
generated by a judicial selection committee. In Hawaii, the governor selects judges from a list
developed by a judicial selection committee. The appointed judge is then confirmed by the state
senate. Every ten years, the judicial selection committee votes to retain or remove judges based
on a majority vote. Unlike judicial selection and retention in the other states, Indiana utilizes
three types of selection and retention methods at the trial-court level. In Indiana the governor
fills all mid-term vacancies and most counties in Indiana use partisan, county-based elections
every six years to retain judges. However, Allen and Vanderburgh counties use nonpartisan

7

All judicial selection information was collected from the American Judicature Society, and where possible, verified
through state election returns.
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elections to select and retain judges, while Lake and St. Joseph counties utilize merit selection
and retention elections. Circuit judges in Kentucky serve eight-year terms and are retained in
circuit-based, nonpartisan elections. Like other states, the governor in Kentucky fills mid-term
vacancies. In Tennessee judges serve eight-year terms and are retained in district-based, partisan
elections. Unlike the other states, Tennessee does not stagger judicial elections, so all judges in
the state are up for reelection at the same. The governor in Tennessee fills mid-term vacancies.
Table 2.2. Institutional Variation
State

Judicial Selection Method

Damage
Caps

Comparative
Fault

Alabama

Partisan Elections

Hawaii

Gubernatorial Appointment

Indiana

Mixed

X

X

Kentucky

Non-Partisan

X

X

Tennessee

Partisan

Institutional
Review Board

X
X

X

Additionally, some states have adopted institutional changes to their civil trial courts,
often in response to tort reforms. One significant reform, damage caps, limits the amount of
money successful plaintiffs may receive for compensation.8 Indiana limits damage awards in
medical malpractice suites to $1,250,000 and awards against municipalities to $500,000. In
Indiana, awards exceeding the damage cap are reduced to the statutory maximum post trial.
Although lacking strict damage caps like Indiana, defendants in Kentucky can request that judges
cap damages to a certain amount on a case by case basis.

8

Although states have enacted caps on non-economic damages and punitive damages; the damage caps referred to
here only reflect caps on compensatory damages and/or total awards.
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Furthermore, the method states use to determine fault in the jury decision-making process
constitutes a significant institutional difference between circuits. In a state that uses comparative
fault such as Tennessee, a jury holding multiple defendants liable may split the damages between
the parties. The case Estate of Soots v. Shelly and Sands Inc., et al. provides an example of a
case in which the jury allocated fault across multiple defendants (49D11-0803-CT-10479)
(Miller IJVR 2009, 376). Tragically, the conflict arose when a worker was killed at a road
construction site. He suffered a fatal head injury after falling out of an open-bed truck while
placing temporary signage at the site. The man‘s estate filed suit against the general contractor
in charge of the construction project, Shelly & Sands Inc., for failing to follow standard safety
protocol that, if followed, would have prevented the man‘s death. Shelly and Sands Inc. named
the sub-contractor, Schutt-Lookabill, which had employed the deceased as a non-party to the
lawsuit and blamed it for the man‘s death. The jury awarded the estate $10,200,000 but
allocated fault 41% to Shelly and Sands Inc. and 39% to Schutt-Lookabill; thus, dividing the
award between the two defendants ($4,182,000 against Shelly and Sands Inc. and $3,987,000
against Schutt-Lookabill). The juries assessed the other 20% liability to Soots. Juries in states
utilizing comparative fault can also adjust awards to offset the plaintiff‘s contributing
negligence. In Drummer v. Stinson (20940) (Miller TJVR 2009, 352) the plaintiff sued her
dentist after he dropped a dental instrument down her throat during a root canal, requiring a
surgical removal. The jury determined mixed fault, assigning 85% of the fault to the dentist and
15% to the plaintiff for swallowing the tool, offsetting the initial award of $24,991 by 15% and
reducing the plaintiff‘s award to $21,242. Defense verdicts also occur in states that use
comparative fault in cases in which the jury assesses more than 50% comparative fault to the
plaintiff.
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Conversely, Alabama uses what‘s called ―no contribution among tort feasers‖ to allocate
damages among multiple defendants. Under the no contribution system, jurors do not determine
how much of an award each defendant will pay in multi-defendant cases. Instead, in a case
where there are multiple defendants, the plaintiff can collect from all tort feasers. According to a
judge in Alabama, ―This creates an interesting dynamic when some defendants have high
coverage and others have little. It can be a disadvantage to have ‗deep pockets.‘ If you have the
most money available, the plaintiff is most likely to try and collect from you, because in
Alabama plaintiffs can collect as much of the verdict from one party as they can.‖
Conversely, in states such as Alabama, civil courts rely on the contributory negligence
standard to determine fault.9 In Alabama, jurors use a two-stage process to determine fault.
First, jurors have to determine if the defendant is negligent. If jurors find the defendant
negligent, they then decide if the plaintiff contributed in any way to his or her injury. Under
contributory negligence, if the plaintiff was even 1% at fault, the plaintiff cannot recover
damages. Contributory negligence creates two hurdles for plaintiffs. First, plaintiffs have to
show that the defendant was negligent. They then have to show that they did not contribute to
their own the injury. The contributory negligence standard of fault produces a greater hurdle for
plaintiffs than comparative fault; however, comparative fault allows jurors to offset successful
plaintiffs‘ awards. Presumably, plaintiffs win more often under the lower bar of comparative
fault; however, successful plaintiffs likely receive less compensation.
Finally, the state of Indiana requires that all plaintiffs alleging medical malpractice must
take their claims before an institutional review board prior to trial. The institutional view board
is an independent institution comprised of medical experts that makes a non-binding evaluation
9

All information regarding the determination of fault in Alabama was obtained from in-depth interviews with
judges in the state. In order to protect the identities of all interview participants, the names and locations of all
interviews will remain confidential.
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of the plaintiff‘s medical malpractice claim. Although the board‘s decision is not binding, the
board‘s determination is admissible as evidence at the trial and likely influences the plaintiff‘s
chances of success at.
Table 2.3.

State

Individual v.
Individual

Individual v.
Business

Individual v.
Government

Alabama

54.2%

30%

0

Individual v.
Other
Defendant
1.2%

Hawaii

33%

33%

0

33%

Indiana

62.7%

19.7%

2.7%

2.5%

Kentucky

45.5%

36%

4.7%

1%

Tennessee

62.3%

26.6%

2.5%

1.5%

All States

56%

28%

2%

2%

In evaluating who participates in litigation, I code each plaintiff and defendant as an
individual, business, or government. Remaining classes of litigants such as organizations or
estates are coded as ―other.‖ This coding scheme is consistent with prior studies (Haynie 1994,
1995; Songer, Sheehan, and Haire 1999; Songer and Sheehan 1992; Wheeler, Carwright, Kagan,
and Friedman 1987) Examining the types of litigants participating in civil trials across the five
states in Table 2.3, demonstrates that most civil trials involve individual plaintiffs suing
individual defendants. The vast majority of all cases involve an individual plaintiff suing an
individual defendant.10 The next largest category of litigants entails individuals seeking damages

10

Auto negligence cases always involve an individual plaintiff suing an individual defendant. However, the
defendant typically relies on legal representation provided by an insurance company. Arguably, these cases might
be considered individual v. business; however all five states under study have non-introduction clauses, preventing
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from business defendants. Only 4% of cases involve an individual challenging the government
or any other class of defendant. Individual appellants challenging an individual, a business, the
government, or other defendants account for 88% of trials in the five states. The percentages of
litigants participating in trials show that, overall, individuals participate in litigation more often
than all other classes of litigants. Additionally, only 12% of cases entail a trial in which a nonindividual serves as the plaintiff, demonstrating that individuals overwhelmingly initiate the civil
trial process. The distribution of litigant classes across states suggests that the combinations of
litigants involved in civil trials are fairly consistent across states.
I also code for eight injury categories ranging from emotional to soft tissue (scratches,
bruises, and whiplash, etc.) to extreme injuries such as paralysis and death (see Appendix B).
Table 2.4 reports the frequencies of alleged injuries in cases coming before civil juries across the
five states. Although previous research finds that soft tissue injuries garner the less
compensation than other types of injuries (Bovbjerg et al 1991), suffer from a lack of familiarity
among the general public (Hans 2008), and are often viewed as illegitimate (Hans 2008), soft
tissue injuries are the most frequent type of injury in civil trials in the five states (195 total cases,
combined). While the data cannot explain the prevalence of soft tissue injuries in civil trials, soft
tissue injuries might simply occur more commonly than other injuries. On the other hand, the
difficulty in proving a soft tissue injury might encourage cases involving soft tissue symptoms to
go to trial rather than settling beforehand. The second and third most frequent injuries occur in
cases in which the plaintiff underwent a surgery as a result of an accident or died. Injuries
involving broken bones are the fourth most common in all states. Combined, physical injuries
account for 77.2% of civil trials (712 our 923 cases). Overwhelmingly, cases involving physical

the admission of the defendant‘s insurance or policy limits as evidence. Additionally, jurors are instructed not to
consider the defendant‘s ability to pay.
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injuries dominate the dockets of state civil trial courts. Overall, the results suggest that the
frequency of alleged injuries in civil trials is relatively evenly distributed across states. The most
interesting difference between states is the far greater frequency of property and monetary
disputes in Alabama. While the other states appear to decide cases involving economic injuries
relatively infrequently, Alabama juries decide a comparatively large number of these cases in a
given year.
Table 2.4. Types of Injuries
Alleged Injury

Alabama

Hawaii

Indiana

Kentucky

Tennessee

Total

Property Loss/Damage

23

0

6

4

1

34

Monetary Loss

32

0

10

25

2

69

Emotional

3

2

2

7

2

16

Broken Bone(s)

8

1

14

16

17

56

Death

25

3

22

21

11

82

Injury Required
Surgical Repair
Slip and Fall

22

1

26

24

11

84

1

1

11

3

9

25

Soft Tissue

32

2

51

31

84

200

Other Physical
Injuries
Other Non-Physical
Injuries

111

1

96

76

57

270

3

1

6

4

5

92

Findings
These data provide the first comprehensive database of civil trials allowing for an in
depth investigation of the dockets, case facts, and litigants in all of the civil jury trials in a state
in a given year. Examining courts‘ dockets comprehensively shows that the types of cases
adjudicated vary considerably across the states; however, auto negligence and medical
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malpractice cases encompass the majority of trials in each state. While determining the factors
that shape courts‘ dockets remains beyond the scope of this project, future research should
explore the factors that drive the demand for particular types of litigation across states.
However, the disparities in case types across states indicate that models of civil litigation should
control for the mix of cases coming before courts. Additionally, factors beyond the population
size appear to determine the volume of cases adjudicated in each state. These findings also show
that the majority of civil trials involve physical injuries. Soft tissue injuries (scratches, bruises,
whiplash, etc.) represent the most frequent category of injury in civil trials. Although the precise
reason for the predominance of soft tissue injuries is unclear, soft tissue injuries may simply
occur more often. On the other hand, the inherent difficulty in proving a soft tissue injury might
simply encourage these types of cases to go to trial. Additionally, trials often involve severe
physical injuries such as death and broken bones. Although explaining this finding also requires
additional research, the data also show that in a given year Alabama civil juries decide
considerably more cases involving economic injuries. Turning to litigants, investigating the
participants in civil litigation shows that individuals are the most frequent participants in civil
litigation. Fifty-six percent of trials involve an individual suing another individual, and 88% of
all trials involve an individual plaintiff. Descriptive comparison of jury verdicts across states
provide evidence that considerable variation occurs across states in the types of cases civil juries
adjudicate, who wins and who loses, and how much successful parties receive. On the other
hand, the data show that the participants in litigation and the types of injuries involved in trials
remain fairly constant across states. Although state statutory restrictions like damage caps
presumably account for some the deviation, the data provide support for the Federalists‘
contention that states employ dissimilar systems of civil law. The following chapters will utilize
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multivariate analyses to further explore how these variables shape the dispute resolution and
resource allocation functions of courts.
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Chapter 3
“Tort Hell”? Alabama Civil Jury Verdicts from 2001-2009
In 1993 Forbes magazine referred to Alabama as ―Tort Hell.‖ The American Tort Reform
Association has also called Alabama a ―judicial hellhole.‖ The large amount of attention
focused on the Alabama civil litigation system makes Alabama‘s civil jury verdicts especially
interesting to compare to other states using comprehensive data. To date, researchers interested
in the Alabama civil litigation system, have attempt to evaluate claims regarding Alabama jury
verdicts. However, these studies, like other civil jury research, suffer from a lack of high quality,
comprehensive data. In 1999 Moller, Pace, and Carroll attempted to compare civil jury verdicts
in Alabama to verdicts in Cook County, Illinois, Harris County, Texas, the St. Louis
metropolitan area, and New York. The author obtained data from the somewhat limited records
available through the state of Alabama and jury verdict reporters operating in the other locations.
Moller et. al conclude that Alabama juries return the largest damage awards relative to
compensatory awards. On the other hand, Alabama juries appear to award punitive damages
with a similar frequency to other jurisdictions. Although the findings suggest that Alabama
juries might hand out larger awards, the study suffers from several limitations. First, since their
previous work indicated that punitive damage awards occur more often in financial cases, the
scholars choose only to look at financial injuries. While focusing on one type of case might
facilitate the authors‘ research questions, it prevents a true comparison of all Alabama jury
verdicts. Additionally, comparison is limited, because the researchers relied on jury verdict
reporters covering different geographic units. For example, the authors compare verdicts in the
state of Alabama to one county in Texas. While verdicts in Alabama might differ from Harris
county, verdicts in Texas overall and Alabama might be quite similar. Furthermore, Moller et. al
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do not examine the determinants of winners and losers or attempt multivariate controls for other
possible explanatory variables.
Priest (1996) argues in favor of punitive damage reform based on his research in three
Alabama circuits. He finds that in the 1992-1993 time period all of the torts in Bullock County
and 78.3% of all torts in Barbour County (Barbour and Bullock counties make up the 2nd circuit)
included a punitive damage claim, and 65.1% of the filings in Lowndes County (part of the 1st
circuit) included a punitive damage claim. Unfortunately, Priest does not report the percentage
of those claims that plaintiffs actually won, or the amount, if any, they received. Additionally,
Priest states that each county possesses a small, mostly rural population, without substantial
industry, preventing a comparison to counties with different demographic characteristics.
However, if claims about Alabama civil juries‘ pro-plaintiff tendencies and excessive
awards are correct, Alabama represents a worst case scenario for tort reformers. Additionally, if
Alabama circuits exhibit high variability in verdicts and awards for similar cases, Alabama
confirms Federalists‘ fears of inconsistent applications of the law. On the other hand, AntiFederalists might argue that Alabama residents retain the right to decide disputes as they see fit.
This research seeks to inform the debate using comprehensive data. Unlike previous studies this
research examines Alabama civil jury decision-making using all reported verdicts rendered
between 2001 and 2009 in the Alabama Circuit Courts. Additionally, this study controls for
community composition, judicial ideology, case issues, the plaintiff‘s alleged injury, and the
influence of litigant status. This research also uniquely incorporates attributes of the judge and
attorneys into models of civil jury verdicts.
Theoretically, previous research suggests that community preferences, litigant resources
and status, judicial ideology, institutions, and case facts shape civil trial outcomes both in terms
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of winners and losers and awards. While the previous chapter finds descriptive evidence that
civil jury verdicts vary across states, this chapter seeks to answer the question: Do jury verdicts
vary from one jurisdiction to another within a state? If we observe differences across circuits,
what factors explain and predict those differences? In order to ascertain whether civil jury
verdicts vary across Alabama circuits in predictable ways, the chapter begins by developing
measures for the variables associated with the theoretical model. The chapter then tests the
model using three dependent variables in order to capture the pro-plaintiff tendencies of the
circuits, how circuits settle disputes, and allocate resources. The results help to evaluate
Federalists‘ and tort reformers‘ fears regarding inconsistent applications of the law and high
variability in outcomes across jurisdictions. The findings also shed light on Anti-Federalists
assertions that jury verdicts reflect community preferences. The chapter concludes with a
summary and discussion of the results.
Modeling Civil Jury Verdicts in Alabama
The Alabama Circuit Courts comprise 41 circuits and decide an average of 284 civil
cases a year with jurisdiction over cases involving damage claims of $3,000 or more. Alabama
selects residents for jury service from lists of all registered drivers. The data include 2,246 civil
cases adjudicated over the nine-year time period. Of the 2,246 cases, plaintiffs won 1,173 or
52.2%. Although the data contains minimum awards of only a dollar and large awards of
multiple millions, the median award in Alabama over the nine years is $30,000. The percent
pro-plaintiff verdicts for the entire time period and the median award are consistent with the
percent pro-plaintiff verdicts and median award in 2009, reported in Chapter 2. The consistency
in verdicts across the nine years also provides evidence that the editors of the Alabama Jury
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Verdict Reporter collect consistent and reliable data. During the nine-year period, Alabama
juries awarded $1,928,101,054 in total awards.
Hypotheses and Independent Variables
I code each case for the verdict, the amount of the award, the judge, the attorneys, case
type, and alleged injury. Next, I develop three measures of the social, political, and economic
context of the circuit. Table 3.1 provides a summary of the key independent variables and their
coding. The first model examines the influence of the overall percent black, percent unemployed,
percent college educated, percent 65 and over, and urban characterization of the circuit
(measured as the percent farming employed). The second model tests the relationship between
the political leanings of the circuit and jury verdicts using the percent Democratic vote in the
2008 presidential elections. The index, the third measure of community composition, predicts
pro-plaintiff demographic characteristics in the circuit based on the relative level of
unemployment, percent college educated in the circuit, percent white, percent black and percent
farmers in each circuit.
I divide the variables that potentially affect the outcome in civil trials into five categories.
First, I examine institutional and ideological influences. Variables in this category include the
partisan identification of the judge and the court workload variable. Next, I explore litigant status
and litigant resources. The first litigant resource variable measures the relative advantage of the
plaintiff‘s representation. The model also examines the parties to each case comparing the
plaintiff‘s likelihood of success when challenging the government, other individuals, and other
defendants to the likelihood of the individual winning against business defendants (i.e. individual
versus business defendant is the excluded category).
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Table 3.1 Key Independent Variables
Variable

Measurement

Institutions and Ideology (all models)
Judges‘ Ideology [+]
Democrat x Percent Democratic Vote

Decisions Per-Circuit Year

-Coded 1 if the judge is a Democrat, and 0
otherwise
-Interacts the Democrat variable with percent
Democratic vote in the circuit in the 2008
election
-Number of decision in each circuit in each
year

Litigant Resources and Status (all models)
Attorney Advantage [+] (all models)
Litigant Matches

# of Plaintiff Attorneys - # Defense Attorneys
Dichotomous Variables

Individual v. Individual
Individual v. Government
Individual v. Other Defendant

Compared to Individual v. Business

Circuit Demographics (Model 1)
%White [-]
%Black [+]
%Poverty [+]
%College Educated [-]
%65 and Over [-]
Urban [+]
Circuit Ideology (Model 2)
Percent Democratic Vote in the 2008
Presidential Election
Demographic Index (Model 3)
Index Predicting Pro-Plaintiff Tendencies and
Larger Awards

Greater resources should increase success rate,
but might also increase awards.
US Census and Department of Agriculture
Statistics

-Coded 1 if The Circuit has More than 500
Persons Per Square Mile, and 0 otherwise
Obtained for Election Returns Available
Through the Alabama Secretary of State

Takes the %White, Black, Unemployment,
College Educated, 65 and over, Farming
population, and subtracts from the state median
on each indicator. The final measure sums the
deviations from the median. Scaled so that
higher values indicate pro-plaintiff
demographic combinations.
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Finally, I examine the issues involved in the case by comparing outcomes in medical
negligence, general negligence, premises liability, uninsured or underinsured motorists, breach of
contract, fraud, premises liability, product liability, and other issues to automobile negligence
cases. Automobile negligence cases account for 45% of the trials adjudicated in Alabama during
the seven-year time period, suggesting auto negligence cases are a routine occurrence in
Alabama circuits. The models compare all less frequent case types to the base category of auto
negligence claim; thus, automobile negligence serves as the excluded category. I then turn to the
plaintiff‘s alleged injury. The analysis incorporates a larger number of issues than previous
studies, allowing us to examine plaintiff success rates and awards across a variety of cases types.
The model compares cases involving a property loss or damage, a monetary loss, broken bones,
slip and fall, emotional injuries, injuries resulting in surgery, and injuries resulting in death to the
excluded category of soft tissue injuries (scratches, bruises, whiplash injuries, etc). Previous
research maintains that plaintiffs alleging soft tissue injuries (scratches, bruises, whiplash
injuries, etc.) face significant difficulties at trial due the ambiguous nature of the injury, jurors‘
lack of familiarity with the term, and jurors‘ perceptions of soft tissue injuries as bogus claims
(Hans 2008). I hypothesize that, the more serious and demonstrable the injury, the more likely
the plaintiff is to win and to receive a larger award (Bronstein 1998; Bovbjerg et al 1989; Chin
and Peterson 1985; Greene and Bornstein 2003). To test this hypothesis I compare all injury
categories to soft tissue injuries. The models also include a variable that measures the number of
decisions in each circuit each year. The number of decisions variable serves as a control for the
workload of the circuit.
The first component of the theoretical model indicates that the community surrounding a
court and from which jurors are drawn might influence courts‘ dispute resolution and resource
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allocation functions. In order to capture the political, social, and economic composition of each
circuit, I develop three measures of community composition with three corresponding models.
Although circuit-level demographics cannot adequately predict the composition of any particular
jury, the demographic composition of a circuit should reflect the political, social, and economic
conditions in which the court resides. In addition, if jury verdicts reflect community preferences,
the socioeconomic and political composition of a circuit should influence communities‘
preferences regardless of the composition of any particular jury. In Alabama most circuits
encompass one county, though rural circuits often include multiple counties. For circuits
including multiple counties, I generate average scores for each indicator.
Previous research provides evidence that county-level demographics predict the
liberal/conservative policy preferences at the state and county levels (Ardoin and Garand 2003;
Erikson, Wright, McIver 1993; Koetzle 1998; Levendusky, Pope, and Jackman 2008), suggesting
that the demographic makeup of a community might also influence other decision-making
patterns. To capture the social and economic community composition, I first model community
composition using six demographic indicators using US Census and Department of Agriculture
statistics. Next, I focus exclusively on the political make-up of the community using the percent
Democratic vote in the circuit in the 2008 presidential election. Finally, I create a model that
uses a demographic index to test the hypothesis that certain political, social, and economic
indicators combine to create strongly pro-plaintiff jurisdictions.
Numerous legislative studies seek to measure constituent preferences using demographic
indicators of racial composition, age, education, and urbanization (Pool, Abelson, and Popkin
1965; Sinclair-Decker 1976; Weber and Shaffer 1976). These studies assume that individuals‘
demographic characteristics shape their policy preferences and that the overall policy preferences
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of an area will reflect the aggregate demographic composition of the community. Theoretically,
demographics might lead to individual policy preferences, because demographics reflect the
interests of certain groups in society and, or represent differing societal socialization processes
across groups. Scholars studying legislative politics typically maintain that urban, lower income
and minority groups favor more liberal policy positions, while white and highly educated groups
possess more conservative preferences (Koetzle 1998; Hogan 2003). Older citizens tend to hold
more conservative views but also favor government intervention (Koetzel 1998; Hogan 2003).
Although scholars of juror behavior remain highly conflicted over the influence of
individual juror traits on jury verdicts, previous research provides some evidence that juror
demographics might shape juror preferences in a manner similar to the relationship between
demographics and general liberal or conservative policy preferences. Some scholars observe that
minority (Bronstein and Rajki 1994; Devon and Imwinklereid 1995; Diamond et al; Overland
2009), low income (Bornstein and Rajki 1994; Devon and Imwinklereid; Diamond et al 1998;
Hastie et al 1998; Overland 2009), and urban (Eisenberg and Wells 2002) jurors exhibit more
pro-plaintiff tendencies. Conversely, highly educated (Goodman et al 1999; Vidmar 1993;
Vidmar and Rice 1993), and white (Overland 2009) jurors appear significantly less plaintiff
oriented. Accordingly, the first model of community composition includes variables for the
percent black or African American in the circuit (as compared to the percent white), the percent
unemployment11, and whether or not the circuit is urban or rural.12 I hypothesize that circuits
characterized by large minority populations, more unemployed citizens, and more urban dwellers
will generate more pro-plaintiff verdicts and larger awards. The model also includes variables
11

Although Helland and Tabarrock (2002, 2003) find an influence of county poverty rates on jury verdicts and
awards, I choose to focus on unemployment, because I believe it is a better indicator of the overall economic climate
in a community. While poverty tends to isolated to certain areas and groups, high levels of unemployment
dramatically impact community conditions such as home prices and public school funding.
12
The US Census designates counties with 500 persons per square mile as urban.
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for the percent college educated and 65 and over. I hypothesize that circuits with older and more
highly educated populations will render fewer pro-plaintiff verdicts and lower awards. The
percent of the population that is black, white, and college educated obtained using the 2005 U.S.
Census.13 In order to capture the effects of economic change, I collect the annual unemployment
rate in each circuit instead of household income. Data for the percent unemployment were
obtained from the U.S. Department of Agriculture.
While circuit demographics might reflect a community‘s liberal or conservative
preferences, the percent Democratic vote in the circuit might provide a more direct measure of a
community‘s political leanings. Instead of circuit demographics, the second model of
community composition includes a measure of the percent Democratic vote in the circuit in the
2008 presidential election. A number of scholars, attempting to capture the overall liberalism or
conservatism of a legislative district, have relied on the past presidential vote (Fleisher 1993;
Glazer and Robbins 1985; Johannes 1984; LeoGrande and Jeydel 1997; Nice and Cohen 1983).
Although district partisanship and juror preferences might at first seem unrelated, a
number of parallels exist between a community‘s partisan leanings and a community‘s
preferences for the dispute resolution and resource allocation processes that occur in courts.
First, strong partisan preferences likely shape the public‘s perceptions of litigation in a given
community. Conservative and business groups, like the ATRA, often hold negative views of the
civil litigation process and support tort reform initiatives, while liberal organizations and trial
lawyer associations tend to view civil litigation more positively. Arguably, conservative
communities should hold more negative views of civil trials than their liberal counterparts.
Additionally, liberal and conservative ideological dispositions typically reflect preferences
13

I select the 2005 Census for data collection purposes because it is the median year in the data set. Though a single
data point is used for the entire time frame analyzed, demographic features change relatively slowly across years.
Because of the greater variability in the economic variables, we collect these annually.
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toward resource distribution that presumably shape the awards juries deliver. If a large
Democratic vote share constitutes a more liberal population, I expect juries in these jurisdictions
to render more pro-plaintiff verdicts and larger awards.
As a third conceptualization of community composition, I adapt a measure of
Congressional district diversity used to predict district partisanship (Koetzle 1998). Koetzle‘s
original measure creates a demographic index by summing the percentage point deviations of a
district‘s population from the national median on five variables (the percent white, black,
household income above $50,000, college educated, and farming employed). The percent of
each circuit‘s population that works in agriculture measures the rural/urban nature of the district
(obtained from the US Department of Agriculture). The final index is then scaled so that higher
values represent more Democratic constituencies. According to Koetzle, communities
characterized by larger minority populations, lower incomes, lower education levels, and greater
percentages of urban dwellers tend to vote more liberally.
Like Koetzle, I hypothesize that certain demographic combinations within a circuit
should produce solidly liberal communities, which in turn should generate strong support for
plaintiffs. I replicate Koetzle‘s index using the percent of the population that is black, white, and
college educated obtained using the 2005 U.S. Census.14 In order to capture the effects of
economic change, I utilize the annual unemployment rate in each circuit instead of household
income. The community composition index is scaled so that higher values should indicate more
pro-plaintiff jurisdictions. Thus, I expect circuits with higher index scores, circuits with larger
minority populations, greater unemployment, lower levels of education, fewer farmers and
college graduates, to vote in favor plaintiffs more often and give more generous awards when
14

I select the 2005 Census for data collection purposes because it is the median year in the data set. Though a single
data point is used for the entire time frame analyzed, demographic features change relatively slowly across years.
Because of the greater variability in the economic variables, I collect these annually.
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they do. At the middle ranges of Koetzle‘s index, where the demographic mix favors neither
party, Koetzle predicts high partisan competition and variability in election outcomes.
Paralleling Koetzle, I predict that middle ranges on the index should produce high variability in
trial outcomes.
Although none of the demographic indicators utilized in this study can account for the
specific background of any particular juror, these measures should predict patterns of decisionmaking across circuits if community composition significantly affects trial outcomes.
Furthermore, examining several demographic indicators should help explicate some of the mixed
findings of previous studies. In particular, the demographic index provides a community-level
measure and permits the examination of combinations of demographic variables.
The second set of expectations generated by the theoretical model suggests that litigant
resources and litigant status influence winners and losers and awards. The relative strength of
the plaintiff‘s representation compared to that of the defense constitutes a critical resource
component. To measure resource advantages in terms of representation, the data set records the
number of attorneys representing the plaintiff and the number of attorneys representing the
defendant in each case as listed in the reporter. Plaintiffs and defendants that represent
themselves, pro se, receive a score of 0 for the number of attorneys. Theoretically, the number of
attorneys representing each side provides two measures of resources. First, the mere listing of
additional counsel indicates that the attorney arguing the case belongs to a larger firm with
multiple attorneys or has engaged other lawyers or firms for assistance. Secondly, the number of
attorneys working on a case represents a measure of the resources the firm invests in the case,
especially for cases taken on a contingency fee basis. The number of attorneys representing each
side provides information regarding the size of the firm the attorney belongs to and approximates
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the human capital the firm invests in each claim.15 An attorney belonging to a large firm with
multiple attorneys or working in accordance with another lawyer or lawyers arguably possess
greater resources than any individual attorney working alone, regardless of the actual number of
attorneys participating in a particular case. Although greater numbers of attorneys likely
participate in cases involving the potential for large awards, the number of attorneys a firm
devotes to a case also reflects an investment of time and money into a case.
To capture the relative resource advantage of the plaintiff versus the defendant, the
attorney advantage variable subtracts the number of defense attorneys from the number of
plaintiff attorneys. The resulting measure of the plaintiff‘s advocacy advantage currently ranges
from -4 to 3 in Alabama. A score of zero indicates that equal numbers of attorneys represented
the plaintiff and defendant. Although the number of attorneys cannot explicitly measure the
quality of counsel, the party listing more attorneys arguably possesses a resource advantage over
a party with fewer attorneys as legal counsel. Accordingly, higher values on the attorney
advantage variable should indicate greater resources for the plaintiff. Additionally, the measure
provides greater information concerning litigants‘ resources than simply relying on litigant
status. The measure provides a substantive gauge of actual resources in each case, thereby
providing a better measure of litigant resources and improving our understanding of the role
resource advantages play in litigation outcomes.
In addition to legal representation, litigant status might also condition litigation
outcomes. Consistent with prior studies, each plaintiff and defendant is coded as an individual,
business, or government to capture the relative resources of each party. Remaining classes of
litigants are coded as ―other.‖ Such coding provides only an indirect measure of the plaintiff‘s
15

However, it should be noted that the number of attorneys listed in the reporter does not account for the attorneys
actually collecting information and arguing the case. Attorneys at large firms may list multiple participants in a case
when only one or two lawyers actually perform the bulk of the work.
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and the defendant‘s resources. Yet, previous research has consistently applied such a coding
scheme, and in general, individuals have fewer resources than do either businesses or the
government. Party capability theory posits that individual litigants suffer a resource
disadvantage when interacting with courts that diminishes individuals‘ ability to garner favorable
outcomes. Conversely, while parties with greater resources may achieve higher success rates,
the ―deep pockets‖ hypothesis maintains that parties, appearing to have greater resources, might
pay larger damage awards when they lose. Wealthy repeat players like businesses presumably
achieve higher success rates than other categories of litigants but might pay larger damage
awards when they lose. To test this hypothesis, the models include a variable for an individual
plaintiff challenging another individual, the government, or other defendants compared to an
individual suing a business.
The next prong of the theoretical model maintains that judicial ideology and institutions
shape civil litigation outcomes. Like other areas of trial court research, the effect of judicial
ideology on outcomes in civil litigation has received little attention. However, if judges are able
to filter information or otherwise affect the decision parameters of trial courts, jury verdicts
might reflect the ideological dispositions of trial court judges. Theoretically, plaintiffs should
win more often in courts presided over by Democratic judges who presumably posses more
liberal ideological policy preferences. The partisan identification for each judge was obtained
from state election returns available through the Alabama Secretary of State. The model tests the
hypothesis that plaintiffs achieve higher success rates and larger awards in trials presided over by
Democratic judges. The models incorporate a variable coded 1 for a Democratic judge and 0 for
Republicans or Independents.
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Furthermore, previous research maintains that judges temper their ideological
dispositions to conform to citizen preferences. Judges on the Supreme Court (Flemming and
Wood 1997; Mishler and Sheehan 1993, 1996; Yates 2002) and state supreme courts
(Baumgartner, DeBoof, and Boystun 2008; Brace and Boyea 2007, 2008) appear adverse to
issuing rulings that deviate substantially from public opinion. Moreover, scholars observe that
the ideological composition of a state is the major determinant of the liberalism/conservatism of
the policies that policy makers adopt (Berry, Rinquist, Fording, and Hansford 1998; Brace et al
2002; Erickson, Wright, and McIver 1993; Wright, Erickson, & McIver 1987). Taken together,
previous research suggests that an interaction effect might occur between s judge‘s ideological
disposition and the liberalism or conservatism of the community in which a judge resides. To
test the hypothesis that judges behave in a more partisan manner when their constituents reflect
judges‘ partisan leanings, I create a variable that interacts judges‘ partisan identifications with
the percent Democratic vote in the circuit in model 2. If trial judges influence jury verdicts, and
judges feel pressure to conform to citizens‘ preferences, Democratic judges residing in the most
Democratic counties should produces the most liberal outcomes. Accordingly, I hypothesize that
plaintiffs will win more often and receive greater compensation when presided over by
Democratic judges in highly Democratic jurisdictions.
Additionally, court workloads vary considerably from one circuit to the next, suggesting
that the volume of cases a court decides constitutes an important institutional attribute. Some
circuits decide only a handful of case each year, while other circuits adjudicate hundreds of cases
in the same time frame. In order to control for court workloads, the models include a variable
that measures the number of decisions in each circuit each year. However, the relationship
between court workloads and jury verdicts remains unclear. Unfortunately, am unable to
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investigate the possible of influence of judicial selection method on judges‘ behavior in a singlestate model; however, the multi-state models in Chapter 4 include institutional variables for the
judicial retention mechanism utilized in the circuit. Finally, to control for any remaining
differences between the circuits, the models include dichotomous variables for each year of data,
minus one excluded year to control for fixed effects. In models using cross-sectional data, fixed
effects correct for potentially omitted variables by holding constant the average effect of annual
change.16
The final prong of the theoretical model maintains that case facts affect jury verdicts.
Accordingly, the models include variables for case issues and alleged injuries. Cases types are
aggregated into eight issue areas such as auto negligence, medical malpractice, premises liability,
fraud, and breach of contract (see Appendix A). This project incorporates a larger number of
issues than previous studies, allowing me to examine success rates and awards across a variety of
cases types. I also code for eight injury categories ranging from emotional to soft tissue
(scratches, bruises, and whiplash) to extreme injuries such as paralysis and death (see Appendix
A). I hypothesize that, the more serious and demonstrable the injury, the more likely the plaintiff
is to win and to receive a larger award (Bronstein 1998; Bovbjerg et al 1989; Chen and Peterson
1985; Greene and Bornstein 2003).
Data and Methods
To assess the variables related winners and losers and awards in each circuit, I utilize
three indicators of community composition across three dependent variables. The first
16

Fixed effects models are the standard approach used to captures the effect of other contextual differences between
the states or sub-state units in cross sectional data (for examples of models using fixed effects see Alter 2002;
Carson, Engstrom, and Roberts 2006; Desposato and Petrocik 2003; Huber and Arceneaux 2007; Lawless 2004;
Preuhs 2006, 2007; Vavreck, Spiliotes, and Fowlker 2002; Whitford and Yates 2003). I have also tried controlling
for circuit fixed effects with dummy variables for each circuit, minus one, both in combination with and without the
year dummies and observe no changes in the significance of key independent variables.
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dependent variable measures the percent pro-plaintiff verdicts by circuit. Since the percent proplaintiff verdicts in a circuit constitutes a continuous measure, I use ordinary least squares
regression. Next, I seek to capture the dispute resolution and resource allocation functions of
courts through the use of two additional dependent variables. The dependent variable in the
plaintiff success model is whether or not the jury found in favor of the plaintiff, coded one if the
plaintiff wins and zero otherwise. Due to the categorical nature of the dependent variable, I
utilize logistic regression. The dependent variable in the award model is the logged dollar
amount of the award upon success. I log the dependent variable in the award model due to the
highly skewed nature of awards (awards range from $0 to $810,000,000). I use a linear
regression model to explore jury awards.17 If the plaintiff wins in the first model, I then examine
the variables associated with awards. The unit of analysis in both the plaintiff success model
and the award model is the primary claim in each case.

17

Awards constitute a selected sample given that the awards are dependent on the liability decision in the plaintiff
success model. Selection models model two simultaneous equations to correct for potential selection bias and work
under the assumption that the observation of the values on dependent variable in the second equation is dependent
on the critical value of another variable(s). In practical terms, this means that the first equation of the model
requires a selection variable or variables that are not included in the second equation. The selection variable(s) in
equation one require strong theoretical justifications in order to correctly specify the model. Additionally, the
selection variable(s) in equation one must not significantly affect the dependent variable in stage two. Although I
gave this issue considerable thought, I unfortunately lack strong theoretical grounds to differentiate between the
variables in the two models. This limitation of selection models is widely documented (see Cameron and Trivedi
2005; Green 1981; Melenberg and Van Soest 1996; Nawata 1993; Nawata and Nagase 1996; Puhani 2000; Winship
and Mare 1992). While incorrectly specified, it is possible to run a sample selection model with identical variables
in both equations, but an incorrectly specified sample selection model can produce even more biased results than an
OLS with a selected sample. Nonetheless, I have run Heckman models using identical variables in both models.
Heckman produces a Rho coefficient that tests for independence between the models. When run this way, I find that
Rho is significant, suggesting selection issues. However, given that the model cannot be correctly specified, I have
limited confidence in these results. On the other hand, I observe no changes in the direction or significance of the
any of the key independent variables when using Heckman. Additionally, I have used the Tobit modeling procedure
to correct for censored data. Although a Tobit model corrects for the fact that the distribution includes only positive
integers, Tobit cannot address the selection bias issue. However, I have modeled awards using a Tobit model and
obtain similar results to OLS and Heckman. Given the consistency in results across modeling techniques, I feel
sufficiently confident in the robustness of the findings.
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Analyses and Results
First, I seek to determine if communities make decisions differently. Figure 3.1
graphically portrays the percentage of pro-plaintiff verdicts in each of Alabama‘s circuits.
Although some circuits hear considerably more cases than others, the wide disparities in plaintiff
success rates across circuits provides descriptive support that substantial differences exist across
communities. While plaintiff success rates remain around 50% in the state overall, at the circuit
level, plaintiff success rates range from 11.8% to 87.5%. Turning to awards, I present a scatter
plot of logged awards across the circuits in Figure 3.2. Figure 2 demonstrates that very large and
small awards occur infrequently. Most awards appear to occur in the middle ranges of the
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Figure 3.1 Percent Pro-Plaintiff Verdicts by Circuit

86

20
15
10
5
0
1

3

5

7

9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41

Circuit

Figure 3.2 Distribution of Logged Awards
Although the descriptive statistics suggest differences across circuits in trial courts‘
dispute resolution and resource allocation processes, multivariate analyses allow greater
understanding of the variables affecting litigation outcomes. Each model includes variables
measuring judicial ideology and institutions, litigation resources and litigation status, community
composition, and case facts; however, I utilize separate models for each measure of community
preferences (the percent black, unemployment, college educated, 65 and over, and urban, the
percent Democratic vote in the 2008 presidential election, and demographic index). First, I
examine the variables associated with the general verdict tendencies in the circuit using the
percent pro-plaintiff verdicts in the circuit. Next, I utilize models predicting the likelihood of
plaintiff success and award models predicting factors that influence awards upon plaintiff
success, reported in Table 3.2 and Table 3.2 Continued.18

18

Note: Although not shown in the table, the model controls for fixed effects by including dichotomous variables
for each circuit, minus one excluded circuit.
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Table 3.2 Plaintiff Success and Awards in Alabama Circuits (2001-2009)
Regression Coefficients for %
Pro-Plaintiff Verdicts

Variables
Circuit Composition
% Black
% Unemployed
% College
% 65 and Over
% Farming
2008 Democratic Vote

Model 1
b
0.002**
0.02**
-0.001**
-0.03**
-0.01
------

Model 2
b
-------------------------0.04**

Logit Coefficients for Plaintiff
Success (1 if the Plaintiff wins &
O otherwise)

Model 3
b
-------------------------------

Model 1
b
0.01**
0.05*
0.02*
-0.02
-0.01
------

Model 2
b
-------------------------0.02**

Model 3
b
-------------------------------

Regression Coefficients for
Logged Awards

Model 1
b
0.02*
0.04
-0.04
-0.01
-0.02
------

Index
----------0.01**
----------0.01**
------Litigant Resources and Status
Attorney Advantage
0.01**
0.01*
0.01**
0.01*
0.20*
0.20*
0.04
Individual v. Individual
-0.01
-0.01
-0.01
-0.01
-0.12
-0.12
-1.28**
Individual v. Government
-0.004
-0.001
-0.002
-0.52*
-0.50*
-0.51*
-0.83*
Individual v. Other Defendant
-0.01
0.01
0.01
-0.01
-0.48
0.49
-1.06**
Institutions and Ideology
Democratic Judge
-0.02
-0.13**
-0.01
-0.02
-0.05
-0.02
-0.14
Democrat x 2008 Vote
-----0.003**
----------0.002
----------Decisions Per Circuit Year
-0.004** -0.001** -0.001**
-0.002
-0.002
-0.002
0.001
* significant at the 0.05 level or higher ** significant at the 0.01 level or higher

Model 2
b
-------------------------0.02*

Model 3
b
-------------------------------

------

0.001**

0.07
-1.30*
-0.80*
-1.06**

0.06
-1.30*
-0.80*
-1.06**

-0.33
0.004
-0.003

-0.11
------1.06

Note: Although not shown in the table, the models control for fixed effects by including dichotomous variables for each year, minus
one excluded year.
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Table 3.2 Continued
Regression Coefficients for %
Pro-Plaintiff Verdicts

Variables
Case Issues
Medical Negligence
General Negligence
Premises Liability
Uninsured Motorist
Fraud
Breach of Contract
Product Liability
Other Issue
Alleged Injuries
Property Loss/Damage
Monetary Loss
Emotional Injury
Broken Bone
Death
Accident Resulted in Surgery
Slip and Fall
Other Injury
Constant

Logit Coefficients for Plaintiff
Success Rate (1 is the Plaintiff
wins & O otherwise)

Regression Coefficients for
Logged Awards

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

b
-0.02**
-0.004
-0.02
-0.01
0.002
0.01
0.003
0.01

b
-0.02**
-0.002
-0.02
-0.01
0.002
0.01
0.004
0.01

b
-0.02**
-0.002
-0.004
-0.02
-0.01
0.004
0.005
0.01

b
-0.92**
0.08
-0.27
1.04*
0.71
0.65*
-0.36
0.37

b
-0.93*
0.10
-0.26
1.03**
0.71
0.71
-0.37
0.40

b
-0.93**
0.10
-0.26
1.03**
0.71
0.71
-0.37
0.40

b
1.78**
0.26
-0.77
-0.18
1.00*
-0.23
2.10**
0.06

b
1.75**
0.30
-0.80
-0.21
1.04*
-0.23
2.10**
0.08

b
1.80**
0.30
-0.80
-0.20
1.03*
-0.23
2.07**
0.08

-0.003
-0.002
-0.002
0.50*
0.50*
0.50*
-0.13
-0.15
-0.14
-0.001
-0.001
-0.001
0.23
0.79
0.23
1.04**
1.02**
1.03
-0.002
-0.001
-0.001
0.10
0.13
0.11
0.03
0.10
0.07
-0.01
-0.001
-0.001
-0.31
-0.31
-0.31
1.26**
1.30*
1.30**
-0.01
-0.01
-0.01
-0.52*
-0.52*
-0.52*
3.45**
3.43**
3.43**
0.001
0.001
0.001
-0.27
-0.26
-0.27
1.20**
1.23**
1.24**
0.01
0.01
0.01
-0.74*
-0.74*
-0.74*
1.24**
1.24**
1.24**
-0.002
-0.002
-0.002
-0.02
-0.03
-0.02
0.90**
0.90**
0.89**
1.46**
1.45**
1.51**
1.66**
1.79**
1.59**
11.48** 11.45** 10.87**
N=369
N=360
N=369
N=2,248 N=2,202 N=2,248 N=1070 N=1024
N=1070
2
2
2
2
2
R =17.3 R =24.2 R2 =16.3 X =194.11** X =189.9**X =191.5**
R2 =31.4** R2 =31.1**R2 =30.0**
F = 13.14** F = 18.32** F= 12.66**
F =13.44** F = 14.57** F = 15.04**
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The percent pro-plaintiff, plaintiff success, and the award models provide strong support
for the hypothesis that community composition strongly influences litigation outcomes in terms
of winners and losers as well as awards. Additionally, case facts and litigant resources also
shape trial court decisions. Table 3.5 reports the results of three measures of community
composition. Each conception of community composition provides some evidence that the
demographic composition of the community in which the court resides and from which courts
draw jurors affect the pro-plaintiff tendencies of the circuit, the likelihood that the plaintiff wins,
and the amount of award upon plaintiff success.
I hypothesized that the political, social, and economic context of a community would
influence the decision-making of juries drawn from that community. The first model of
community composition examines the effect of a circuit‘s racial composition, economic
conditions, population age, education levels and urbanization on winners and losers and awards.
The coefficients for model 1 show that circuits characterized by large black populations and
more unemployed residents deliver more pro-plaintiff verdicts. Conversely, circuits with larger
retired populations and more highly educated citizens appear to render fewer verdicts in favor of
plaintiffs. The percent farming employed in a circuit fails to reach statistical significance in any
of the models. On the other hand, both the percent black and the percent unemployed in the
circuit continue to exhibit a positive influence on the likelihood that plaintiff wins. The award
model shows that the percent black is the only variable to significantly affect the size of the
plaintiff‘s award; awards in a circuit appear to increase as the percent black in the circuit
increases. The findings indicate that the racial and economic composition of a community as
well as the population‘s age and educational attainment influence the overall pro-plaintiff
tendencies of a circuit. Although race and economics appear to shape the likelihood that the
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plaintiff wins, race seems to have the most persistent influence on both winners and losers and
awards.
Next, model 2 explores the effect of a circuit‘s political leanings on jury verdicts. The
percent Democratic vote in 2008 presidential election is positive and significant for all three
dependent variables, indicating that circuits become more pro-plaintiff and dispense larger
awards as the Democratic population in the circuit increases. If the Democratic vote indicates
political liberalism, the results suggest that liberal populations are more sympathetic to plaintiffs
and more generous in giving compensation.
The final demographic model tests the hypothesis that combinations of demographic
variables within a circuit combine to shape the jury verdicts emanating from the circuit.
Specifically, I created an index that should predict demographic features that favor plaintiffs and
produce larger awards in each circuit. The model demonstrates that higher values on the
community composition index significantly increases the percent pro-plaintiff verdicts in a
circuit, the likelihood that plaintiffs win, and predicts larger awards upon success. Although
modeling each demographic indicator separately provides some evidence that circuit
demographics shape juries‘ dispute resolution and resource allocation functions, the percent
Democratic vote and the demographic index provide more consistent results. The ideological
composition of the community appears to strongly influence how juries evaluate civil trials.
Additionally, the demographic index suggests that combinations of demographic variables
interact to produce an additive effect that shapes verdicts. In fact, the index seems to better
predict outcomes and awards than individual demographic indicators.
Table 3.6 reports the results for litigant resources and status. The attorney advantage
variable is positive and highly significant in both the percent pro-plaintiff model and the plaintiff
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success model, but insignificant in the award model, indicating that an attorney advantage helps
plaintiffs win cases but produces little effect on the amount of the award. I also find, while
unimportant with regard to the pro-plaintiff tendencies of the circuit, the type of litigant
participating in each trial influences winners and losers and awards. When compared to
challenging a business defendant, individual plaintiffs appear less likely to prevail when
challenging the government. This result supports previous studies indicating that the
government is in fact the gorilla in the courtroom (Kritzer and Sibley 2003). No other
combination of litigants achieves statistical significance in the plaintiff success model. On the
other hand, juries hand out significantly lower awards when individuals challenge other
individuals, the government, and all other classes of defendants than when individuals challenge
businesses. This finding reinforces extant literature demonstrating that juries award larger
verdicts against businesses (Chin and Peterson 1985; Hans and Ermann 1989; MacCoun 1996).
However, turning to the ideology and institutional variables, only the model examining
the percent pro-plaintiff verdicts provides evidence that judges‘ partisan identifications affect
jury verdicts. The percent pro-plaintiff verdicts in a circuit appear to increase where both judges
and citizens identify as Democrats. This result could imply that judges defer to constituent
preferences or that judges and jurors‘ preferences parallel. On the other hand, the results could
indicate that juries are truly the decision-makers in trial courts or that judges‘ influence the
settlement processes more than the actual trial outcome. The variable denoting the number of
decisions per year is negative and significant in the percent pro-plaintiff model but fails to
achieve statistical significance in either the plaintiff success or award models. The finding that
the percent pro-plaintiff verdicts diminish as the number of trials in the circuit increases could
imply that citizens in high litigation jurisdiction view the civil litigation system critically. Or,
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higher litigation rates might increase uncertainty regarding outcomes (Priest and Klein 1984;
Waldfogel 1995) and encourage more cases to go to trial.
Turning to case issues, the results for the case issues and alleged injury variables. The
models indicate that case facts and alleged injury produce differential affects on winners and
losers and awards. Medical malpractice cases are the only case type to significantly impact the
percent pro-plaintiff verdicts in the circuit; the percent pro-plaintiff verdicts decreases for
medical malpractice claims. Turning to case facts and plaintiff success, I observe that plaintiffs
are more likely to win breach of contract cases and less likely to win medical malpractice cases
than cases involving automobile accidents, the excluded category. The model also shows that
plaintiff‘s achieve greater success in uninsured motorist trials. The results demonstrate that
plaintiffs face special difficulties winning medical malpractice cases. However, the award model
shows that when plaintiffs win medical malpractice cases, they receive significantly larger
awards. The model also predicts that despite the fact that plaintiffs making product liability or
fraud claims appear no more or less likely to win than those involved in automobile claims,
juries give successful plaintiffs greater compensation. Finally, the premises liability variable
shows that juries give significantly lower awards in that issue area. Overall, both models
confirm results from previous studies that the type of case before the court predicts both the
likelihood of plaintiff success and the amount of the award upon success.
The models also show that the alleged injury in a case influences the plaintiff‘s likelihood
of success and the amount of compensation the jury gives; however, the plaintiff‘s alleged injury
appears to produce no effect on the overall percent pro-plaintiff verdicts in the jury. Yet, the
impact of the alleged injury also appears to produce differential effects on the liability decision
and the award. When compared to soft tissue injuries, plaintiffs appear more likely to prevail in
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cases in which the alleged injury involves a property loss and less likely to win when claiming
negligence resulting in a death. The model predicting plaintiff success demonstrates that
plaintiffs alleging non-physical injuries achieve greater success in civil trials even compared to
the most severe physical injury, death. On the other hand, the plaintiffs asserting more severe
physical injuries, broken bones, death, and injuries requiring surgical correction, receive greater
compensation when successful. Successful plaintiffs alleging a slip and fall or monetary loss
also appear to receive larger awards. The results suggest that juries favor plaintiffs in claims
involving non-physical injuries more often than physical injuries; however, when juries judge the
defendant liable for a serious physical injury, juries appear willing to compensate the injured
party.
To help substantively interpret the results, Table 3.3 provides predicted probabilities of
the percent pro-plaintiff verdicts in each circuit, plaintiff success rates, and predicted awards,
holding all other values in the models constant at the means. Although we cannot directly
interpret logged awards as dollars, the predicted log awards reflect the variable‘s substantive
influence on the size of the awards. Logged awards range from 0 to 20.51 with an average of
10.99.

The predicted effects of community demographics in model 1 demonstrate the racial,

economic, retirement age population, and educational attainment of a community all shape the
percent pro-plaintiff verdicts in a circuit. Moving from the least percent black to the greatest
percent black increases the predicted percent pro-plaintiff verdicts from about 48% to about
59%. Moving from the least percent unemployment to the greatest percent unemployment
produces the largest substantive influence on the predicted percentage of pro-plaintiff verdicts.
At the greatest percent unemployed, the model predicts that 86% of all verdicts will favor
plaintiffs, strongly substantiating the hypothesis that circuit economic conditions affect jury
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verdicts. As the percent of the population 65 and over increases from the minimum to the
maximum the model predicts that pro-plaintiff verdicts in the circuit will decrease from about
54% to around 51%. The percent pro-plaintiff verdicts also decrease from about 54% to about
50% as the college age population increases. The percent black and the percent unemployment
continue to exert a significant influence on the predicted probability of plaintiff success. Moving
from the least percent black to the greatest percent black increases the predicted probability of
plaintiff success by about 12%, while the moving from the minimum to the maximum percent
unemployment increases the predicted probability of plaintiff success by about 21%. The
predicted logged awards show that circuits with larger black populations also give larger awards
to successful plaintiffs.
The predicted probabilities for the effect of the percent Democratic vote in the circuit in
the 2008 presidential election demonstrate that the partisan leanings of the community influence
the percent pro-plaintiff verdicts, the likelihood that individual plaintiffs win, and the size of the
award success plaintiffs receive. Both the predicted percent pro-plaintiff in the circuit and the
predicted probability of individual plaintiff success increase by about 21% when moving from
the least to the greatest percent Democratic vote. Changes in the percent Democratic vote also
increases the size of the award successful plaintiffs receive. Furthermore, the predicted percent
pro-plaintiff verdicts for the interaction between the percent Democratic vote and Democratic
judges shows that the percent pro-plaintiff verdict in the circuit increases from 52.3% to 65.8%
as the percent Democratic vote increases from the minimum to maximum.
The community composition index also predicts substantial differences in jury verdicts
across circuits. At the minimum index score about 46% of verdicts are pro-plaintiffs and
plaintiffs win about 45% of the time. At the maximum index value, pro-plaintiff demographic
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Table 3.3 Predicted Percent Pro-Plaintiff Verdict, Plaintiff Success, and Awards
Predicted
Percent ProPlaintiff
Variable
Circuit Demographics (model1)
Least Percent Black
Greatest Percent Black
Least Percent Unemployment
Greatest Percent Unemployment
Least Percent 65 and Over
Greatest Percent 65 and Over
Least Percent College
Greatest Percent College
Democratic Vote (model 2)
Least Percent Democratic Vote
Greatest Percent Democratic Vote
Democratic Judge x Min. Vote
Democratic Judge x Max. vote

Predicted
Plaintiff
Success

Predicted Log
Award

47.6 %
58.6 %
48.3 %
86.3 %
53.9 %
50.8 %
54.3 %
49.7 %

43.4 %
55.3 %
52.5 %
73.4 %
N/S
N/S
N/S
N/S

10.1
11.0
N/S
N/S
N/S
N/S
N/S
N/S

44.7 %
66.2 %
52.3%
65.8%

43.5 %
64.1 %
-----

10.1
11.0
-----

Demographic Index (model 3)
Minimum Index
Mean Index
Maximum Index

46.2 %
52.3 %
61.4 %

45.2 %
52.7 %
63.5 %

10.2
10.5
10.9

Attorney Advantage (model1)
Least Attorney Advantage
No Advantage
Greatest Attorney Advantage

49.2 %
52.3 %
54.6 %

33.5 %
47.1 %
67.2 %

N/S
N/S
N/S

N/S
N/S
N/S

N/S
40.0 %
N/S

9.80
9.67
8.69

50.0 %
N/S

25.3 %
41.0 %

12.19
13.75

Litigant Status (model 1)
Individual v Individual
Individual v Government
Individual v Other Defendant
Case Issues and Injuries (model 1)
Medical Malpractice
Death

*Logged awards range from 0 to 20.51; the average logged award is 10.99.
Missing values in the table represent non-significant variables in the original model.
All predicted probabilities are significant at the 0.5 level.
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compositions demonstrate high predicted plaintiff success rates. The model predicts that 61% of
verdicts will favor plaintiffs at the maximum index, and plaintiffs win about 64% of the time (an
increase in plaintiff success of 17%). At the average index, the predicted percent pro-plaintiff
verdicts and the plaintiff success rate are near 50% at 53%. Although plaintiffs appear to have a
slight advantage at the average index, success rates at the mean index, as predicted, demonstrate
the greatest variability.
Beginning with the plaintiff‘s attorney advantage, I find that moving from the most
advantaged plaintiff (plaintiff advantage of 3) to the least advantaged (plaintiff advantage of -4)
produces a 6% increase the percent pro-plaintiff verdicts and 33.7% increase in predicted
plaintiff success. When parties are equally matched in terms of representation, circuits delivers
pro-plaintiff verdicts about 52%, and plaintiffs win about 47% of the time, suggesting that when
evenly matched in terms of legal representation, plaintiffs are slightly advantaged. Finally,
compared to challenging a business, individuals win against the government about 40% of the
time. The predicted logged awards demonstrate that the awards successful plaintiffs receive
vary depending on the type of defendant. The model also suggests that individuals receive
smaller awards when challenging the government and other defendants.
The predicted plaintiff success rates and awards show that the case issues and injuries
produce considerable differences in the likelihood that plaintiffs prevail and generate the largest
relative influence on award amounts. When pursuing litigation involving a medical malpractice
claim, the model predicts that plaintiffs win about 25.3% of the time. In cases involving a death,
plaintiffs prevail in 41% of cases. Successful plaintiffs receive the largest awards for cases
involving a death, followed by medical malpractice claims.
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Summary and Discussion
The findings indicate the variation in jury verdicts across circuits that Federalists and tort
reformers fear exists to some extent. However, juries also demonstrate more consistency than
opponents would suggest. Although pro-plaintiff verdicts vary considerably from one circuit to
the next, juries appear to respond somewhat similarly to case facts and award the most generous
compensation to the most seriously injured plaintiffs. The analyses also indicate that legal
representation and the demographic composition of the circuit predict within-state variation in
winners and losers and awards. Although scholars of voting behavior have long acknowledged
that the demographic composition of a district predicts citizens‘ partisan preferences, few studies
have explored the relationship between community composition and the courts. Through the use
of three measures of community composition, I show that circuits with demographic
compositions likely to favor plaintiffs demonstrate consistent pro-plaintiff verdicts and distribute
larger awards. The results demonstrate that a circuit‘s social, political, and economic
composition influences both the likelihood that juries find in favor of the plaintiff and conditions
the amount of the award upon success, strongly substantiating the hypothesis that community
composition shapes trial court decision-making. The results contribute to our theoretical
understanding of trial court outcomes. The findings also validate Anti-Federalists‘ assertions
that resolutions rendered by civil juries reflect attributes of the local community. Additionally,
the analyses confirm Federalists‘ apprehensions that civil juries‘ decisions can lead to variability
in outcomes across trial venues.
Although findings provide considerable information regarding civil jury decision-making
in Alabama with more comprehensive data than previously available, it is not without
limitations. First, although the data provide significant variation at the sub-state level, this is a
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single-state study, and I do not claim that Alabama is necessarily representative of the other 49
states. Subsequent analyses further apply this theory to other social, political, and economic
contexts to ensure that the results are generalizable. Secondly, I would ideally model the
demographic composition of each jury; unfortunately, trial courts keep jurors‘ identities
confidential and do not record jurors‘ demographic statistics, making such an analysis
impossible. However, if community composition exerts an influence on litigation outcomes,
patterns of jury behavior should and do emerge across circuits, regardless of the composition of
any particular jury. Additionally, Alabama civil procedure allows plaintiffs to file cases in
either the circuit in which the alleged incident occurred or the circuit in which the plaintiff
resides when the two locales differ. In that instance, procedural rules allow plaintiffs to choose
between two venues, permitting plaintiffs to select the more favorable circuit. Although Alabama
civil procedure largely limits ―forum shopping,‖ plaintiffs possess a slight advantage in limited
circumstances. Although restricted, plaintiffs occasionally posses an upper hand in selecting trial
venues, which could possibly result in a slight overestimation of the pro-plaintiff tendencies in
the circuits. Furthermore, previous studies maintain that, because attorneys strategically
determine which cases to settle prior to trial, the cases that reach trial tend to be those with the
least predictable outcomes or the most at stake for the parties (Priest and Klein 1984; Waldfogel
1995). Due to attorney strategy, trial courts adjudicate only the most contentious and
unpredictable cases. Unfortunately, I am unable to compare settled cases to cases concluding in
trial with these data, and I acknowledge that community composition might affect litigation
differently at the pre-trial stage. Despite these limitations, this study provides considerable
insight regarding the factors that influence outcomes in civil litigation.
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Furthermore, the results provide empirical support for theories regarding litigant
resources and status. Galanter‘s (1974) original thesis predicted that better-resourced parties
would prevail more often in trial courts; yet, few scholars have examined the role of litigant
resources at the trial court level. This analysis provides considerable support for Galanter‘s
theory; parties with a resource advantage, in terms of representation, win more often. On the
other hand, the repeat player literature suggests that businesses and the government, generally
the defendants, possess considerable advantages when interacting with the courts, because they
acquire better representation, become familiar with the courts, and shape the rules over time. My
findings indicate the plaintiffs are overwhelmingly individuals (see Table 2.3), while businesses
and the government typically fill defendant roles. However, the literature ignores the important
fact that plaintiff attorneys are also repeat players. Although individuals, Galanter‘s oneshotters, likely lack familiarity with the courts and possess fewer resources than businesses or
government, the contingency fee system appears to allow plaintiffs with strong cases to hire
quality legal representation. Additionally, as repeat players, plaintiff attorneys routinely interact
with the courts and appear to devote greater resources to the cases with a high profit potential.
The analyses indicate that when plaintiffs acquire a resource advantage in terms of
representation, plaintiffs achieve higher success rates. Conversely, the model indicates that a
representational advantage produces no effect on awards, implying that a resource advantage
helps plaintiffs win cases, while issue and injury variables more strongly predict compensation.
Additionally, the number of attorneys participating in a case may also serve as a proxy
for case salience. Attorneys likely devote greater time and resources to cases involving more
serious injuries with greater potential for larger awards. On the other hand, the results show that
juries assess larger damage awards against business defendants than any other classes of
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defendant, implying that while those with greater resources may win more often, wealthier
defendants pay more when they lose.
Results regarding case issues and alleged injuries also confirm previous research. I
uncover an interesting relationship between medical malpractice claims and jury decisionmaking. While plaintiffs appear especially unsuccessful in garnering jury support in medical
malpractice cases, once plaintiffs cross the liability threshold, juries hand down considerably
larger awards. Overall, the results indicate that plaintiffs alleging non-physical injuries prevail at
higher rates than plaintiffs seeking compensation for physical injuries. The analyses show that
cases involving a death produce considerable hurdles for plaintiffs seeking jury support. The
plaintiff success model demonstrates that plaintiffs prevail significantly less often when alleging
that the defendant‘s negligence contributed to an individual‘s death, but when juries hold the
defendant liable for a serious physical injury, juries give more generous compensation to the
injured party. Through, the use of jury simulations Hans (2008) observes that the term ―soft
tissue injury‖ is often ambiguous to jurors, and jurors perceive whiplash and other soft tissue
injuries as quintessential bogus injuries. Like Hans and other researchers, I observe that when
compared to soft tissue injuries, plaintiffs alleging more severe and concrete injuries receive
greater compensation (Bronstein 1998; Bovbjerg et al 1989; Chen and Peterson 1985; Greene
and Bornstein 2003).
Is Alabama “Tort Hell”? The Evidence
The results also provide information concerning the ongoing tort reform debate.
Admittedly, the major debates regarding the Alabama civil litigation system occurred well before
the time period under review here. Perhaps, a better question might be, is Alabama still tort hell,
if it ever was? However, the evidence suggests that Alabama‘s civil litigation system produces
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more consistent verdicts than opponents would suggest but also demonstrates trends that some
might find disturbing. As tort reformers suggest, the results show that business defendants suffer
a disadvantage in certain contexts; however, other contexts strongly favor defendants. Yet, the
models demonstrate that better-resourced parties, such as businesses, achieve higher success
rates. On the other hand, even after controlling for case facts, Alabama juries assess larger
damage awards against business defendants than other litigant classes. This finding likely
provides reason for concern for tort reformers seeking to limit businesses‘ liability in civil
claims.
Additionally, Table 2.1 in Chapter 2 suggests that Alabama civil courts generate more
verdicts per-capita than the other states, implying the trials occur with somewhat greater
frequency in the state. Although punitive damage awards occur infrequently, Table 2.1 also
shows that Alabama civil juries award punitive damages more often than the other states. On the
other hand, over the nine-year period, plaintiffs‘ success rate remain around 50% overall.
However, at the circuit level, circuit workloads vary dramatically, and plaintiff success rates
range from 11.8% to 87.5%. Yet, the mean and mode for pro-plaintiff verdicts in all circuits
consistently approaches 50%, implying that most circuits appear to possess no strong proplaintiff bias. On the other hand, circuits where plaintiffs win more or less than 50% of the time
likely indicate pro-plaintiff and pro-defense tendencies. Furthermore, the analyses indicate that
the social, political, and economic composition of the community partially explains circuit‘s
decision-making tendencies. For those seeking consistency in the civil litigation system the wide
disparities in number of trials and the percentage of pro-plaintiff wins might suggest cause for
concern. However, those that see jury verdicts as citizens‘ constitutionally protected rights to
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make decisions based on community evaluations likely consider differences across circuits as
appropriate reflections of community values.
Beyond the empirical results, I also sought to determine Alabama judges‘ and attorneys‘
views regarding tort reform in the state. According to the American Judicature Society, ―Judicial
races in Alabama became increasingly politicized in the 1980s and 1990s, in large part because
of the controversy over tort reform. The size of jury verdicts began to increase during this time,
to the extent that Alabama was dubbed "Tort Hell" by Forbes magazine. The legislature passed a
tort reform package in 1987, but many of its provisions were declared unconstitutional by the
Alabama Supreme Court during the early 1990s. As judicial races took on heightened
significance, campaign fundraising became more important. Between 1986 and 1996,
expenditures by supreme court candidates grew by 776%. As campaigns became more
expensive, they also became more contentious. The 1996 elections were dubbed "the year of the
skunk" because of an ad run by an incumbent supreme court justice that alluded to his opponent
and featured pictures of a skunk, accompanied by the caption ‗Some things you can smell a mile
away‘.‖
Interviews with judges in attorneys in Alabama largely confirm the American Judicature
Society‘s observations regarding transformations in the Alabama civil system. However,
interviewees suggest that when the state supreme court overturned statutory tort reforms,
Alabama business groups largely achieved tort reform through a conscious effort to change the
ideological disposition of the state supreme court. According to one circuit judge, ―A few years
ago, ten to twelve, Alabama had a reputation of being ‗tort hell.‘ But, over the last ten years or
so, we‘ve had two competing interests. Plaintiffs‘ lawyers and business defense groups are
competing in the political arena. For years plaintiffs‘ lawyers controlled who was elected to the
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appellate courts and the legislature. Ten years, ago businesses became very active in recruiting
conservative judges and legislators, and they were able to get some tort legislation passed. Some
of it was declared unconstitutional the first time around, before the composition of the supreme
court changed. The Business Council has become very active and has been successful.
Currently most of the supreme court is conservative. In the 2000 election cycle, Carl Rove had
two clients, George W. Bush and the Business Council of Alabama. The Business Council ran
elections for the judges they were supporting. Since 2000, we‘ve had a very conservative
supreme court.‖
Most of the lawyers and judges interviewed agree that the switch from a Democratic
dominated to a Republican dominated court significantly altered the civil litigation system in
Alabama both in terms of winners and losers and awards. However, although a judge stated that,
―I think the courts in Alabama are operating at a good equilibrium that‘s not too extreme in any
direction,‖ not all interviewees perceive the same balance. An attorney interviewed believes that
the tort reform and the large media attention focused on the subject in Alabama altered the way
jurors think about civil litigation with negative consequences for plaintiffs. ―I think that tort
reform has had a big effect on jurors. All of the advertising that has been for the Alabama
whatever tort reform association, you know Skip Jones, has really influenced jurors. Juries think
about it a lot of the time now. They think: If we give them this it will raise our insurance. This
could affect us. It‘s bad for the state of Alabama. People fall for it.‖ Another trial lawyer
complained that, ―The entire Alabama state supreme court is Republican, and they overturn
rulings based on their preferences all of the time. The only reason all of the judges are
Republican is because the people of Alabama are so conservative and they go into the ballot box
and pull the Republican lever.‖ In fact, one defense attorney agreed with the pro-defense nature
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of Alabama civil courts following tort reform and the election of a conservative supreme court.
When asked what the biggest change since reform and the reconstitution of the supreme court, he
stated, ―Small cases don‘t get filed. Plaintiff firms don‘t even file those cases. A lot more small
cases settle without even filing a case. I don‘t have any evidence, but I would guess that fewer
cases get filed now overall. At one point in time juries where totally out of control, like when a
jury awarded $2,000,000 for a bad paint job in Gore v. BMW[…] ‗Tort hell.‘ Those of us on the
defense side thought there was a plaintiff bias. Since tort reform, there is a defense bias.‖
When asked if he supported additional tort reforms in Alabama, one self-identified
Democratic attorney said, ―No. No one wants tort reform, not even Republicans, because, if it
happens, Republicans can‘t campaign on it any more. The whole tort reform debate was
designed by Republicans as a campaign strategy, and Republicans and businesses duped
Alabama Republicans into believing that everyone who files a case in Alabama wins a million
dollars.‖ Somewhat surprisingly, when asked if Alabama needs additional tort reforms, Alabama
judges, plaintiff attorneys, and defense attorneys almost unanimously answered, ―No.‖ In
response to the same question, a defense attorney told me, ―No. Tort reform has gone far enough.
I‘m not so defense oriented that I don‘t think anyone ever does anything wrong.‖ In fact, of all
the lawyers interviewed, only one suggested an additional reform. The attorney said, ―State and
national governments are protected by sovereign immunity, but local government is not.
Counties have limited sovereign immunity, and potentially large verdicts burden the county. […]
When the government is forced to pay a large damage award it hurts citizens. Either government
has to cut back on the services it can provide, or government must raise taxes. It‘s a circle; what
government pays out, it gets back somewhere. We need more tort reform to protect local
government. It would lessen the tax burden of citizens. Federal and state government would be
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sued a lot more than they currently are if they allowed themselves to be. Local government
needs the same kind of protections.‖
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Chapter 4
Modeling Civil Jury Verdicts in Comparative Context
At the time of the ratification, Federalists feared that states would employ disparate civil
jury systems that would lead to inconsistent outcomes across states. This chapter explores civil
jury verdicts across four states, in addition to Alabama, in order to assess the variables that
jointly and separately predict winners and losers and awards. Are civil juries reaching
incongruent conclusions across states? Research conducted in Alabama indicates that circuit
demographics, legal representation, litigant status, and case facts influence both winners and
losers and awards across circuits. Do similar factors predict jury verdicts across circuits in
Hawaii, Indiana, Tennessee, and Kentucky? This chapter begins with an overview of the
specific variables included in the models and hypotheses regarding the effect of each variable.
The chapter then proceeds with a section for Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky, and Tennessee. Each
section provides an overview of the organization and jurisdiction of the civil trial courts in that
state along with a discussion of variables specific to each state. Following the overview, each
section reports and discusses the analyses and results. The final section examines a combined
model using 2009 data in Alabama, Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky, and Tennessee to examine the
variables that similarly affect outcomes across states and explores the influence of state-level
institutions on trial court behavior. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the similarities
and differences in jury verdicts across the five states.
Modeling Civil Jury Verdicts in Comparative Context
Table 4.1 lists the key independent variables utilized in the individual state analyses. The
theoretical model previously developed maintains that civil jury verdicts reflect the community
surrounding the court, and are also affected by judicial ideology, institutional arrangements,
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Table 4.1 Key Independent Variables
Variable

Measurement

Institutions and Ideology
Judges‘ Ideology [+]
Democrat x Percent Democratic Vote [+]

Decisions Per-Circuit Year [+/-]

-Coded 1 if the judge is a Democrat, and 0
otherwise
-Interacts the Democrat variable with percent
Democratic vote in the circuit in the 2008
election
-Number of decision in each circuit in each
year

Litigant Resources and Status
Attorney Advantage [+] (all models)
Litigant Matches

# of Plaintiff Attorneys - # Defense Attorneys
Dichotomous Variables

Individual v. Individual
Individual v. Government
Individual v. Other Defendant

Compared to Individual v. Business

Circuit Demographics (Model 1)

Greater resources should increase success
rates, but might also increase awards.
US Census and Department of Agriculture
Statistics

% Black, compared to % White [+]
% Unemployment [+]
% College Educated [-]
% 65 and Over [-]
% Farming [-]
Circuit Ideology (Model 2)
Percent Democratic Vote in the 2008
Presidential Election
Demographic Index (Model 3)
Index Predicting Pro-Plaintiff Tendencies and
Larger Awards

Obtained from election returns available
through the each states‘ secretary of state

Takes the %white, black, unemployment,
college educated, 65 and over, and farming
population, and subtracts from the state median
on each indicator. The final measure sums the
deviations from the median. Scaled so that
higher values indicate pro-plaintiff
demographic combinations.

Note: Signs in brackets denote the predicted direction of the effect for each variable.
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litigant resources and status, and case facts. Like Alabama, I predict that juries will render more
pro-plaintiff verdicts and give larger awards in Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky, and Tennessee where
circuit demographics favor liberal ideological dispositions. Specifically, I theorize that circuits
with larger minority populations, higher unemployment, lower education levels, and more rural
residents will vote in favor of plaintiffs and give larger awards than their urban, highly educated,
white, economically better-off counterparts. I also utilize the percent Democratic vote in the
2008 Presidential election to test the hypothesis that population liberalism predicts jury verdicts
and a demographic index to assess the possibility of addictive effects among demographic
variables. Additionally, I hypothesize that the likelihood of pro-plaintiff verdicts and the size of
awards will increase when a Democratic judge presides over the case, and when the plaintiff
possesses a representational advantage. Furthermore, litigants such as businesses and
government should possess greater resources than individuals and achieve correspondingly
higher success rates. While greater resources should lead businesses and government to achieve
higher success rates than other classes of litigants, the ―deep pockets‖ hypothesis maintains that
perceived wealth might lead juries to assess large damage awards against affluent parties when
they lose. Finally, the models compare all cases types to automobile negligence cases and all
alleged injuries to soft tissue injuries.19
Since Hawaiian juries rendered only 12 verdicts in 2009, the Hawaii section reports only
descriptive statistics. The sections for Kentucky, Indiana, and Tennessee report the results for
logistic regression models predicting the likelihood of plaintiff success and regression models
predicting the size of the logged award successful plaintiffs receive. Since I currently lack data
over time in Indiana, Kentucky, and Tennessee I do not possess enough observations to model

19

For a detailed description of variable sand coding see Appendix B. For a detail discussion of the literature, theory,
and hypotheses see Chapter 1 and 3.
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the percent pro-plaintiff verdicts in each circuit like I did in Alabama. However, the combined
models in the final section explore the factors related to the percent pro-plaintiff verdicts in all
circuits, the likelihood that the plaintiff wins, and the size of the awards successful plaintiffs
receive.
Part I. Hawaii
Hawaii divides circuits among the Hawaiian Islands. Hawaii utilizes four circuits of
general jurisdiction with exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving damage claims of $25,000 or
more. Each circuit shares concurrent jurisdiction with district courts in cases involving damages
less than $25,000. Hawaii attempts to include all citizens in the pool of potential jurors and
creates a list of eligible jurors using voter registration, drivers‘ license, and state income records.
Hawaii‘s extensive efforts to collect the names of all citizens for jury roles suggests that jury
roles in the state should more closely reflect the states‘ population. Although the small number
of observations in Hawaii prevents multivariate analyses in the state, the very few trials in the
state make Hawaii unique. Additionally, Hawaii is one of very few states that appoint trial court
judges. Furthermore, of the five states under review, Hawaii possesses the most liberal
population with a percent Democratic vote in the 2008 Presidential Election at or above 70% in
all four circuits. Hawaii also holds the largest minority population of any of the states with no
circuit possessing a white population greater than 40%. Although it is impossible to draw any
definitive conclusions about Hawaii‘s civil jury system from only 12 observations, Hawaii
presents an interesting case. While I cannot fully assess all aspects of the theoretical model in
Hawaii, Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 descriptively examine legal representation and case facts in
Hawaii and provide preliminary information regarding the composition of Hawaii‘s docket and
the factors that might influence plaintiff success rates.
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Table 4.2 provides the range of values on the attorney advantage variable (-2 to 1), the
frequency of occurrence for each value and the corresponding percentage of times the plaintiff
won. The observations show that the plaintiff possess a representational advantage in only three
of the twelve cases; however, plaintiffs also achieved the highest success rates when they obtain
the representational advantage, suggesting that plaintiffs achieve higher success rates in Hawaii
when possessing a representational advantage.
Table 4.2 Attorney Advantage
Attorney Advantage
-2
-1
0
1

Frequency
2
2
5
3

% Plaintiff Wins
0
50%
25%
66.7%

Table 4.3 reports the percentages of the cases that make up the docket in Hawaii, the
alleged injuries in the cases, and corresponding plaintiff success rates. Like Alabama, Indiana,
and Tennessee, in 2009 the most common case type in Hawaii was auto negligence followed by
medical malpractice, general negligence, other issues, and premises liability. Overall, Hawaiian
juries appear to decide similar types of cases when compared to the other states; however, no
clear pattern of plaintiff success rates emerges across case types for the 12 available cases.
Examining the injury categories in Hawaii shows that death is the most common alleged injury at
trial. Interestingly, plaintiffs lost all three cases involving a death, implying that a relationship
between death cases and lower plaintiff success rates, like the one observed in Alabama, might
also exist in Hawaii. Future research should expand the data collection in Hawaii to better
understand the relationship between jury verdicts and the interesting social and political context
Hawaii provides.

111

Table 4.3 Issues and Injuries
Variables
Case Issues
Auto Negligence
Fraud
Breach of Contract
Premises Liability
Products Liability
Uninsured Motorist
Medical Malpractice
General Negligence
Other Issue
Total
Alleged Injuries
Soft Tissue
Slip and Fall
Emotional
Surgery
Property Loss/Damage
Monetary Loss
Death
Broken Bone(s)
Other Injury
Total

N
4
0
0
1
0
0
2
3
2
12

% Docket
33%
0
0
8%
0
0
17%
25%
17%
100%

Plaintiff Wins
1/4
0
0
1/1
0
0
0/2
2/3
1/2
5/12

2
1
2
1
0
0
3
1
2
12

17%
8%
17%
8%
0
0
25%
8%
17%
100%

1/2
1/1
0/2
1/1
0
0
0/3
1/1
1/2
12/12

Part II. Indiana
Circuits in Indiana represent 91 counties, each with its own circuit, expect for Dearborn
and Ohio counties which share a circuit. In 2009 Indiana civil juries decided 244 claims. Both
superior and circuit courts in Indiana have general jurisdiction over civil disputes. However,
some counties only maintain circuit courts. In counties without superior courts, the circuit courts
also hear small claims. Circuit courts in counties with superior courts hear cases involving
disputes involving damage claims greater than $6,000 and appeals from superior courts. Of all
the states examined in this study, Indiana maintains the most decentralized system and allows
individual circuits the greatest discretion in determining the circuits‘ jurisdiction and judicial
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selection methods. Indiana allows circuits to utilize partisan, nonpartisan, and retention elections
to retain judges, making Indiana a perfect context for testing the hypothesis that jury verdicts
vary across judicial retention methods. Indiana‘s decentralized civil litigation system, utilization
of multiple judicial selection methods, and the authority Indiana places within circuits could
potentially lead to greater disparities in outcomes across circuits. On the other hand, the Indiana
civil courts also operate under the most statutory regulation of the five states. For example,
Indiana requires a medical review board to review all medical malpractice claims before trial.
While non-binding, the review board‘s decision regarding the existence or non-existence of
medical malpractice is admissible as evidence. In addition to the review board, Indiana places a
damage cap of $1,250,000 in medical malpractice suits, often resulting in a considerable
reduction of the award post-trail. Indiana also limits awards against a municipality to
$500,000.20
The first series of models replicates the analyses conducted in Alabama and tests the
hypothesis that judicial ideology, as measured by judges‘ partisan identifications, affects the
likelihood that the plaintiff wins and the size of the award upon success.21 The section examining
circuit contextual influences reports the results from three separate models using each of the
three measures of community composition. As described in detail in Chapter 3, I again utilize
three measures of community composition to both compare various measures and to ensure that
the results are indeed robust across various conceptions of community composition. The first
model utilizes the percent unemployed, percent black as compared to the percent white, percent
college educated, percent 65 and over, and the percent farming. The second and third models of
20

The dataset records only the jury‘s initial award, and jury instructions do not inform jurors of a cap on damages.
However, subsequent analyses in the combined state models will test the hypothesis that damage caps affect the
jury‘s initial award.
21
For circuits that utilize retention or nonpartisan elections, judges‘ partisan identifications are unavailable, and
therefore, these circuits are omitted from models examining judicial ideology.
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community composition utilized the percent Democratic vote in the 2008 election and the
demographic index respectively. Next, I test that the retention method hypothesis using models
that compare winners and losers and awards across retention mechanisms in Indiana, omitting
the judicial ideology variable. Finally, I descriptively explore the relationship between
institutional review board rulings and jury verdicts in medical malpractice trials. Prior to
exploring the results for the individual state models, it should be noted that with just one year of
data for Indiana, Kentucky, and Tennessee, I possess relatively few observations for each circuit,
and conclusions should be considered tentative.
Analyses and Results
Turning first to the models of Indiana jury verdicts including the judicial ideology
variable, Table 4.4 reports results for the community composition, litigant resources and status,
and judicial ideology variables. Examining the results from the three models of community
composition imply that the demographic characteristics of circuits in Indiana affect winners and
losers more than awards, but none of the demographic variables researches statistical
significance in any of the award models. However, the first model shows that plaintiffs in
Indiana achieve higher success rates in circuits with more retirement age and college educated
inhabitants. The findings regarding population age and education are opposite my expectations
and opposite of the findings in Alabama. Although preliminary, these findings could imply that
more highly educated and older populations in Indiana evaluate the civil litigation system more
favorably in Indiana than in Alabama. On the other hand, as expected, plaintiffs are significantly
less likely to win in circuits with larger farming populations. The model examining the political
leanings of the community demonstrates that plaintiffs also achieve higher success rates in
circuits where more citizens voted for Barack Obama, implying that greater population
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liberalism increases pro-plaintiff jury verdicts. Unlike Alabama, the demographic index appears
not to be a good predictor of community preferences regarding civil litigation outcomes in
Indiana, providing further evidence that demographics combinations might work differently in
Indiana.
Table 4.4 Plaintiff Success and Awards Indiana (2009)

Variables
Circuit Composition
% Black
% Unemployed
% College
% 65 and Over
% Farming
2008 Democratic Vote

Logit Coefficients for Plaintiff
Success (1 if the Plaintiff wins & O
otherwise)

Regression Coefficients for Logged
Awards

Model 1
b
-0.004
0.19
0.08*
0.34*
-0.85*
------

Model 1 Model 2
b
b
-0.06
-----0.08
------0.05
-----0.01
------0.15
-----------0.01

Model 2
b
-------------------------0.05**

Model 3
b
-------------------------------

Model 3
b
-------------------------------

Index
----------0.005
-----------Litigant Resources and
Status
Attorney Advantage
-0.12
-0.12
-0.10
0.42*
0.43*
Individual v. Individual
-0.50
-0.42
-0.43
0.88
-0.87
Individual v. Government
1.00
0.59
0.67
-0.88
-0.90
Individual v. Other Defendant
0.29
0.25
-0.35
-0.37
-0.31
Institutions and Ideology
Democratic Judge
-0.26
1.97
-0.35
0.70*
0.67*
Democrat x 2008 Vote
------0.05
-----------0.01
Decisions Per Circuit Year
0.01
0.02
0.01
0.001
0.001
* significant at the 0.05 level or higher ** significant at the 0.01 level or higher
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0.96

0.44*
-0.75
-0.85
-0.21
0.69*
-----0.01

Table 4.4 Continued
Logit Coefficients for Plaintiff
Success Rate (1 is the Plaintiff wins
& O otherwise)

Variables
Case Issues
Medical Negligence
General Negligence
Premises Liability
Uninsured Motorist
Fraud
Breach of Contract
Product Liability
Other Issue
Alleged Injuries
Property Loss/Damage
Monetary Loss
Emotional Injury
Broken Bone
Death
Accident Resulted in Surgery
Slip and Fall
Other Injury
Constant

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

b
-1.94**
-1.39*
-3.93**
-1.38
------1.66
-1.20
-1.29

b
-2.17**
-1.30*
-3.46**
-1.45
------1.78
-1.72
-1.41

b
-2.05**
-1.40*
-3.50**
-1.34
------1.90
-1.71
-1.18

Regression Coefficients for Logged
Awards
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

b
2.01**
1.40
1.19
1.26
-----4.85*
6.29**
0.35

b
1.99**
1.10
1.02
1.05
-----4.60*
6.37**
0.34

b
1.92**
1.02
0.75
1.12
-----4.36*
5.66**
0.27

-1.41
-1.83
-1.29
-1.56
-1.89
-1.37
-1.48
-3.20**
---------------------2.76** -2.77** -2.44**
-0.02
-1.99*
-1.71*
-1.63*
2.18**
-1.40*
-1.35*
-1.19*
2.24**
-0.53
-0.80
-0.62
-0.60
-0.95
-1.14
-1.01
0.30
-4.36**
-3.30*
-2.65*
9.72**
N =242 N =242 N =242
N=137
X2 =90.66** X2 =88.42**X2 =81.19**

-1.35
-3.45**
-----1.50
2.10**
2.25**
-0.65
0.32
10.67**
N=137

-1.01
-3.07**
-----1.90
2.11**
2.41**
2.27**
0.31
10.07**
N=137

R2 =53.3** R2 =52.5**R2=52.5**
F =4.83** F =5.44** F=5.74**
Note: For the purposes of consistency all issue and injury variables are included in each model for all
states, but some states lack sufficient observations in every category, preventing multivariate analyses.
Missing issue and injury variables in the tables denote insufficient observations.

The influence of litigant resources and status also appears less relevant to litigation
outcomes in Indiana than in Alabama. In Alabama a representational advantage increases
plaintiffs‘ success rates but fails to increase the size of the damage award successful plaintiffs
receive; however, the exact opposite pattern emerges in Indiana. The attorney advantage
variable (which ranges from -5 to 2 in Indiana) is insignificant in the plaintiff success model and
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positive and significant in the award model, suggesting that a representational advantage neither
helps nor hurts plaintiffs in Indiana but appears to assist successful plaintiffs in garnering greater
compensation for their claims. Although inconsistent with the findings in Alabama, the results
further confirm the finding that legal representation strongly influences litigation outcomes. On
the other hand, none of the combinations of litigants achieves statistical significance in either
model, suggesting that Indiana juries appear unresponsive to litigant status.
Like Alabama, the plaintiff success model shows no relationship between the presence of
a Democratic judge presiding over the trial and the likelihood that the plaintiff wins. On the
other hand, the award model provides evidence that awards in Indiana appear to increase when a
Democratic judge presides over the case. This finding implies that Democratic judges might
transmit their liberal policy preferences to the jury. However, neither the interaction between
judicial ideology and the 2008 Democratic vote nor the number of decisions per year in each
circuit produces significant effects in either model.
The issues and injuries variables, reported in Table 4.4 Continued, demonstrate that case
facts contribute to plaintiff success rates and award amounts. The negative and significant effect
of medical malpractice, premises liability, and general negligence cases produces additional
evidence that, across states, plaintiffs receive less support in those issue areas. Plaintiffs in
Indiana also appear less successful when pursing uninsured motorist claims. The award model
also demonstrates patterns in Indiana similar to Alabama regarding the issue area and the size of
the award. Successful plaintiffs garner greater compensation in medical malpractice, products‘
liability, and breach of contract cases. Consistent with previous findings, the injury variables
show that plaintiffs suffering severe physical injuries encounter significant hurdles in
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winning their cases; yet, when successful, injury severity predicts greater compensation. The
models demonstrate that juries in Indiana find for the plaintiff significantly less often when the
plaintiff seeks compensation for a death, broken bones, or an accident resulting in surgery.
Conversely, the award model shows that juries deliver larger damage awards to successful
plaintiffs in cases involving a death or injuries resulting in surgery. Interestingly, the award
model also shows that plaintiffs seeking compensation for a monetary loss receive significantly
less compensation.
Table 4.5 reports predicted plaintiff success rates and logged awards for the key
independent variables in the plaintiff success and award models holding all other variables
constant at their means. First, I report the predicted probabilities for the models examining
circuit demographics, followed by the predicted results for the second model, measuring circuit
ideology as the percent Democratic vote. Beginning with predicted plaintiff success rates in
Indiana, the results indicate that the age, educational attainment, and farming population in each
circuit substantially influence the likelihood of plaintiff success. Moving from the smallest
retirement age population to the largest produces a predicted increase in plaintiff success rates of
57%. The model predicts that the least college-educated populations will produce plaintiff
success rate about 41% of the time, while circuits with the highest percentage of college
graduates produce plaintiff success rates of nearly 90%. As the farming population increases
from the minimum to the maximum, plaintiff success rates decrease from about 69% to only
16%. As in Alabama, the model produces relatively low predicted plaintiff success rates for
medical malpractice cases and cases involving a death. Plaintiffs achieve a predicted success
rate of about 28% in medical malpractice cases and about 24% in death cases. However,
predicted probabilities generated from the second model examining population liberalism, shows
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that moving from the least percent Democratic vote to the greatest percent Democratic vote
increases that likelihood of plaintiff success by almost 37%.
As in previous models, predicted logged awards cannot be interpreted as dollar amounts;
however, they provide a measure of the substantive influence of each variable on the size of the
award. Logged awards in Indiana range from 6.33 to 18.87; the average logged award is 10.5.
Table 4.5 Predicted Plaintiff Success and Logged Awards (Indiana 2009)
Variable

Predicted Plaintiff Success

Predicted Logged Award

Model 1
Democratic Judge
N/S
11.0
Least Attorney Advantage
N/S
8.4
Greatest Attorney Advantage
N/S
11.3
Minimum % 65
32.5%
N/S
Maximum % 65
89.8%
N/S
Minimum % College
41.4%
N/S
Maximum % College
90.1%
N/S
Minimum % Farming
69.3%
N/S
Maximum % Farming
16%
N/S
Medical Malpractice
27.7%
12.3
Death
24.4%
12.6
Model 2
Minimum % Democratic Vote
50.7%
N/S
Maximum % Democratic Vote
87.5%
N/S
*Logged awards in Indiana range from 6.33 to 18.87; the average logged award is 10.5.
Missing values in the table represent non-significant variables in the original models.
All predicted probabilities are significant at the 0.5 level.
The model demonstrates that the presence of a Democratic judge and an attorney advantage
produce a predicted logged award above the average award. On the other hand, awards diminish
considerably when the defense possesses the greatest representational advantage. Like Alabama,
plaintiffs achieve lower success rates in Indiana when involved in medical malpractice and death
cases. However, medical malpractice and death cases produce that largest substantive impact in
the size of the award, confirming that successful plaintiffs garner greater compensation in those
cases.
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Next, I investigate the influence of judicial selection method in Indiana by replicating the
previous models, substituting the judicial selection variables for the judicial ideology variable.
The judicial retention variables compare nonpartisan and retention election circuits to partisan
elections, the excluded category. Each model includes variables for litigant resources and status,
and the demographic composition of the circuit. I conduct separate models for each of three
measures of community composition. Unfortunately, the one year of data provides relatively
few observations for each circuit, making any conclusions tentative. The only evidence that
judicial retention methods affect jury verdicts in Indiana comes from the model examining proplaintiff verdicts that utilizes the percent Democratic vote in the circuit in the 2008 election.
After controlling for the partisan leanings of the community, plaintiffs appear more likely to win
in circuits that utilize retention elections when compared to partisan elections. No statistical
difference emerges between nonpartisan and partisan elections. The award models generate no
significant effects for any of the retention variables. The results for models of plaintiff success
and award using the judicial retention variables are reported in Appendix C. Given the small
number of observations, making definitive conclusions from these results remains premature.
However, the results imply a possible relationship between judicial retention mechanism and the
ideological leanings of the community, which would support previous research (Brace and
Boyea 2007, 2008; Brace and Hall 1990, 1993, 1997; Hall 1992, 1995, 1987). However, future
research across a greater time period is needed to fully investigate the relationship between
judicial selection method and civil trial outcomes in Indiana.
Institutional Review Board Rulings and Outcomes in Medical Malpractice Cases
Although the results for all case types in Indiana suggest that medical malpractice cases
in Indiana achieve considerably lower success rates than other case types, Indiana‘s use of a
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medical review board to issue a non-binding determination regarding the alleged breach in the
standard of care presents an interesting institutional feature that likely influences outcomes in
civil trials. The review board first determines if a breach in the standard of care occurred in the
plaintiff‘s treatment. Then, if the board finds a breach in the standard of care, the board
determines if that deviation in care caused the plaintiff‘s injury. Presumably, a review board
ruling for or against the plaintiff affects the plaintiff‘s decision to pursue litigation into the trial
stage. A vote from the review board maintaining that a breach of the standard of care
contributed to the plaintiff‘s injuries likely encourages plaintiffs to take cases to trial, while a
vote a to the contrary should encourage plaintiffs to seek settlement. Consequently, the medical
review board likely serves as an important filtering mechanism that eliminates weaker cases
prior to trial.
In 2009 Indiana juries decided 33 medical malpractice cases. Of those, the reporter
provides the review boards‘ decision in 29 trials. The small number of observations prevents
multivariate analyses; however, Table 4.6 reports the review boards‘ decisions and the
corresponding jury verdicts. The table reports cases in which the review issued a unanimous
vote in favor of the plaintiff; in other words, the board determined that the doctor or medical
facility breached the standard of care, causing the plaintiff‘s injury. Mixed decisions occur when
the board cannot agree on one or both parts of the decision. Decisions in favor of the defense
result when either the board unanimously agrees the doctor or medical facility upheld the
standard of care, or the breach in the standard of care was causally unrelated to the plaintiff‘s
injury.
Overall, plaintiffs in Indiana won 11 out of 29 medical malpractice cases tried in the state
in 2009. However, examining the table indicates that of the seven cases in which the review
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board found a breach in the standard of care that was causally related to the injury, plaintiffs won
6 or 85.7%. Although the board found in favor the plaintiff in only six cases, the plaintiffs‘
4.6 Institutional Review Board Decisions
Review Board Decision

% Pro-Plaintiff Verdicts

For the Plaintiff

Plaintiff Verdicts Out of the
Total
6/7

Mixed Decision

1/6

16.7%

For the Defense

4/16

25%

85.7%

success rates in those cases are substantially higher than the overall success rates for plaintiffs
pursuing medical malpractice claims. On the other hand, the observations suggest that the review
board issues considerably more verdicts in favor of the defense and mixed opinions than
decisions in favor of the plaintiff. Sixteen decisions of the Institutional Review Board favored
the defense while 6 were mixed decisions. However, it appears that even mixed decisions from
the review board hurt plaintiffs‘ changes of success. When the board issued a mixed decision,
juries decided only one out six cases (16.7%) in favor of the plaintiff. Interestingly, juries
delivered more pro-plaintiff verdicts in trials where the board found against the plaintiff than in
cases with mixed decisions from the board. Of cases in which the board found no breach in the
standard of care or no injury to plaintiff as a result of the breach, plaintiffs won 4 of 16 trials
(25%).
Of the five states, the Indiana civil courts operate under the most decentralized civil
system, allowing circuits considerable control over jurisdiction and the retention of judges; yet,
Indiana also utilizes the most statutory regulation over award amounts and medical malpractice
claims. Despite this, Indiana juries seem to respond in manner similar juries in Alabama when
evaluating case facts. On the other hand, Indiana juries appear unresponsive to litigant status.
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Apparent wealth or litigant class seems unrelated to plaintiff success rates or awards in Indiana.
This finding could indicate that the regulation of the civil litigation system in Indiana might
diminish disparities between parties, or that reforms in the state encourage only the most
contentious cases with relatively equal evidence to reach trial. Conversely, a representational
advantage continues to exert an important impact on the jury decision-making process; although,
attorneys in Indiana appear more successful in garnering compensation than in achieving proplaintiff verdicts. Furthermore, results in Indiana, demonstrate that community composition also
affects outcomes. However, findings in Indiana only show a relationship between community
composition and plaintiff success rates and not awards. Perhaps, regulation of awards in the
state limits contextual influences on jury verdicts. The results also supply preliminary evidence
that judicial ideology and selection method might shape juries‘ dispute resolution and resource
allocation functions. Awards in Indiana appear to increase when a Democratic judge presides
over the case. Additionally, plaintiffs appear to achieve higher success rates in circuits that
retain judges through retention elections than in circuits that utilize partisan elections, once
citizen ideology is controlled for.
Part III. Kentucky
The Kentucky circuit courts comprise 57 circuits made up of a county or counties.
Kentucky Circuit courts have general jurisdiction over cases involving disputes over $4,000.
Circuit judges serve 8-year terms and are retained through non-partisan, circuit-based elections.
Kentucky compiles a list of available jurors based on state tax roles, registered voter lists, and
driver‘s licenses. Although Kentucky does not utilize strict statutory damage caps like Indiana,
judges in Kentucky may cap damages on case by case basis; thereby giving judges in Kentucky
far greater control of the damage award. Like the other states, I hypothesize that community
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composition, litigants‘ resources, and case facts will predict jury verdicts in Kentucky.
However, nonpartisan elections in Kentucky prevent a test of the hypothesis that judges‘ partisan
identifications affect jury verdicts in the state. In 2009 Kentucky civil juries adjudicated 210
trials.
Analyses and Results
Table 4.7 provides logistic and ordinary least squares regression results for the circuit
composition and litigant resource variables associated with plaintiff success rates and awards in
Kentucky. The coefficients demonstrate some evidence that the composition of the circuit
predicts winners and losers and awards in Kentucky, but the results demonstrate less consistency
than Alabama. Like Indiana, some demographics affect plaintiff success but not awards. The
models show that the percent unemployment and the percent college educated in the circuit
predict the likelihood of plaintiff success. However, contrary to my predictions, the model
predicts that plaintiffs win less often in circuits with higher unemployment plaintiffs. This
finding could support attorneys‘ perspectives that local economic conditions can help or hurt
plaintiffs depending on the context. Conversely, greater percentages of college graduates
decreases support for plaintiffs, as predicted. None of the individual circuit demographics
significantly predicts awards. The model examining the ideological leanings of Kentucky
circuits based on the percent Democratic vote in the 2008 Presidential Election shows that
awards increase where greater percentages of the population vote for Democrats; yet, plaintiffs
appear no more or less likely to prevail among liberal populations. Like the results for Indiana,
the demographic index fails to achieve statistical significance in either model.
Next I turn to the attorney advantage and litigant status variables for winners and losers
and awards in Kentucky. Like Indiana, the attorney advantage variable also influences outcomes
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in Kentucky but only significantly impacts awards. Plaintiffs in Kentucky with a
representational advantage appear to garner greater compensation. On the other hand,
individuals appear no more or less likely to win or receive greater compensation when
challenging another individual or the government, than when challenging a business.
Table 4.7 Plaintiff Success and Awards Kentucky (2009)
Logit Coefficients for Plaintiff
Success (1 if the Plaintiff wins
& O otherwise)

Variables
Circuit Composition
% Black
% Unemployed
% College
% 65 and Over
% Farming
2008 Democratic Vote
Index
Litigant Resources and
Status
Attorney Advantage
Individual v. Individual
Individual v. Government
Individual v. Other Defendant
Institutions
Decisions Per Circuit Year

Regression Coefficients for
Logged Awards

Model 1
b
0.02
-0.43*
-0.10*
0.02
-0.14
------

Model 2
b
-------------------------0.03

Model 3
b
-------------------------------

Model 1 Model 2
b
b
0.01
------0.31*
------0.04
-----0.15
------0.21
----------0.10*

Model 3
b
-------------------------------

------

------

0.01

-------

------

0.03

0.40
0.64
-1.74*
------

0.45
0.58
-1.99*
------

0.43
0.56
-1.91
------

0.48*
-1.97**
-1.33
-0.89

0.54*
-1.86**
-1.33
-0.27

0.43*
-1.66**
-1.87
-0.67

-0.01

-0.01

-0.01

-0.39

-0.39

-0.46

* significant at the 0.05 level or higher ** significant at the 0.01 level or higher
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Table 4.7 Continued
Logit Coefficients for Plaintiff
Success Rate (1 is the Plaintiff
wins & O otherwise)

Variables
Case Issues
Medical Negligence
General Negligence
Premises Liability
Uninsured Motorist
Fraud
Breach of Contract
Product Liability
Other Issue
Alleged Injuries
Property Loss/Damage
Monetary Loss
Emotional Injury
Broken Bone
Death
Accident Resulted in Surgery
Slip and Fall
Other Injury
Constant

Regression Coefficients for
Logged Awards

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

b
-1.83**
0.48
0.97
1.08
1.80
3.51**
0.05
0.82

b
-1.90**
0.57
0.66
0.84
1.91
3.47**
0.50
-0.04

b
-1.88**
0.56
0.67
0.77
1.98
3.36*
-0.07
-0.06

b
3.50**
0.24
-0.72
-0.77
4.64**
1.13
2.82**
0.49

b
3.90**
0.54
-0.19
-0.81
4.81**
1.65
3.22**
0.70

b
3.40**
0.60
-0.50
-0.53
5.15**
1.23
3.12**
0.57

-0.80
-0.70
-0.63
2.32
-1.19
-1.53
-1.52
0.52
-2.22*
-1.77*
-1.72*
1.36
-2.10*
-1.90*
-1.88*
3.26**
-0.11
-0.10
-0.08
3.17**
0.19
0.06
0.03
0.82
-1.69
-1.57
-1.57
-0.46
-0.50
-0.62
-0.60
0.60
-6.42*
-5.29*
-6.24*
12.64**
N =209 N =209 N =209
N=111
2
2
2
X =66.93** X =59.96**X =59.96**

1.86
0.20
1.06
3.20**
3.15**
0.84
-1.05
0.24
10.80**
N=111

2.14
0.55
1.36
3.23**
3.16**
1.05
-0.43
0.58
10.79**
N=111

R2 =57.0** R2 =57.5**R2=57.6**
F =4.73** F =5.73** F=3.46**
Note: For the purposes of consistency all issue and injury variables are included in each model for all
states, but some states lack sufficient observations in every category, preventing multivariate analyses.
Missing issue and injury variables in the tables denote insufficient observations.

Kentucky juries also seem to exhibit less sensitivity to case facts than juries in either
Alabama or Indiana. Verdicts in Table 4.7 Continued only significantly differ from auto
negligence claims in breach of contract and medical malpractice cases. Like the other states,
plaintiffs appear significantly less like to prevail when making medical malpractice claims, but
plaintiffs in Kentucky seem to win breach of contract cases more often. Fraud allegations,
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medical malpractice, and product liability claims are the only alleged injuries to significantly
influence awards. The positive and significant coefficients for the fraud, medical malpractice,
and product liability variables indicate that successful plaintiffs receive greater compensation in
those issue areas. Kentucky juries also appear less sensitive to alleged injuries. Plaintiffs‘
likelihood of success decreases in cases in which the plaintiff alleges an emotional injury or
broken bones. However, like the other states, successful plaintiffs claiming more severe physical
injuries receive greater compensation. When compared to soft tissue injuries, Kentucky juries
deliver larger awards when successful plaintiffs are seeking compensation for broken bones or a
death.
Table 4.8 reports predicted plaintiff success rates and predicted logged awards for
Kentucky jury verdicts holding all other variables constant at their means. The table displays the
results for the first model examining circuit demographics and the second model examining
circuit ideological composition measured as the percent Democratic vote in the 2008 Presidential
Election. The predicted plaintiff success rates for Kentucky jury verdicts further demonstrate the
significant impact of unemployment and college education on jury verdicts. Although opposite
my expectations and the findings in the other states, the model predicts that plaintiffs will prevail
about 71% of the time in Kentucky circuits with lowest percent unemployed. The predicted
plaintiff success rate drops almost 62 percentage points when moving circuits with the greatest
percent unemployed (9.7% predicted plaintiff success). Although these findings cannot explain
precisely why increased unemployment so dramatically decreases plaintiff success rates in
Kentucky, the results demonstrate that economic conditions strongly influence trial court
outcomes. On the other hand, the model predicts that moving from the least college educated
circuit to the most college educated circuit decreases plaintiff‘s chance of success by about 51%,
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showing that the more highly educated populations in Kentucky tend to deliver more pro-defense
verdicts. Furthermore, the model predicts that plaintiffs making breach of contract claims win
over 90% of the time.
Table 4.8 Predicted Plaintiff Success and Logged Awards (Kentucky 2009)
Variable

Predicted Plaintiff Success

Predicted Logged Award

Model 1
Least Attorney Advantage
N/S
8.4
Greatest Attorney Advantage
N/S
13.1
Minimum Unemployment
71.4%
N/S
Maximum Unemployment
9.7%
N/S
Minimum % College
71.8%
N/S
Maximum % College
20.2%
N/S
Fraud
N/S
16.0
Breach of Contract
91.52%
N/S
Medical Malpractice
91.5%
13.2
Death
N/S
14.6
Model 2
Minimum % Democratic Vote
N/S
9.17
Maximum % Democratic Vote
N/S
12.4
*Logged awards in Kentucky range from 7.17 to 17.84; the average logged award is 11.4.
Missing values in the table represent non-significant variables in the original models.
All predicted probabilities are significant at the 0.5 level.
Next, I examine Kentucky jurors predicted logged awards. Logged awards in Kentucky
range from a minimum of 7.14 to 17.84 with mean award of 11.4. The predicted awards verify
the significance of the plaintiffs‘ representational advantage in Kentucky. The most
disadvantaged plaintiff in Kentucky receives a predicted logged award well below the mean
award, while the most advantaged plaintiff receives an award well above the average.
Interestingly, the predicted awards also show that plaintiffs receive the largest predicted awards
in fraud cases. In fact, fraud cases, which typically involve monetary injuries, receive larger
awards than cases involving a death. Finally, Table 4.17 reports the effect of circuit partisanship
on predicted awards. Yet, consistent with results in Alabama, Successful plaintiffs receive larger
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awards in medical malpractice cases. Moving from the least to the greatest percent Democratic
vote increases the plaintiff‘s predicted award from below the mean award to an above average
award.
The Kentucky analyses provide further evidence that community composition predicts
civil jury decision-making patterns. In Kentucky, circuit educational attainment and economic
conditions predict the likelihood of plaintiff success; although, the results suggest that economic
conditions might produce differential influences across states. On the other hand, Kentucky
circuits with more liberal populations appear to give consistently larger awards. Additionally,
like Alabama and Indiana, a representational advantage continues to influence litigation
outcomes; however, the plaintiff‘s relative advantage in representation seems to shape the size of
the award more than plaintiff‘s probability of success. The results also indicate that juries in
Kentucky respond to case issues and alleged injuries. Consistent with the results in Alabama and
Indiana, plaintiffs are significantly less likely to win medical malpractice suits in Kentucky.
Conversely, the results suggest that Kentucky juries demonstrate little significant difference in
their treatment of other issues areas. Kentucky jurists also appear sensitive to alleged injuries
and deliver fewer pro-plaintiff verdicts when the plaintiff alleges an emotional injury or broken
bones. Awards in Kentucky increase for success plaintiffs in cases involving and a death or
broken bones, further supporting the hypothesis that juries deliver larger awards when the
plaintiff prevails in a case involving a more severe and concrete injury.
Part IV. Tennessee
Tennessee divides its 95 counties into 31 judicial circuits. Tennessee counties determine the
jurisdiction of the courts in their corresponding circuits. Judges in Tennessee stand for reelection
in partisan elections every eight years. All judges in the state run for reelection at one time.
Tennessee civil juries decided 190 disputes in 2009.
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Analyses and Results
Table 4.9 reports the coefficients for the plaintiff success and awards models across the
three measures of community composition for Tennessee along with the litigant resource and
status and judicial ideology variables. The results suggest that community composition, at least
as measured, produces little influence on jury verdicts in Tennessee. None of the variables
measuring a circuit‘s demographic or ideological composition affect the likelihood that
Tennessee juries deliver pro-plaintiff verdicts. In the award model, only the percent
unemployment in the circuit significantly impacts the amount juries award successful plaintiffs.
Unlike my expectations, the size of the award Tennessee juries deliver decreases as the percent
unemployed in the circuit decreases. The findings indicate the economic conditions affect juries‘
evaluations of fair compensation for an injury; however, inconsistent directional effect implies
that economic conditions produce differential results from one context to the next.
Turning to litigant resources and status, the results for Tennessee indicate that plaintiffs
achieve significantly higher success rates when they possess a representational advantage. Like
Alabama, Indiana, and Kentucky, plaintiffs in Tennessee benefit from legal representation. On
the other hand, none of the combinations of litigant matches achieves statistical significance in
the award model, implying that Tennessee juries are indifferent to the status of the litigants
involved in each case. Yet, the award model shows that Tennessee juries award success plaintiff
significantly less when they challenge and individual then when challenging a business,
providing evidence that Tennessee juries adjust awards according perceived ability to pay.
Next, I examine the influence of ideology and institutions on jury verdicts in Tennessee.
Although the plaintiff success model provides no evidence that judicial ideology affects the
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likelihood that plaintiffs win in Tennessee, the award model shows that judicial ideology and the
interaction between ideology and constituent preferences shape the size of awards in the state.
The variable denoting a Democratic judge and the interaction between the presence of a
Democratic judge and the percent Democratic vote in the circuit both produce positive and
significant coefficients, indicating that plaintiffs receive larger awards in cases presided over by
Democratic judges, especially where greater percentages of the population vote liberally.
Table 4.9 Plaintiff Success and Awards Tennessee (2009)
Logit Coefficients for Plaintiff
Success (1 if the Plaintiff wins
& O otherwise)

Variables
Circuit Composition
% Black
% Unemployed
% College
% 65 and Over
% Farming
2008 Democratic Vote

Model 1
b
0.01
0.12
0.03
-0.10
-0.26
------

Model 2
b
-------------------------0.002

Model 3
b
-------------------------------

Regression Coefficients for
Logged Awards

Model 1 Model 2
b
b
0.01
------0.31*
------0.04
-----0.15
------0.21
----------0.01

Model 3
b
-------------------------------

Index
----------0.01
-----------0.04
Litigant Resources and
Status
Attorney Advantage
0.90**
0.89**
0.89**
0.48
0.54
0.47
Individual v. Individual
0.11
0.08
0.12
-1.97** -1.86** -1.49**
Individual v. Government
-0.21
-0.11
-0.73
-1.33
0.93
0.99
Individual v. Other Defendant
-0.66
-0.59
-0.66
-0.89
-0.27
-0.60
Institutions and Ideology
Democratic Judge
0.24
0.50
0.12
-0.39
2.98*
-0.46
Democrat x 2008 Vote
-----0.01
----------2.08*
-----Decisions Per Circuit Year
-0.001
-0.004
-0.005
-0.01
-0.01
-0.02
* significant at the 0.05 level or higher ** significant at the 0.01 level or higher
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Table 4.9 Continued
Logit Coefficients for Plaintiff
Success Rate (1 is the Plaintiff
wins & O otherwise)

Variables
Case Issues
Medical Negligence
General Negligence
Premises Liability
Uninsured Motorist
Fraud
Breach of Contract
Product Liability
Other Issue
Alleged Injuries
Property Loss/Damage
Monetary Loss
Emotional Injury
Broken Bone
Death
Accident Resulted in Surgery
Slip and Fall
Other Injury
Constant

Regression Coefficients for
Logged Awards

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

b
-2.32**
-0.88
-0.31
---------------0.93
-1.06

b
-2.32**
-0.70
-0.44
---------------0.67
-1.01

b
-2.31**
-0.71
-0.47
---------------0.62
-0.96

b
3.50**
0.24
-0.72
-------------2.82**
0.49

b
3.90**
0.54
-0.19
-------------3.22**
0.70

b
3.40**
0.60
-0.50
-------------3.12**
0.57

------------------------------------------------------------0.56
-0.56
-0.54
0.45
-0.11
0.02
-0.04
0.40
1.93*
1.89*
1.89*
0.82
-1.81
-1.73
-1.68
-0.46
0.87
0.87
0.86
0.60
-3.75*
-3.32*
-2.35*
12.64**
N =190 N =190 N =190
N=111
2
2
2
X =43.39** X =39.72**X =40.22**

---------------0.50
0.21
0.84
-1.05
0.24
10.80**
N=111

---------------0.28
0.60
1.05
-0.43
0.58
11.03**
N=111

R2 =57.0** R2 =57.5**R2=54.6**
F =4.73** F =5.73** F=5.42**
Note: For the purposes of consistency all issue and injury variables are included in each model for all
states, but some states lack sufficient observations in every category, preventing multivariate analyses.
Missing issue and injury variables in the tables denote insufficient observations.

Although the percent Democratic vote in the circuit fails to achieve statistical
significance, the interaction between population liberalism and judicial ideology appears to
predict more generous awards.22 The findings imply that the size of the award juries deliver in

22

In addition to running a model that interacts the percent Democratic vote in the 2008 Presidential Election with
the presence of a Democratic judge, I have also run models without the interaction. The presidential vote is
insignificant in both models with and without the interaction.
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Tennessee depends both on judges‘ and juries‘ ideological dispositions. The number of verdicts
in each circuit fails to achieve statistical significance in either the plaintiff success or award
models.
Table 4.9 Continued reports the results for the case issue and injury variables in
Tennessee. The results show that juries in Tennessee evaluate medical malpractice claims
similarly to the other states. The medical malpractice variable is the only statistically significant
issue or injury variable. Like the Alabama, Indiana, and Kentucky, plaintiffs seeking
compensation in medical malpractice cases prevail significantly less often in Tennessee. On the
other hand, when successful, plaintiffs involved in medical malpractice cases achieve
substantially larger awards. The models confirm that plaintiffs face special difficulties in
winning medical malpractice cases in Alabama, Indiana, Kentucky, and Tennessee. However,
none of the models demonstrate any significant difference between the other case types or
alleged injuries in either the probability that the plaintiff wins or the size of the award upon
success. Excepting medical malpractice, Tennessee juries appear to treat most cases and injuries
similarly.
Table 4.10 reports predicted plaintiff success rates and predicted logged awards for
Tennessee jury verdicts holding all other variables constant at their means. I examine the
predicted plaintiff success rates for the model using separate variables for each demographic
indicator, followed by the predicted values for the model examining the interaction between
judicial ideology and the 2008 presidential vote in the circuit. The predicted plaintiff success
rates further demonstrate the impact of legal representation on plaintiff success rates. The model
predicts that moving for the least advantaged plaintiff (attorney advantage of -2) to the most
advantaged plaintiff (attorney advantage of 1) increases the predicted plaintiff success rate from
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18% to about 77%, an increase of 69%. On the other hand, the model predicts that plaintiffs in
Tennessee win medical malpractice cases only about 15% of the time.
Table 4.10 Predicted Plaintiff Success and Logged Awards (Tennessee 2009)
Variable

Predicted Plaintiff Success

Predicted Logged Award

Model 1
Least Attorney Advantage
18.1%
N/S
Greatest Attorney Advantage
77.2%
N/S
Minimum Unemployment
N/S
11.0
Maximum Unemployment
N/S
8.7
Medical Malpractice
15.8%
13.5
Model 2
Democratic Judge
N/S
12.3
Republican Judge
N/S
9.4
Democrat x Min. Dem. Vote
N/S
5.03
Democrat x Max. Dem. Vote
N/S
13.4
*Logged awards in Tennessee range from 5.62 to 16.98; the average logged award is 10.21.
Missing values in the table represent non-significant variables in the original models.
All predicted probabilities are significant at the 0.5 level.
Next, I examine predicted logged awards in Tennessee. Logged awards in Tennessee
range from a minimum of 7.14 to 17.84 with mean award of 11.4. The predicted logged awards
show that moving from the lowest to the highest levels of unemployment in the circuit decreases
the award from slightly over the mean award to a below average award. The predicted logged
awards also suggest that plaintiffs receive the largest awards in medical malpractice cases. The
predicted awards demonstrate that plaintiffs receive above average awards when a Democratic
judge presides over the trial and below average awards when a Republican judge resides over the
trial. Interestingly, the predicted logged awards for the interaction between judicial ideology and
population liberalism indicate that plaintiffs receive even lower awards from Democratic judges
in highly Republican circuits than from Republican judges. On the other hand, awards increase
considerably when a Democratic judge presides over the cases in a highly Democratic circuit.
The predicted logged awards further substantiate a relationship between judicial ideology and
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litigation outcomes in Tennessee, as well as a relationship between judicial ideology and
constituent preferences.
Compared to Alabama, Indiana, and Kentucky, Tennessee jury verdicts evidence the least
responsiveness to circuit social, political, or economic conditions. The only indication that circuit
demographics affect verdicts in Tennessee comes from the negative influence of unemployment
on the size of awards in the states, suggesting that economic conditions influence how juries
evaluate appropriate compensation. However, the Tennessee results uncover an interesting
interaction between judicial ideology and population ideological preferences, suggesting that
outcomes in Tennessee civil trial courts depend on both the preferences of the judge and the
community. On the other hand, like the other states, plaintiffs in Tennessee benefit from legal
representation. Additionally, the observed lack of plaintiff success in medical malpractice cases
in Alabama, Hawaii, Indiana, and Kentucky persists in the Tennessee analyses.
Part V. 2009 Verdicts in Alabama, Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky, and Tennessee
Multi-state analyses provide the opportunity to explore the social, political, and economic
conditions that commonly affect civil courts‘ dispute resolution and resource allocation
functions, as well as the influence of varying institutional arrangements. Overall, civil trial
courts in the five states adjudicated 926 cases in 2009 of which plaintiffs won 500, or 54%.
Table 4.11 lists the variables and measurement for the institutions under investigation in the
multi-state models. In particular, multi-state models allow me to test the hypothesis that judicial
retention methods affect jury verdicts. If elections substantially alter judicial behavior as
previous research would suggest (Brace and Hall 1995, 1997; Hall 1987, 1992), jury verdicts
might reflect judges‘ modified behaviors. In particular, partisan elections appear to encourage
judicial responsiveness to public opinion (Brace and Boyea 2007,2008). However, prior studies
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also maintain that judges‘ might favor campaign contributors (Cann 2007). Unfortunately
previous research provides no clear guide regarding the possible effect of judicial retention
method on trial court behavior. Should elected judges tend to favor individuals who typically
serve as plaintiffs, or business which presumably contribute to judges‘ campaigns and typically
participate in litigation as defendants? I hypothesize that plaintiff success rates and awards will
vary systematically across partisan, nonpartisan, retention, and appointment systems; however,
given the lack of theoretical guidance, I make no directional hypothesis.
The combined models also investigate the influence of the institutions of fault standards
and damage caps on winners and losers and awards. States that utilize comparative fault allow
juries to assess the plaintiff‘s relative contribution to his or her alleged injury and adjust the On
the other hand, the contributory negligence standard prevents a plaintiff from collecting any
damages if he or she shares any responsibility with the plaintiff for the alleged injury.
Theoretically, the lower standard of fault applied in comparative fault states might produce
higher plaintiff success rates. On the other hand, the ability to reduce successful plaintiffs‘
awards under the comparative fault standard might lead to systematically lower damage awards.
Additionally, Indiana and Kentucky use damage caps to limit defendants‘ potential liability.
Although the models only examine the juries‘ initial award and not post-trial reductions, the use
of damage caps in the state might decrease the jury‘s initial award if individual jurors are aware
of damage caps or if plaintiffs limit their initial demands in response to damage caps.
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Table 4.11 Institutions
Variable

Measurement

Judicial Selection Method
Partisan Elections [+/-]

Nonpartisan Elections [+/-]

Coded 1 for partisan elections, and 0 otherwise
Coded 1 for nonpartisan elections, and 0
otherwise
Coded 1 for retention elections, and 0
otherwise.

Retention Elections [+/-]
Unelected [+/-]

Coded 1 for judges retained through any
procedure other than elections, and 0
otherwise.

Other Institutions
Comparative Fault [+] plaintiff success [-]
awards

Coded 1 for comparative fault, 0 for
contributory negligence

Damage Caps [+/-] plaintiff success [-] awards

Coded 1 for states with damage caps, and 0
otherwise

Analyses and Results
Examining winners and losers and awards both within and across states produces
evidence that community composition and institutions affect both how courts settle disputes and
allocate resources. The following section investigates the variables associated with the percent
pro-plaintiff verdicts in each circuit, the probability that the plaintiff wins, and the size of the
award in Alabama, Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky, and Tennessee in 2009. First, I examine how the
institutional features of judicial selection method, comparative fault, damage caps, and court
workloads affect pro-plaintiff tendencies, plaintiff success, and awards. The models compare
judges retained in nonpartisan elections, retention elections, and appointment systems to judges
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retained in partisan elections.23 The damage cap variable compares states with statutory damage
caps to states without. Then, I turn to community composition, litigant resources and status, and
finally case issues and alleged injuries.
Table 4.12 reports the results for the institutional, community composition, and litigant
resources and status variables, while Table 4.12 Continued reports the results for the issue and
injury variables. The models show that institutional arrangements significantly shape the proplaintiff tendencies of a circuit. The percent pro-plaintiff verdicts in a circuit increase where
states utilize comparative fault. Allowing juries to find in favor of the plaintiff even when the
plaintiff contributes in part to his or her injury appears to increase the percentage of cases
plaintiffs win. The plaintiff success model demonstrates that the lower standard of fault applied
in comparative fault states also increases the probability that the plaintiff wins. The comparative
fault variable produces a negative value in the award model, suggesting that, as predicted,
successful plaintiffs receive smaller awards in comparative fault states, although the effect is not
statistically significant. Interestingly, capping the amount that successful plaintiffs receive also
seems to increase the percentage of plaintiff wins, suggesting that limiting the amount plaintiffs
may collect actually increases juries‘ likelihood of finding in the plaintiff‘s favor. On the other
hand, damage caps appear not to affect plaintiff success rates or awards. Although the award
variable does not account for statutory reductions of the jury‘s verdict post-trial, this finding
suggests that juries do not initially distribute lower awards in response to damage caps in the
state. Conversely, the percent pro-plaintiff verdicts significantly decrease where judges retained
in nonpartisan elections preside over trials. This finding provides initial support for the
23

Partisan elections include Alabama, Tennessee, and most Indiana circuits. Nonpartisan
elections include Kentucky and Vanderburgh and Allen counties in Indiana. Retention elections
include Lake and St. Joseph counties, Indiana. Hawaii judges are appointed and retained by
selection committees.
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Table 4.12 Plaintiff Success and Awards (Alabama, Hawaii, Indian, Kentucky, and Tennessee 2009)
Regression Coefficients for %
Pro-Plaintiff Verdicts

Variables
Circuit Composition
% Black
% Unemployed
% College
% 65 and Over
% Farming
2008 Democratic Vote

Model 1
b
0.20**
0.66**
-1.93**
0.94**
-10.21**
------

Index
-----Litigant Resources and Status
Attorney Advantage
-1.07
Individual v. Individual
0.12
Individual v. Government
5.19
Individual v. Other Defendant
-0.24
Institutions and Ideology
Comparative Fault
12.85**
Damage Caps
6.64**
Nonpartisan
-13.90**
Merit
-4.61
Unelected
-----Decisions Per Circuit Year
0.20**

Logit Coefficients for Plaintiff
Success (1 if the Plaintiff wins &
O otherwise)

Regression Coefficients for
Logged Awards

Model 2
b
-------------------------0.04**

Model 3
b
-------------------------------

Model 1
b
0.01
0.01
0.05
-0.02
-0.52*
------

Model 2
b
-------------------------0.01**

Model 3
b
-------------------------------

Model 1
b
0.002
0.01
-0.31
0.06
0.16
------

Model 2
b
-------------------------0.02*

Model 3
b
-------------------------------

------

0.01

------

------

0.01

-------

------

0.001

-1.05
0.41
4.08
-1.64

-0.67
0.53
4.53
-2.30

0.27**
0.07
-0.97*
0.43

0.45*
0.05
-1.06*
0.44

0.25*
0.03
-1.03*
0.40

0.55**
-1.46**
-0.10
-0.77

0.54**
-1.50*
-0.18
-0.80

0.56**
-1.50*
-0.18
-0.78

7.19**
1.42*
-13.10**
8.41**
-----0.40**

7.75**
3.34*
-15.1**
4.29
-----0.20**

0.65**
0.23
-0.17
0.05
-----0.01

0.45*
0.10
-0.11
0.77*
-----0.01

0.45*
0.13
-0.24
0.50
-----0.01

-0.03
0.50
0.19
0.36
0.80
-0.01

-0.06
0.20
0.61
0.49
------0.01

-0.02
0.20
0.54
0.24
------0.01

* significant at the 0.05 level or higher ** significant at the 0.01 level or higher
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Table 4.12 Continued
Regression Coefficients for %
Pro-Plaintiff Verdicts

Variables
Case Issues
Medical Negligence
General Negligence
Premises Liability
Uninsured Motorist
Fraud
Breach of Contract
Product Liability
Other Issue
Alleged Injuries
Property Loss/Damage
Monetary Loss
Emotional Injury
Broken Bone
Death
Accident Resulted in Surgery
Slip and Fall
Other Injury
Constant

Logit Coefficients for Plaintiff
Success Rate (1 is the Plaintiff
wins & O otherwise)

Regression Coefficients for
Logged Awards

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

b
-7.20**
-2.42
-7.40**
-1.88
11.70
-0.42
-1.76
0.27

b
-7.43**
-3.70
-7.21*
-2.00
9.80
-0.58
-2.08
-0.13

b
-7.74**
-3.60
-7.24*
-2.98
11.38
0.20
-2.56
-0.38

b
-1.32**
0.10
1.26**
0.86*
0.72
1.07
0.25
0.11

b
-1.38**
0.007
-1.31
0.84*
0.65
1.10
0.20
0.11

b
-1.45**
0.06
-1.17**
0.74
0.76
1.10
0.38
0.12

b
2.06**
0.10
-0.38
-0.26
2.91**
1.23*
2.30**
-0.10

b
2.04**
0.23
-0.33
-0.25
3.03**
1.31*
2.35**
-0.08

b
2.03**
0.30
0.26
-0.25
3.06*
1.34*
2.07**
-0.08

2.16
-2.66
-7.24*
-5.65*
-5.48
-1.76
-5.30
0.27

3.49
-1.51
-8.76*
-6.20*
-4.92
-1.60
-5.94
0.31

-4.16
-1.91
-12.25*
-8.20*
-3.25
-2.03
-6.40
0.25

-0.52
-0.53
-1.28*
-1.17**
-0.75*
0.11
-0.71
-0.38

-0.50
-0.51
-1.02
-1.21**
-0.65*
-0.10
-0.82
-0.40

-0.49
-0.67
-0.62
-1.24**
-0.67*
-0.11
-0.83
-0.38

-0.13
1.04**
0.03
1.26**
3.45**
1.20**
1.24**
0.90**

-0.15
1.02**
0.10
1.30*
3.43**
1.23**
1.24**
0.90**

-0.45
1.03**
0.07
1.15**
2.82**
1.31**
1.24**
0.87**

9.74**

43.49**

51.10**

1.69**

1.87**

1.57**

11.48**

11.45**

10.87**

N=225
N=225
N=225
N=922 N=911 N=896
N=472 N=467
N=369
2
2
2
2
2
R =16.6 R =16.7 R2 =16.1 X =140.84** X =149.95**X =148.41**
R2 =43.1** R2 =43.0**R2 =42.8**
F = 10.73** F = 12.74** F= 12.66**
F =10.73** F = 12.74** F = 13.83**
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hypothesis that judicial retention mechanisms condition trial court judges‘ behavior, which in
turn shapes the jury‘s verdict. Finally, the percent pro-plaintiff verdicts in a circuit significantly
increases as the annual number of decisions in the circuit increases, implying that where more
cases go to trial plaintiffs win more often, perhaps providing evidence of attorney strategy.
Turning to circuit demographics, the table reports findings for three measures of
community composition. The first model examines the overall influence of the percent black in
the circuit, percent unemployment, percent 65 and over, percent college educated, and the
rural/urban characteristic of the circuit (measured by the percent farming employed). The second
model attempts to capture the overall liberalism of the circuit based on the percent Democratic
vote in the 2008 Presidential Election. The third model utilizes the demographic index to capture
the additive influence of circuit demographics on jury verdicts. Although the individual state
analyses suggest that circuit demographics affect jury verdicts differently across states, the
aggregate results for the percent pro-plaintiff verdicts for all of the circuits demonstrate that a
general pattern of pro-plaintiff verdicts emerges across demographic indicators. For all circuits,
the percent pro-plaintiff verdicts increase as the black and unemployed population increases,
indicating that the racial and economic composition of a community shape jury decision-making.
Although I originally predicted that older populations would produce more defense oriented
verdicts, the combined models indicate that circuits with large retirement age populations vote in
favor of plaintiffs more often. Finally, the percent pro-plaintiff verdicts for all circuits decrease
as the college educated and farming population in the circuits increase. The results substantiate
the hypothesis that circuit demographics affect the general pro-plaintiff tendencies of circuits
across states.
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Although circuit demographics appear to predict the general pro-plaintiff tendencies of
circuits, the plaintiff success model and the award model demonstrate no consistent effect of
circuit demographics on the likelihood that a plaintiff wins a particular case or the size of the
award. Yet, the overall liberalism of the circuit, measured as the percent Democratic vote in
2008, significantly increases the percent pro-plaintiff verdicts in the circuit as well as the
likelihood that the plaintiff wins but not awards. The findings demonstrate that circuits with
larger Democratic populations tend to produce more pro-plaintiff verdicts than their more
conservative counterparts. On the other hand, the combined models suggest that community
composition affects the liability decisions to a far greater extent than the size of the award.
Finally, the demographic index is positive across all three dependent variables but insignificant.
Next, I explore the results for litigant resources and litigation status on pro-plaintiff
tendencies, winners and losers, and awards. Like the models for the individual states, the
combined models evidence a substantial influence of attorneys on litigation outcomes. Although
an attorney advantage seems not to influence that percent pro-plaintiff verdicts in the circuit in
the combined models, possessing and attorney advantage positively and significantly increases
the likelihood that plaintiffs win and increase the size of the award upon success. The consistent
positive influence of a representational advantage confirms that when plaintiffs acquire a
resource advantage in terms of representation, plaintiffs win more often and garner greater
compensation. On the other hand, litigant resources, as typically measured based on litigant
status, produces less of an affect after controlling for representation. None of the litigant
matches significantly influences the percent pro-plaintiff verdicts in the circuits. On the other
hand, the plaintiff success model shows that the plaintiff is less likely to win when challenging
the government than when challenging a business, supplying additional evidence that the

142

government is the ―gorilla‖ in the courtroom. The award model also supplies some support for
the ―deep pockets‖ hypothesis. The model produces negative coefficients for every category,
suggesting that individuals receive greater compensation when successfully challenging
businesses than other types of defendant. However, only the Individual vs. Individual variable
achieves statistical significance, demonstrating that plaintiffs garner larger awards when an
individual successfully sues a business than when an individual sues another individual.
Finally, I explore the influence of case types and alleged injuries on civil jury verdicts.
The models examining aggregate patterns of pro-plaintiff verdicts, the probability that a plaintiff
wins his or her cases, and the award model all provide evidence that the type of case and the
injury alleged affect the plaintiff‘s likelihood of success and the amount of compensation
received upon success. The percent pro-plaintiff verdicts across circuits significantly decreases,
when compared to auto negligence cases, for cases involving medical negligence, premises
liability, products liability, and uninsured motorist claims. On the other hand, aggregate patterns
of pro-plaintiff verdicts in the circuits exhibit no sensitivity to alleged injuries, perhaps indicating
that injuries are somewhat evenly distributed in the aggregate. Turning to the plaintiff success
model, the results demonstrate that plaintiffs win medical negligence claims less often and
uninsured motorist claims more often across the five states. However, the results for the
combined award model show that plaintiffs in Alabama, Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky, and
Tennessee receive greater compensation when successfully pursing fraud, products liability, and
medical malpractice cases. Additionally, the plaintiff success model indicates that plaintiffs win
significantly less often when seeking compensation for an emotional injury, broken bones, and
death. Yet, the award model further confirms that juries in all five states give larger awards to
successful plaintiffs alleging concrete and severe physical injuries. Plaintiffs receive greater

143

compensation when successfully pursing claims for injuries resulting in surgery, death, and
broken bones.
Table 4.13 reports predicted percent pro-plaintiff verdicts, predicted plaintiff success
rates, and predicted logged awards for the combined models examining verdicts in Alabama,
Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky, and Tennessee in 2009, holding all other variables constant at the
means. The predicted percent pro-plaintiff verdicts demonstrate that institutional variables shape
the overall pro-plaintiff tendencies of the circuits. The model predicts that circuits which rely on
comparative fault standards will generate more pro-plaintiff verdicts and damage caps will
produce pro-plaintiff verdicts about 56% of the time. On the other hand, only about 42% of
verdicts favor plaintiffs in circuits that utilize nonpartisan elections to retain judges.
Additionally, the plaintiff success model predicts that plaintiffs will prevail under comparative
fault standards about 57% of the time. The findings indicate that institutional arrangements
significantly shape jury decision-making.
The predicted percent pro-plaintiff verdicts in all of the circuits support the theory that
aggregate patterns of jury verdicts reflect the social, political, and economic composition of the
circuit, providing considerable support for the hypothesis that jury verdicts reflect community
preferences. Moving from the smallest black population in the circuit to the greatest percent
black, increases the predicted percent pro-plaintiff verdicts by 13.1%. Economic conditions in
the circuit, as measured by the percent unemployed also substantially shape verdicts. At the least
percent unemployed, the models predict that about 44% of verdicts will favor plaintiffs. On the
other hand, the model predicts that communities with the most unemployed residents will issue
pro-plaintiff verdicts in about 67% of cases, an increase of almost 23%. Predicted pro-plaintiff
verdicts for all circuits also increase with the retirement age population. The model predicts that

144

Table 4.13 Predicted Percent Pro-Plaintiff Verdicts, Plaintiff Success, and Awards
(Alabama, Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky, and Tennessee 2009)
Predicted
Percent ProPlaintiff
Variable
Institutions (model 1)
Comparative Fault
Damage Caps
Nonpartisan Elections
Circuit Demographics (model1)
Least Percent Black
Greatest Percent Black
Least Percent Unemployment
Greatest Percent Unemployment
Least Percent 65 and Over
Greatest Percent 65 and Over
Least Percent College
Greatest Percent College
Democratic Vote (model 2)
Least Percent Democratic Vote
Greatest Percent Democratic Vote
Attorney Advantage (model1)
Least Attorney Advantage
No Advantage
Greatest Attorney Advantage
Litigant Status (model 1)
Individual v Individual
Individual v Government
Individual v Other Defendant
Case Issues and Injuries (model 1)
Medical Malpractice
Death

Predicted
Plaintiff
Success

Predicted Log
Award

55.7%
55.6%
41.7%

57.2%
N/S
N/S

N/S
N/S
N/S

48.5 %
61.6%
43.7 %
66.5 %
46.9 %
59.2 %
76.8 %
50.8%

N/S
N/S
N/S
N/s
N/S
N/S
N/S
N/S

N/S
N/S
N/S
N/S
N/S
N/S
N/S
N/S

46.3%
61.8 %

45.1 %
67.2 %

N/S
N/S

48.0 %
52.3 %
57.7 %

24.7 %
54.1%
76.7 %

7.8
10.6
12.8

N/S
N/S
N/S

N/S
32.9 %
N/S

10.1
N/S
N/S

36.3 %
N/S

27.6 %
39.0 %

12.6
13.5

*Logged awards range from 4.60 to 18.9; the average logged award is 10.7.
Missing values in the table represent non-significant variables in the original model.
All predicted probabilities are significant at the 0.5 level.
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46.9% of verdicts will favor plaintiffs in circuits with the smallest retirement age populations,
while circuits most inhabitants 65 and over will support plaintiffs 46.9% of the time, an increase
of about 12%. Finally, the predicted percent pro-plaintiff verdicts decrease from about 76.8%
for least college educated circuits to 50.8% for the most highly educated circuits.
The predicted percent pro-plaintiff verdicts also demonstrate that circuits with larger Democratic
populations generate more pro-plaintiff verdicts. The model predicts that 46% of the verdicts
will favor plaintiffs in circuits with the least Democratic populations, while 62% of verdicts will
favor plaintiffs in the most Democratic circuits. Additionally, the plaintiff success model
predicts that an individual plaintiff will win about 45% of the time where the Democratic
presidential candidate received the least percent of the vote and win about 67% where the
Democratic candidate received that largest vote share.
Next, the attorney advantage variable indicates a substantial positive benefit for plaintiffs
both on the predicted percent pro-plaintiff in the circuit, the likelihood that the plaintiff wins and
the size of the award. The predicted percent pro-plaintiff verdicts in the circuit increase from
48% for the least advantaged plaintiffs to about 58% for the most advantaged plaintiffs. The
plaintiff success model predicts an even greater increase for the change in plaintiff success rates.
The model predicts that the least advantaged plaintiff will win about 25% percent of the time,
while the plaintiff with the greatest advantage wins about 77% if the time, an increase of about
52%. When evenly matched, the models predict that plaintiffs and defendants are nearly equally
likely to prevail.
Logged awards for all states range from 4.60 to 18.9 with an average award of 10.7. The
predicted awards shows that the least advantaged plaintiffs, when successful, receive a below
average award, while plaintiffs with the greatest representational advantage receive above
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average awards. The predicted probabilities for the combined models produce considerable
evidence that legal representation substantially influences plaintiffs‘ likelihood of success and
increases the amount successful parties receive. Turning to litigant resources and status, the
plaintiff success model predicts that individual plaintiffs will win suits challenging the
government only about 33% of the time, and the award model predicts that individual plaintiffs
receive below average awards when they win when challenging another individual.
Finally, the predicted probabilities for medical malpractice cases and cases in which the
plaintiff seeking compensation for death indicate that juries across states respond similarly to
these case facts. The plaintiff success model predicts that plaintiffs win medical malpractice
cases only about 28% of the time and death cases bout 39% of the time. However, when
successful, the award model predicts that plaintiffs will receive above average awards.
Summary and Discussion
Table 4.14 summarizes the results for the key independent variables and reports the
direction of the effect of each significant independent variable on the plaintiff‘s likelihood of
success and the size of the award for each state. Comparing the results for the effect of
community composition and awards across states suggests that the demographic composition of
the circuit predicts winners and losers and awards, substantiating the notion that community
preferences affect jury verdicts. The percent Democratic vote in 2008 Presidential election
provides the most consistent indicator of jury verdicts across states, indicating that population
liberalism plays a critical role in trial courts dispute resolution and resource allocation functions.
However, the results also suggest different patterns of decision-making in response to circuit
demographic across the states. When compared to Alabama, circuit demographics and citizen
ideological preferences seemingly matter less in Indiana, Kentucky, and Tennessee.
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Additionally, the circuit characteristics that positively affect plaintiff success rates and awards in
one state negatively affect awards in other states. The results could indicate that the community
composition affects jury verdicts differently across circuits and states. If different community
features or varying social and political cleavages affect how juries in one community perceive
fair dispute resolution and compensation, then jury verdict should reflect those differing values.
For example, the results could imply that race may play a more critical role in community
debates in Alabama than the other states. Yet, the results should be interpreted with caution. At
this time I possess data for only the 2009 legal calendar in Hawaii, Indian, Kentucky, and
Tennessee, which accounts for relatively few observations in many circuits in those states.
Perhaps, more consistent effects of community composition would emerge in an investigation
over a greater time period. However, overall, the analyses support Anti-Federalists‘ assertions
that civil jury verdicts reflect local community preferences.
The analyses also demonstrate that possessing an advantage in representation clearly
benefits plaintiffs. Although the effect of an attorney advantage appears in the plaintiff success
model for some states and in the award model for others, the attorney advantage variable exhibits
a consistent positive benefit for plaintiffs in every state. On the other hand, Alabama juries
appear more responsive to litigant status than juries in the other states. However, the results
overall suggest that the government achieves higher success rates than other litigants, and jurors
assess smaller damage awards against individual defendants than business defendants.
Additionally, judicial ideology seems to exhibit some influence on jury verdicts in Indiana and
Tennessee, suggesting that judges can transmit their ideological preferences to jurors. Yet, in
Alabama where judges also stand for reelection in partisan elections, I find no effect of judicial
ideology. Although it is too soon to make definitive conclusions, my fieldwork in Alabama

148

might shed some light on this apparent contradiction. Alabama judges in one circuit state that
the Alabama Bar Association recommends three lawyers as possible candidates to fill vacancies
on the bench in that circuit (but not all circuits utilize this process), of which the sitting governor
selects one. That judge will then run under the partisan label of the governor that selected him or
her. Furthermore, judges typically run in competitive elections only in open-seat races. The
judges indicate that where constituencies lean heavily in one partisan direction, the real election
occurs during the primary, and judges run under the most favorable partisan banner. Both the
processes of selecting judges to fill midterm vacancies in some Alabama counties and one-party
dominated, largely uncontested races might result in judges running under incongruent partisan
labels. Although future research is necessary to explain the variation across states in the
influence of judicial ideology, the results imply a greater congruence between partisan
identification in Indiana and Tennessee than in Alabama. However, while preliminary, the
findings also suggest that a relationship between judges‘ preferences and jury verdicts does exist.
The results also demonstrate a consistent pattern of jury decision-making with regard to
medical malpractice cases. Despite tort reformers‘ concerns that juries sympathize with
plaintiffs in medical malpractice cases, the results show that plaintiffs prevail less often in
medical malpractice cases in Alabama, Indiana, Kentucky and Tennessee. However, when
plaintiffs win medical malpractice cases, juries give more generous compensation, suggesting an
incentive for plaintiffs‘ lawyers to take medical malpractice cases despite the low probability of
success. The large awards successful plaintiffs receive also provide a reason for medical
professionals to continue to push for medical malpractice reform. The results for Alabama,
Indiana, and Kentucky also exhibit a similar pattern for cases involving a death; plaintiffs prevail
less often but receive greater compensation when they do.
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However, the combined models provide evidence that institutional arrangements partially
explain differences across states, supporting Federalists‘ assertions that state variation in civil
justices systems leads to variability in outcomes. The type of fault standard states apply, the use
of damage caps to limit defendants‘ potential liability, and the type of judicial retention
mechanism utilized all significantly influence the probability that juries support plaintiffs,
suggesting that how states shape the rules plays a critical role in the decision-making process.
The combined models also show that the ability of plaintiffs to obtain better representation than
the defense plays a critical role in shaping plaintiffs chances of success before juries as well as
altering plaintiff‘s ability to garner compensation. Yet, despite differences across states and
circuits, the combined models indicate that juries in Alabama, Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky, and
Tennessee respond similarly to medical malpractice cases and give larger awards to more
seriously injured parties.
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Conclusion
This research utilizes a comprehensive database and interviews to develop and test a
theoretical model of civil trial court decision-making and provides important insights into the
continuing debate regarding the merits of the civil jury system with implications for academic
theory, the tort reform debate, and future research. The data utilized in this study provide the
first comprehensive, multi-state database of civil jury verdicts in political science. Collecting
these data allow me to examine the distribution of cases, plaintiff success rates, and awards
within and across states. Drawing on the rich theoretical discussions regarding the virtues of
civil juries, beginning with the ratification debates, I develop and test an empirical model of civil
jury decision-making to ascertain whether or not jury verdicts vary in predictable ways across
circuits and states. My quantitative analyses and qualitative investigations indicate that the
social, political, and economic context of the circuit as well as state institutional features predict
patterns of winners and losers, while case issues and injuries more strongly influence awards.
Overall, the results provide considerable support for the hypothesis that community preferences
shape trial courts‘ dispute resolution and resource allocation functions. Additionally, I find
substantial evidence that civil litigation outcomes vary considerably from one jurisdiction to the
next.
At the time of the ratification, Federalists‘ objected to a constitutional protection of civil
juries, because Federalists believed that civil juries issue inconsistent verdicts and that states
would employ disparate civil justice systems, resulting in a precarious and unpredictable legal
system. Conversely, Anti-Federalists saw civil juries as important institutions of local
government that allow citizens to settle disputes based on community values. Results comparing
jury verdicts in Alabama, Hawaii, Kentucky, Indiana, and Tennessee provide support for
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Federalist apprehensions regarding disparate systems and outcomes and Anti-Federalists
assertions that civil juries constitute an important mechanism of home rule.
If, like the Federalists, one values consistency in the legal system, this study provides
considerable room for concern. Outcomes for participants in civil litigation vary across
jurisdictions both within and across states. Additionally, states utilize different mechanisms for
selecting jurors and judges, determining fault, and limiting damages, providing considerable
evidence of the lack of uniformity that the Federalists feared. The results also demonstrate that
both community preferences and state institutional features significantly affect litigation
outcomes. Although the results for community composition vary across states, quantitative
analyses indicate that the racial composition, economic conditions, population age, educational
attainment, the rural/urban nature of the circuit, and the overall liberalism or conservatism of a
circuit predict the circuit‘s pro-plaintiff tendencies, indicating that civil trial courts, like other
political institutions, respond to local social, political, and economic conditions.
Furthermore, states employ dissimilar institutional arrangements which in turn lead to
variability in outcomes. Plaintiffs prevail at higher rates where states utilize comparative fault
standards and damage caps, while nonpartisan elections appear to decrease plaintiff success
rates, demonstrating that disparate institutional arrangements across states lead to dissimilar
outcomes for litigants. Comparative fault liability standards allow plaintiffs to prevail even in
cases in which the jury determines that the plaintiff contributed to his or her own injury; thereby,
boosting plaintiff success rates over states that apply the contributory negligence standard which
negates the defendant‘s liability when the plaintiff contributed to the alleged injury. Although
damage caps limit the defendant‘s possible financial liability to a statutory maximum, this reform
seems to increase the probability that plaintiffs win, signifying that altering the amount of
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damages a successful plaintiff may receive also alters the liability decision. This result could
suggest that limiting the maximum award a plaintiff may receive lowers the liability threshold.
On the other hand, limiting the plaintiff‘s maximum award presumably shapes pre-trial decisionmaking. Limiting the maximum award might encourage less contentious cases involving less
severe injuries to settle prior to trial. The models provide only preliminary evidence that judicial
selection and retention mechanisms influence outcomes in civil trials, but plaintiffs appear to
garner greater support from juries presided over by judges retained through nonpartisan
elections. The results suggest that judges influence the jury decision-making process and that the
judicial retention mechanisms utilized conditions that relationship. These results support
Federalists‘ assertions that varying institutions across states leads to inconsistent outcomes.
Yet, if one views civil juries through the Anti-Federalist lens as important mechanisms of
local government that facilitate home rule and quintessentially reflect community preferences,
then variability across states and circuits confirms that the civil jury system works correctly.
Additionally, this study provides evidence that civil juries are significant political institutions
that make decisions that appreciably affect individuals, businesses, and government. Civil trial
courts settle disputes involving millions of dollars annually and often evaluate serious physical
and nonphysical injuries. Although Latin (1993) argues that civil juries rarely solve cases
involving important social issues, the typical civil trial involves an individual plaintiff seeking to
hold a business or government entity accountable for an alleged injury. More so than appellate
courts, trial courts routinely settle disputes between haves and have-nots, fulfilling a vital
societal role currently provided by few other outlets. While this research does not resolve the
debate, it provides room for both comfort and unease depending on one‘s normative evaluation
of the civil jury system.
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However, though plaintiff success rates vary across states and circuits with circuit
socioeconomic conditions and institutional variation, the award models demonstrate less
sensitivity to both circuit composition and institutions. When determining compensation, juries
appear most sensitive to the type of case and the type injury. While variation in plaintiff success
rates across states and circuits largely confirms Federalists‘ fears, those seeking consistency can
take comfort from that fact that juries‘ awards consistently respond to injury severity with more
seriously injured parties receiving greater compensation. Unlike plaintiff success rates, jury
awards across states and circuits demonstrate far greater consistency than opponents would
suggest. Taken together the findings suggest that civil jury decisions reflect local community
preferences and vary with institutional arrangements; however, juries‘ awards evidence a
consistently high correlation between injury severity and the amount awarded.
Beyond the debate regarding the merits of civil juries, this study also generates important
insights into judicial politics theory. I rely on prior political science and trial court research to
develop and test a theoretical model of trial-court decision-making. The theoretical model
predicts that communities‘ socioeconomic and political composition, litigant resources and
status, institutions, judicial ideology, and cases facts impact civil jury decision-making both in
terms of dispute resolution and resource allocation. The analyses provide at least some support
for each element of the theoretical model and present a foundation for future investigations of
trial courts as political institutions.
The first component of the theoretical model suggests that the social, political, and
economic makeup of a community shape the verdicts juries render. Most studies of civil jury
decision-making investigate the influence of individual juror traits on jury verdicts and produce
inconsistent results across studies. While individual juror traits might affect the outcome of
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particular trials, my results show that jury verdicts reflect the larger social, political, and
economic conditions in a circuit, regardless of the composition of any particular jury. Unlike
previous research which looks for a direct link between the particular individuals on a jury and
the jury‘s verdict, the findings of this research imply that civil jury verdicts are a product of
broad societal influences.
The second component of the theoretical model asserts that litigant resources and status
affect the probability that the plaintiff wins and the size of the award that success plaintiffs
receive. Although Galanter‘s (1974) original thesis regarding the influence of litigant resources
on litigation outcomes originally referred to trial courts, scholars have largely investigated his
theory in the context of appellate courts. This study represents one of the first to examine the
effect of litigant resources on trial court outcomes. As Galanter predicted, the analyses
demonstrate that the parties‘ legal representation constitutes a key aspect of litigant resources.
The models utilize a new measure of representational advantage that subtracts the number of
plaintiff attorneys from the number of defense attorneys. Theoretically, this variable captures at
least two aspects of resources, the size of the firm the lawyer belongs to and the human capital
invested in each case. The new measure provides a concrete indicator of the relative resources of
each party beyond simply relying on litigant status as previous studies have done. Empirically,
the data show that plaintiffs reap considerable benefits when they possess a representational
advantage. In every state the attorney advantage variable achieves statistical significance in
either the plaintiff success or the award model. The findings show that individuals, Galanter‘s
prototypical one-shotters and the plaintiffs in 88% of trials, may hire quality representation and
win at correspondingly higher rates, at least in certain circumstances. Future research should
further examine the influence of legal representation on outcomes in trial courts. Perhaps, an
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investigation of the effect of firm size on attorneys‘ and litigant‘s success rates could better
capture advocate resources.
The results in Alabama and the combined models also indicate that juries respond to
litigant status. In Alabama and in the combined models, individuals win less often when
challenging the government. The results confirm that studies finding a considerable advantage
for government in appellate courts may be generalized to trial courts. Furthermore, the results in
Alabama show that juries award plaintiffs larger verdicts against business defendants than any
other litigant class, and the combined models demonstrate individual plaintiffs receive lower
awards when challenging another individual than when challenging a business. The analyses
provide support for the ―deep pockets‖ hypothesis; juries appear to award larger damages against
defendants with greater perceived wealth. The results for Indiana, Kentucky, and Tennessee
evidence less sensitivity to litigant status; however, data over a greater time period is necessary
to fully corroborate this finding.
Although judicial politics scholars ascribe a considerable role to judges in determining
outcomes in appellate courts, political scientists and scholars of civil courts have devoted little
attention to the possible effect of trial judges on jury verdicts. This study is also one of the first
to investigate a possible link between civil jury verdicts and judicial ideology. Admittedly,
measuring the influence of trial judges on jury verdicts presents a difficult task for researchers,
since juries deliver the final verdict. Yet, trial judges might influence juries through their
courtroom demeanor, rulings on evidence and procedure, and issuance of jury instructions.
Despite the indirect relationship between judicial ideology and jury verdicts, the analyses
provide at least preliminary support for a connection between jury verdicts and judicial ideology.
While the influence of judicial ideology, as measured by judges‘ partisan identifications, appears
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to impact civil jury verdicts in some states and not in others, this research provides preliminary
evidence that judges‘ rulings and courtroom demeanor can affect juries‘ evaluation of litigants‘
claims. Results for Indiana and Tennessee both confirm that juries‘ awards increase when a
Democratic judge presides over the trial. Additionally, the findings in Tennessee also support a
link between judicial and citizen ideology; juries presided over by Democratic judges issue even
larger awards where the local community votes more liberally in presidential elections. The
findings could indicate an electoral link between judges and citizen preferences. Judges in
liberal communities might seek to vote in a manner consistent with their electorate.
Additionally, the results might also provide support for a direct link between judicial ideology
and public opinion; liberal populations generate more liberal juries and elect more liberal judges.
Conversely, the lack of an influence of judicial ideology on jury verdicts in Alabama
could indicate that trial judges actually influence that settlement process more than the final
verdict, or that measures of judicial ideology, developed for appellate courts, are not sufficient
for capturing the ideological dispositions of trial judges. Furthermore, utilizing judges‘ partisan
identifications as a measure of judicial ideology provides only a blunt distinction between judges
and prevents an examination of judicial ideology in states or circuits that utilize nonpartisan,
retention, or appointment systems. Yet, my results suggest that trial court research that ignores
the influence of judicial ideology, omits a potentially important variable. Future research should
include measures of judicial ideology in models of trial court decision-making. Additionally,
scholars should develop better measures of trial judges‘ ideological dispositions in order to
create more nuanced measures of ideology and properly incorporate judicial ideology into
models of trial court behavior.

157

Furthermore, scholars studying state supreme courts maintain that judicial selection and
retention mechanism substantially affect outcomes on state appellate courts. In particular,
researchers observe that judicial selection and retention mechanism alter judges‘ behavior on the
bench which in turn influences litigation outcomes on states supreme courts. Since scholars of
trial courts focus their attention almost exclusively on jurors without examining the influence of
judges, previous research fails to examine the possibility that jury verdicts vary across judicial
selection and retention mechanism. If trial judges alter their behavior in response to the judicial
retention mechanism utilized in the state or circuit, evidence of judges‘ altered behavior might
emerge in varying patterns of jury decision-making. The combined models for Alabama,
Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky, and Tennessee provide foundational evidence that outcomes in civil
trial courts vary depending on how states retain judges. Juries render more pro-plaintiff verdicts
when judges retained in nonpartisan elections preside over the trial than when presided over by
judges retained in partisan elections. Perhaps, the findings could imply that judges retained
through partisan elections feel greater pressure to support businesses that typically serve as
defendants in most trials and that supply a large source of campaign contributions. Despite the
preliminary nature of these findings, the analyses suggest that future research should examine a
larger number of states and observations to better understand the relationship between judicial
selection and retention mechanisms and outcomes in civil litigation.
The final component of the theoretical model maintains that the type of case and the issue
alleged predict plaintiff success rates and award amounts. The analyses confirm that the type of
case in which litigants participate and the plaintiffs‘ alleged injury predict the winner and the
amount of compensation. Comparing the dockets in Alabama, Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky, and
Tennessee shows that auto negligence and medical malpractice occupy the majority of civil trial
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court‘s workloads. Yet, plaintiffs achieve higher success rates in automobile negligence case
than in medical malpractice, but successful plaintiffs receive greater compensation in medical
malpractice claims. Through the use of jury simulations Hans (2008) observes that the term
―soft tissue injury‖ is often ambiguous to jurors, and jurors perceive whiplash and other soft
tissue injuries as quintessentially phony claims. Like Hans and other researchers, I find that
when compared to soft tissue injuries, plaintiffs alleging more severe and concrete injuries
receive greater compensation (Bornstein 1998; Bovbjerg et al 1989; Chin and Peterson 1985;
Greene and Bornstein 2003). Overall, the results confirm Sak‘s (2002) assertion that models of
civil jury decision-making must control for case facts and alleged injuries.
While this research makes no specific policy recommendations, the analyses provide
important insights into the ongoing tort reform debate. First, although much of the current tort
reform debate revolves largely around medical malpractice suits, my quantitative and qualitative
research strongly indicates that plaintiffs prevail less often in medical malpractice cases. In all
five states plaintiffs win medical malpractice cases relatively rarely compared to other issue
areas. Even in Indiana where a medical review board presumably filters weaker cases prior to
trial, juries consistently find in favor of defendants in medical malpractice cases. While suits in
which the defense wins are certainly not without cost, the medical profession appears to
currently benefit from considerable protections. Yet, when successful, plaintiffs involved in
medical malpractice cases receive the largest awards, but these cases also tend to involve
seriously injured parties. Furthermore, while reformers, like the ATRA, accuse juries of
delivering ―emotion-filled‖ verdicts, the results indicate that the most seriously injuries plaintiffs,
including those seeking compensation for a death, actually prevail less often, suggesting that in
reality, juries evaluate defendant‘s liability for the most serious claims quite critically. Whether
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or not the medical community requires further protections from legal liability remains an issue
for policy makers; however, the results indicate that plaintiffs rarely win these suits and receive
compensation in proportion to the severity of their injuries when they do.
Although tentative, the results also suggest that damage caps, a popular tort reform
utilized to limit defendants‘ potential liability, might actually lead to unintended consequences.
The analyses indicate that plaintiffs actually prevail more often where states cap the total damage
awards successful plaintiffs receive. If limiting the total amount successful plaintiffs receive
actually lowers the threshold for the liability decision, damage caps might limit the award in each
individual case but unintentionally open defendants to greater economic liability overall as
plaintiff success rates increase.
Although I find considerable support for the hypothesis that civil juries function as
political institutions whose verdicts reflect the larger social, economic, and political conditions in
the circuit, several limitations must be acknowledged. First, although the data collected provide
a more comprehensive database than any data source currently available, this study, like others,
suffers from data limitations. Although the states under study provide considerable variation at
the sub-state level and on state institutional variables, this research only examines five states, and
these five states might not adequately represent the entire nation. The analyses in Hawaii,
Indiana, Kentucky, and Tennessee are also limited, because I possess data for only one year,
making conclusions about these courts are tentative. Furthermore, while my findings
demonstrate that jury verdicts reflect the larger demographic and political context of a circuit, an
ideal model of civil jury decision-making would incorporate individual juror characteristics.
Unfortunately, courts keep jurors identities confidential and do not make juror‘s demographic
statistics available, preventing such an analysis. Also, states utilize different mechanisms for
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determining eligible jurors, circuits enforce juror summons with varying stringency, and judges
differentially monitor the extent to which lawyers illegally strike jurors during voir dire, making
any assessment of jury representativeness in comparison to the population at large extremely
difficult. Additionally, although I qualitatively investigated the settlement process in Alabama, I
am unable to explore the settlement process quantitatively based on post-trial data. Given that
lawyers strategically determine which cases to settle prior to trial (Priest and Klein 1984;
Waldfogel 1995), attorneys likely utilize circuit demographics when calculating the settlement
decision. Thus, circuit composition might produce an even greater effect on settled cases.
Furthermore, trial judges directly make numerous decisions that influence trial outcomes during
the pre-trial phase, creating considerable room for judicial ideology to influence the litigation
process. Unfortunately, I am also unable to test the hypothesis that judges‘ ideological
dispositions impact the settlement decision with these data. Despite these limitations, this study
provides considerable insight regarding the factors that influence outcomes in civil litigation and
advances both theory and policy debates regarding civil jury decision-making.
Future Research
In the end, the debate over the merits of the civil jury and the need for tort reform
continues. Unfortunately, much of the deliberation relies on limited empirical evidence. While
this study provides new insight into a number of issues regarding civil jury decision-making,
there is still much we don‘t know. Future investigations of civil jury verdicts could benefit
considerably from a deeper examination of the relationship between judges and jury verdicts.
How do judges communicate their preferences to jurors? A continuous measure of judicial
ideology at the trial court level that allows for greater distinction between judges‘ liberal and
conservative preferences could potentially shed considerable light on this subject. Additionally,
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future research should further explore the connection between judicial retention mechanism and
trial judges‘ behavior. How do trial judges respond to judicial retention mechanism, and how
does their response affect jurors‘ decision-making? Future research should incorporate more
states utilizing nonpartisan, retention, and appointment systems. Furthermore, the overwhelming
influence of legal representation on litigation outcomes indicates a need to more fully explore the
relationship between the quality of legal representation and jury verdicts. Future research should
develop additional measures of representational quality and lawyer‘s resources in order to more
fully understand this relationship.
In terms of the policy implications of civil litigation outcomes, upcoming research must
directly address the tort reform issue with comprehensive data over time. Supporters and
opponents of tort reform make numerous claims about the implications of civil jury verdicts, but
both rely largely on normative evaluations and limited empirical evidence. How have tort
reforms reshaped the civil jury system in states that have enacted them? Furthermore, tort
reformers claim the jurisdictions that consistently award large damages against business
defendants hinder economic growth; yet, little empirical evidence supports or refutes this claim.
Future investigations of civil litigation should explore the link between jury verdicts and local
economic growth. Tort reformers also argue that large damage awards assessed to insurance
companies increase insurance premiums at the detriment of consumers. However, this assertion,
like other claims about civil litigation, rests on limited objective evidence. Hopefully, this study
will contribute to an expanded investigation of civil jury decision-making, so that scholars and
policy makers can base future discussions regarding civil juries on firmer empirical evidence.
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Appendix A, Interview Questionnaires
Judge Questionnaire
Demographic Information
Age____
Race____
Sex____
Practitioner Questions
How long have you served as a circuit court judge for the Nth Circuit?
What did you do prior to becoming a circuit court judge?
Do you have experience outside of the county?
(a) If so, do you find differences between this circuit and the previous circuit?
Judicial Elections
Judges I‘ve talked to in X county tell me that there is more electoral competition in X than in Y
county.
Do you perceive that as true?
If so, how does that affect the electoral process in X?
Do you support judicial elections?
Pre-trial procedure
How do you use mediation?
Post trial procedure
What are the steps leading up to a judgment?
When would you adjust or a jury‘s award?
Are there certain case types or verdicts that are more likely to receive appellate review?
Perception of Litigants
Do you think juries in the county are biased? For plaintiffs or defendants?
Would you support some kind of tort reform?
(a) If so, what kind?
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How well do juries in Mobile represent the population as a whole?
Do you think that economic conditions influence jury verdicts? For example are awards higher in
economically disadvantaged areas?
How much influence do judges have on trial outcomes?
Follow Up
Is there anything that I didn‘t ask about the process of filing and taking a civil case to trial that
you think I should know?
If I have additional questions in the future, would it be possible for me contact you?
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Attorney Questionnaire
Demographic Information
Age____
Race____
Sex____
Occupation Information
Plaintiff Attorney_____
Defense Attorney_____
Practitioner Questions
You currently work as a plaintiff/defense attorney, do you specialize in a particular type of
litigation?
(a) How long?
(b) Have you ever worked as a plaintiff/defense attorney?

(c) If so, what is the biggest difference between the two?
Do you think defense attorneys typically have greater resources than plaintiff attorneys?
How many attorneys work at your office/firm?
Do you think attorneys at large firms have more resources than single practitioners or small
firms?
Describe your typical client.
Judicial Elections
Do you support judicial elections?
Do you think judicial elections influence the litigation process?
If yes, how so?
Perception of Litigants
Do you think juries in the circuit are biased? For plaintiffs or defendants?
Would you support some kind of tort reform?
(a) If so, what kind
How well do juries in the circuit represent the population as a whole?
What type of case do you think you are most likely to win in the circuit?
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What type of case are you least likely to win?
What factors do you consider when deciding to take a case to trial rather than settle?
Do you think that economic conditions influence jury verdicts? For example are awards higher in
economically disadvantaged areas?
How much influence do judges have on trial outcomes?
Are there differences between trying cases in Circuit 1 vs. Circuit 2?
Follow Up
Is there anything that I didn‘t ask about the process of filing and taking a civil case to trial that
you think I should know?
If I have additional questions in the future, would it be possible for me contact you?
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Questionnaire for Court Clerk
Procedural Questions
How long have your served as the court clerk?
Tell me about your typical job duties.
What is the procedure for filing a case?
What percent of cases would you say typically settle before trial?
How long does it typically take for a case to go to trial from the time the case is filed?
How are judges assigned to cases once they have been filed?
What is the procedure for moving a case to a circuit other than circuit where originally filed?
Are certain types of cases more likely to be moved than others?
What is the procedure for filing an appeal?
In automobile cases, the court records indicate that insurance companies ―opt out‖ of litigation.
How does opting out work?
Jury Selection
How are jurors selected?
In county, what are the allowable reasons to get out of jury duty?
How is voir dire conducted in the county?
How does the process of jury selection affect the composition of juries?
Would you say juries in Mobile are representative of the population as a whole?
Is there anything about the process of filing and taking a civil case to trial that you think I should
know?
If I have additional questions in the future, would it be possible for me contact you?
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Appendix B, Variables and Coding

Judge and Attorney Variables
Democrat-Coded 1 if the judge‘s partisan ID is Democrat, and 0 otherwise
Plaintiff Attorney Advantage-The number of plaintiff attorneys minus the number of defendant
attorneys
Institutional Variables
Comparative Fault (comfault)
Coded 1 if the state use comparative fault and zero otherwise.
Judicial Retention Method (retention)
Coded 1 for partisan elections.
Coded 2 for nonpartisan elections.
Coded 3 for retention elections.
Coded 4 for retention by committee.

General Issue
Auto Negligence-Coded 1 for cases involving an auto accident, and 0 otherwise
Uninsured/Under Insured Motorist-Coded 1 for cases involving uninsured/underinsured
motorist, and 0 otherwise
Premises Liability-Coded 1 for cases involving premises liability, and 0 otherwise
Medical Negligence-Coded 1 for cases involving medical negligence and 0 otherwise
General Negligence-Coded 1 for cases involving general negligence, and 0 otherwise
Product’s Liability-Coded 1 for cases involving product‘s liability, and 0 otherwise
Fraud-Coded 1 for cases involving fraud, and 0 otherwise
Breach of Contract-Coded 1 for cases involving a breach of contract and 0 otherwise
Other Issue-Coded 1 for cases involving(Excessive Force, Employment Retaliation,
Outrage/Wantonness, Defamation/Libel, Assault/Battery, Trespassing/Nuisance, Discrimination,
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Civil Rights, Sexual Harassment, Insurance Subrogation, Invasion of Privacy, Wrongful Death,
Conversion), and 0 otherwise
Type of Injury- note, for cases involving more than one injury, the most severe was used
Soft Tissue-Coded 1 for cases involving scratches, bruises, whiplash, et., and 0 otherwise
Emotional/Mental-Coded 1 for emotional and mental injuries, and 0 otherwise
Death-Coded 1 for cases where the plaintiff died as a result of the incident, and 0 otherwise
Broken Bone-Coded 1 for cases in which the plaintiff broke a bone, and 0 otherwise
Surgery-Coded 1 for cases in which the plaintiff underwent surgery as a result of the incident,
and 0 otherwise
Slip and Fall-Coded 1 for cases involving a slip and fall, and 0 otherwise
Monetary Loss-Coded 1 for cases involving a monetary loss, and 0 otherwise
Property Loss/Damage-Coded 1 for cases involving a property loss or damage, and 0 otherwise

Other Injury-Coded 1 for cases involving (Disfiguration, Consortium, Laceration, Loss of Limb, Fetal Injury, D
Demographics
%Percent Black
%White
% Unemployment
% 65 and Over
% College Educated
Percent Democratic Vote-Percent of the popular vote for the Democratic candidate in the 2008
general election, obtained from state elections returns available online through the secretary of
state in each state.
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Index-The summed deviations from the state median for unemployment, percent white, percent
black, percent 65 and over, percent farmers, and percent college educated; scale so that higher
values indicate pro-plaintiff community features
Alabama Circuits
1. Choctaw (Clarke, Washington)
2. Butler (Crenshaw, Lowndes)
3. Barbour (Bullock)
4. Dallas (Bibb, Hale, Perry, Wilcox)
5. Randolph (Chambers, Tallapoosa, Macon)
6. Tuscaloosa
7. Calhoun, Cleburne
8. Morgan
9. DeKalb, Cherokee
10. Jefferson
11. Lauderdale
12. Coffee, Pike
13. Mobile
14. Walker
15. Montgomery
16. Etowah
17. Greene, Sumter, Marengo
18. Shelby
19. Autauga (Chilton, Elmore)
20. Houston (Henry)
21. Escambia
22. Covington
23. Madison
24. Pickens (Lamar, Fayette)
25. Marion, Winston
26. Russell
27. Marshall
28. Baldwin
29. Talladega
30. St. Clair
31. Colbert
32. Cullman
33. Dale, Geneva
34. Franklin
35. Monroe (Conecuh)
36. Lawrence
37. Lee
38. Jackson
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39. Limestone
40. Clay, Coosa
41. Blount

Hawaii Circuits
12.1.
12.2.
12.3.
12.5.

First Circuit—O‘ahu
Second Circuit—Maui, Moloka‘i, Lana‘i, Kaho‘olawe, Molokini
Third Circuit—Hawai‘i, 4th circuit merged into the 3rd circuit
Fifth Circuit—Kaua‘i, Ni‘hou

Indiana Circuits
14.1 Adams
14.2 Allen
14.3 Bartholomew
14.4 Benton (no superior court, circuit only)
14.5 Blackford
14.6 Boone
14.7 Brown (no superior court, circuit only)
14.8 Carroll
14.9 Cass
14.10 Clark
14.11 Clay
14.12 Clinton
14.13 Crawford (no superior court, circuit only)
14.14 Daviess
14.15 Dearborn/Ohio
14.16 Decatur
14.17 Dekalb
14.18 Delaware (no superior court, circuit only)
14.19 Dubois
14.20 Elkhart
14.21 Fayette
14.22 Floyd
14.23 Fountain (no superior court, circuit only)
14.24 Franklin (no superior court, circuit only)
14.25 Fulton
14.26 Gibson
14.27 Grant
14.28 Greene
14.29 Hamilton
14.30 Hancock
14.31 Harrison
14.32 Hendricks
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14.33
14.34
14.35
14.36
14.37
14.38
14.39
14.40
14.41
14.42
14.43
14.44
14.45
14.46
14.47
14.48
14.49
14.50
14.51
14.52
14.53
14.54
14.55
14.56
14.57
14.58
14.59
14.60
14.61
14.62
14.63
14.64
14.65
14.66
14.67
14.68
14.69
14.70
14.71
14.72
14.73
14.74
14.75
14.76
14.77
14.78

Henry
Howard
Huntington
Jackson
Jasper
Jay
Jefferson
Jennings
Johnson
Knox
Kosciusko
LaGrange
Lake
LaPorte
Lawrence
Madison
Marion
Marshall
Martin (no superior court, circuit only)
Miami
Monroe (no superior court, circuit only)
Montgomery
Morgan
Newton
Noble
Ohio/Dearborn
Orange
Owen (no superior court, circuit only)
Parke (no superior court, circuit only)
Perry (no superior court, circuit only)
Pike (no superior court, circuit only)
Porter
Posey
Pulaski
Putnam
Randolph
Ripley
Rush
St. Joseph
Scott
Shelby
Spencer (no superior court, circuit only)
Starke (no superior court, circuit only)
Steuben
Sullivan
Switzerland (no superior court, circuit only)
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14.79
14.80
14.81
14.82
14.83
14.84
14.85
14.86
14.87
14.88
14.89
14.90
14.91
14.92

Tippecanoe
Tipton (no superior court, circuit only)
Union (no superior court, circuit only)
Vanderburgh
Vermillion (no superior court, circuit only)
Vigo
Wabash
Warren (no superior court, circuit only)
Warrick
Washington
Wayne
Wells
White
Whitley

Kentucky Circuits
17.1 Ballard, Carlisle, Fulton, Hickman
17.2 McCracken
17.3 Christian
17.4 Hopkins
17.5 Crittenden, Union, Webster
17.6 Daviess
17.7 Logan, Todd
17.8 Warren
17.9 Hardin
17.10 Hart, Larue, Nelson
17.11 Green, Marion, Taylor, Washington
17.12 Henry, Oldham, Trimble
17.13 Garrard, Jessamine
17.14 Bourbon, Scott, Woodford
17.15 Carroll, Grant, Owen
17.16 Kenton
17.17 Campbell
17.18 Harrison, Nicholas, Pendleton, Robertson
17.19 Bracken, Fleming, Mason
17.20 Greenup, Lewis
17.21 Bath, Menifee, Montgomery, Rowan
17.22 Fayette
17.23 Estill, Lee, Owsley
17.24 Lawrence, Johnson, Martin
17.25 Clark, Madison
17.26 Harlan
17.27 Knox, Laurel
17.28 Lincoln, Pulaski, Rockcastle
17.29 Adair, Casey
17.30 Jefferson
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17.31
17.32
17.33
17.34
17.35
17.36
17.37
17.38
17.39
17.40
17.41
17.42
17.43
17.44
17.45
17.46
17.47
17.48
17.49
17.50
17.51
17.52
17.53
17.54
17.55
17.56
17.57

Floyd
Boyd
Perry
Whitley, McCreary
Pike
Magoffin, Knott
Carter, Elliot, Morgan
Butler, Edmonson, Ohio, Hancock
Breathitt, Wolfe, Powell
Clinton, Cumberland, Monroe
Clay, Jackson, Leslie
Calloway, Marshall
Barren, Metcalfe
Bell
Muhlenberg, McLean
Breckinridge, Grayson, Meade
Letcher
Franklin
Allen, Simpson
Boyle, Mercer
Henderson
Graves
Shelby, Anderson, Spencer
Boone, Gallatin
Bullitt
Caldwell, Livingston, Lyon, Trigg
Russell, Wayne

Tennessee Judicial Districts
42.1 Carter, Johnson, Unicoi, Washington
42.2 Sullivan
42.3 Greene, Hamblen, Hancock, Hawkins
42.4 Cocke, Grainger, Jefferson, Sevier
42.5 Blount
42.6 Knox
42.7 Anderson
42.8 Campbell, Clairborne
42.9 Loudon, Meigs, Morgan, Roane
42.10 Bradley, McMinn, Monroe, Polk
42.11 Hamilton
42.12 Bledsoe, Franklin, Grundy, Marion, Rhea, Sequatchie
42.13 Clay, Cumberland, DeKalb, Overton, Pickett, Putnam, White
42.14 Coffee
42.15 Jackson, Macon, Smith, Trousdale, Wilson
42.16 Cannon, Rutherford
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42.17 Bedford, Lincoln, Marshall, Moore
42.18 Sumner
42.19 Montgomery, Robertson
42.20 Davidson
42.21 Hickman, Lewis, Perry, Williamson
42.22 Giles, Lawrence, Maury, Wayne
42.23 Cheatham, Dickson, Houston, Humphreys, Stewart
42.24 Benton, Carroll, Decatur, Hardin, Henry
42.25 Fayette, Hardeman, Lauderdale, McNairy, Tipton
42.26 Chester, Henderson, Madison
42.27 Obion, Weakley
42.28 Crockett, Gibson, Haywood
42.29 Dyer, Lake
42.30 Shelby
42.31 Van Buren, Warren
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Appendix C, Indiana Institutional Models
Table C.1 Plaintiff Success and Awards Indiana (2009)
Logit Coefficients for Plaintiff
Success (1 if the Plaintiff wins
& O otherwise)

Variables
Circuit Composition
% Black
% Unemployed
% College
% 65 and Over
% Farming
2008 Democratic Vote

Model 1
b
0.02
0.001
0.06
0.24
-0.40
------

Model 2
b
-------------------------0.04**

Model 3
b
-------------------------------

Regression Coefficients for
Logged Awards

Model 1 Model 2
b
b
-0.01
-----0.05
------0.01
------0.20
------0.90
-----------0.01

Model 3
b
-------------------------------

Index
----------0.01
-----------Litigant Resources and
Status
Attorney Advantage
-0.08
-0.08
-0.10
0.35*
0.36*
Individual v. Individual
-0.48
-0.61
-0.43
-0.90
-0.99
Individual v. Government
0.73
0.48
0.67
-0.80
-0.88
Individual v. Other Defendant
-0.01
-0.20
-0.35
-0.42
-0.41
Institutions and Ideology
Nonpartisan Elections
0.86
0.47
1.04
-0.81
-0.84
Merit Elections
-0.16
1.11*
0.25
-0.10
-0.38
Decisions Per Circuit Year
0.02
0.01
0.02
0.002
0.01
* significant at the 0.05 level or higher ** significant at the 0.01 level or higher
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-0.01

0.38*
-0.87
-0.68
-0.38
-0.51
0.28
0.01

Table C.1 Continued
Logit Coefficients for Plaintiff
Success Rate (1 is the Plaintiff
wins & O otherwise)

Variables
Case Issues
Medical Negligence
General Negligence
Premises Liability
Uninsured Motorist
Fraud
Breach of Contract
Product Liability
Other Issue
Alleged Injuries
Property Loss/Damage
Monetary Loss
Emotional Injury
Broken Bone
Death
Accident Resulted in Surgery
Slip and Fall
Other Injury
Constant

Regression Coefficients for
Logged Awards

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

b
-1.97**
-1.30*
-3.46**
-1.53
------1.61
-1.43
-1.40*

b
-1.95**
-1.33*
-3.71**
-1.58
------1.57
-1.33
-1.32*

b
-1.95**
-1.33*
-3.40**
-1.37
------1.66
-1.41
-1.25*

b
1.86**
1.07
0.66
1.10
-----4.64*
4.77**
0.24

b
1.93**
1.00
0.51
1.00
-----4.33*
5.78**
0.31

b
1.92**
1.02
0.75
1.12
-----4.36*
5.66**
0.27

-1.69
-1.75
-1.43
-1.05
-1.99
-1.61
-1.63
-3.05
---------------------2.92** -3.09** -2.74**
0.14
-2.06*
-2.16*
-1.76*
2.18**
-1.53*
-1.58*
-1.38*
2.40**
-0.91
-0.80
-0.76
-0.37
-1.16*
-1.12
-1.02
-0.43
-2.11*
-2.45*
-1.87*
12.48**
N =242 N =242 N =242
N=137
2
2
2
X =85.05** X =87.46**X =82.19**

-1.15
-3.21
-----0.01
2.21**
2.24**
-0.29
0.30
10.14**
N=137

-1.01
-3.07
-----1.90
2.11**
2.41**
2.27**
0.31
8.80**
N=137

R2 =52.7** R2 =51.5**R2=52.7**
F =4.50** F =5.21** F=5.25**

* significant at the 0.05 level or higher ** significant at the 0.01 level or higher
Note: For the purposes of consistency all issue and injury variables are included in each model for all
states, but some states lack sufficient observations in every category, preventing multivariate analyses.
Missing issue and injury variables in the tables denote insufficient observations.
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Appendix D, Letter of Permission
Community Preferences and Trial Court Decision-Making: The Influence of Political, Social, and
Economic Conditions on Litigation Outcomes

Tao L. Dumas
PhD candidate
240 Stubbs Hall
Baton Rouge, LA 70802
tdumas2@lsu.edu

I am conducting dissertation research on the effects the local ecology, the local political, social,
economic, and political conditions, on civil trial outcomes. As part of my research, I will be
conducting interviews in Mobile with circuit clerk, local attorneys and judges, parties to civil
suits, and jurors.
My research seeks to improve our general understanding of the civil trial process and the factors
that predict jury verdicts. I will conduct in-depth, in-person interviews with legal practitioners
and trial participants that have been involved in a civil trial between 2004 and 2009. Interview
questions will cover interviewees‘ experiences with the civil trial(s) they have participated in
and/or their relevant professional experiences. Interviews should last between 30 minutes and 1
hour. Most participants will only be interviewed once; however, I may make additional contacts
for follow-up information. All participants also retain the right to refuse to participate in followup interviews.
All identities will be kept confidential. Additionally, to minimize any risk to interviewees, I will
ask only questions about trials that have already concluded. Anyone contacted for an interview
has the right to refuse to participate.
The Louisiana State University Institutional Review Board has approved this study. For
Questions regarding participant rights, please contact the chair, Dr. Robert C. Matthews, 5788692, or irb@lsu.edu.
Signing this form indicates that you consent to be interview.

Signature_________________________________________Date__________________
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